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WHY A SUPERMARKET USE CLAUSE, AND WHY A SUPERMARKET
EXCLUSIVE CLAUSE?

Taken together, use and exclusive clauses are the heart and soul of
a shopping center supermarket lease. They function like a constitution
for the retail activities that take place in a community-type' or
neighborhood-type' shopping center.
The use clause regulates the supermarket tenant's business in the
demised premises. It imposes limits on the merchandise the supermarket
is allowed to sell, and it prohibits activities the landlord and the
supermarket's cotenants feel are inappropriate.

I. Community-type shopping centers (anchored by at least one department store or category
killer plus one supermarket) serve customers who need the services of both a department store or
category killer and a supermarket, who prefer not to drive too far, and who want to get in and out of
stores quickly. Community-type centers are usually much smaller than regional-type shopping
centers.
2. Neighborhood-type shopping centers are usually anchored by a lone supermarket. They
are smaller than community-type centers and usually consist of a single supermarket anchor and a
group of small stores. Neighborhood shopping centers target a narrower geographical band than
community shopping centers.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss2/2

2

Halper: Supermarket Use and Exclusive Clauses
2001]

SUPERMARKET USE AND EXCLUSIVE CLAUSES

The exclusive clause is the antithesis of the use clause.3 It is the
other side of the coin. While the use clause imposes limits on the
supermarket's activities within its premises, the exclusive clause
imposes limits on the use of the shopping center's other leaseable
premises. Typical supermarket exclusive clauses prohibit significant
competition for the consumer's food dollar within the shopping center.
They also prohibit other activities in the balance of the shopping center
that might, in the opinion of the supermarket tenant, have an adverse
impact on the supermarket's sales volume. Thus, a supermarket tenant
might ask its landlord to agree that the shopping center will not have a
motion picture theater or a so-called adult bookstore. Supermarkets do
not like motion picture theaters as cotenants because they believe that
the theater patrons will occupy too many parking spaces. They do not
like adult bookstores because they are offensive to many supermarket
shoppers.
Experienced supermarket lease negotiators spend a great deal of
time and effort negotiating use and exclusive clauses. Why?
Supermarkets and shopping centers, particularly neighborhood-type
shopping centers and community-type shopping centers, have a
symbiotic relationship with each other, and they need rules to enhance
the relationship. Well-drafted supermarket use and exclusive clauses can
be the foundation for a mutually beneficial and very profitable
relationship between a supermarket and a shopping center landlord. In
contrast, a poorly drafted supermarket use or exclusive clause can be the
foundation for grief, bitter litigation, and severe financial losses.
Supermarkets usually have a positive impact on community-type
and neighborhood-type shopping centers. Most families need to buy
food at least once a week, and most of them do that at supermarkets.
When a supermarket is in a shopping center, consumers visit the
shopping center to buy food; and when they do that, they are within
strolling distance of the shopping center's other stores. The opportunity
to entice consumers within strolling distance makes the shopping
center's other stores desirable to other merchants, and enhances the
landlord's ability to profit from leasing them.
Conversely, shopping centers have a positive effect on supermarket
prosperity. Supermarket customers need products and services offered

3. Exclusive clauses prohibit landlords from permitting excessive competition or obnoxious
activities by other tenants of the shopping center. Among other things, supermarket tenants need
exclusive clauses to avoid direct competition with another supermarket and specialty food stores in
the same shopping center.
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by other merchants, and they prefer shopping where they can satisfy all
or most of their needs.
Use and exclusive clauses should be drafted with deference to the
realistic needs of supermarket operators to cope with an ever-changing
retail climate, as well as the needs of shopping center landlords to lease
the other stores of the shopping center. A stringently drafted use clause
can impose rigid standards on a supermarket operator that would impair
its ability to compete with other supermarkets, and a loosely drafted use
clause can endow a supermarket with enough power to overwhelm the
shopping center's shop space tenants and category killers.' A loosely
drafted exclusive clause might not adequately protect a supermarket
from direct competition within the confines of the shopping center, and a
stringently drafted exclusive clause could exclude so many other tenants
from the shopping center that the landlord would be unable to lease the
shopping center's shop space stores.
A.

Use and Exclusive Clauses as the Foundationfor the Symbiotic
RelationshipBetween Supermarketsand Shopping Centers

Among other things, well-conceived and well-drafted use and
exclusive clauses govern what each store of a shopping center can sell,
and they delineate merchandise category and marketing method
boundaries among a shopping center's tenants. Delineating these
boundaries reasonably and realistically benefits the entire shopping
center community including the supermarket tenant, the landlord, the
category killers, and the shop space tenants. Carefully drafted use and
exclusive clauses help keep a shopping center interesting. They keep a
shopping center interesting by preventing tenants from cloning each
other's product lines and marketing methods.
Use and exclusive clauses also protect a shopping center's tenants
against excessive direct competition from their cotenants. Shopping
centers are compact commercial islands. They are separated from the
rest of the world by the consumer's reluctance to return to his or her
automobile before finishing a shopping expedition. A shopping center's
geographical market is defined by the time potential customers are
willing to spend getting there, and its opportunities to attract customers
at any given time are limited. These opportunities are limited by the

4. Category killers are merchants occupying very large blocks of space, some even larger
than supermarkets. A category killer differs from other large nonfood stores because it concentrates
on only a narrow group of merchandise categories. See infra Part IV.C.3 for discussion of how
supermarkets and category killers relate to each other in the shopping center setting.
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number of people in the geographic market and their shopping habits.
Given these limits, many shopping center tenants need protection from
excessive direct competition from their cotenants. Some shopping center
tenants cannot tolerate any direct competition from cotenants, and others
can tolerate direct competition from cotenants only to a limited extent.
When a shopping center's geographic market is small, direct competition
between two stores in the same shopping center selling the same kind of
merchandise in approximately the same way can impair the ability of
both stores to survive. When a shopping center's geographic market
potential is large, two stores selling the same kind of merchandise in
approximately the same way might thrive--even three similar stores
might thrive. However, there is always a threshold beyond which the
market will be saturated.
B. The Symbiotic Relationship of Shopping Centers and Supermarkets
1. Benefits Inuring to Shopping Center Landlords from
Supermarket Tenancies
The modem supermarket is the place where modem people satisfy
their ancient and primeval need to gather food. When human beings first
walked on the Earth, the task of acquiring food was the foundation of
human society, and the role of food acquisition has never diminished.
Charles Darwin contended that the search for food is so basic to life that

5. See generally CHARLES DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES 157 (Morse Peckham ed.,
1959) (1859). Charles Darwin stated:
The number of humble-bees in any district depends in a great degree on the number
of field-mice, which destroy their combs and nests; and Mr. H. Newman, who has long
attended to the habits of humble-bees, believes that "more than two-thirds of them are
thus destroyed all over England."

Now the number of mice is largely dependent, as every one knows, on the number
of cats; and Mr. Newman says, "Near villages and small towns I have found the nests of
humble-bees more numerous than elsewhere, which I attribute to the number of cats that
destroy the mice."
Hence it is quite credible that the presence of a feline animal in large numbers in a
district might determine, through the intervention first of mice and then of bees, the
frequency of certain flowers in that district!
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it drives the process of natural selection, 6 the process that underlies
evolution itself.
Our daily routines revolve around food. Some people prefer
sleeping late to a proper breakfast, but the primeval need to eat remains
with them. Most people think about breakfast as soon as they awaken.
With or without breakfast, people yearn for the morning's coffee break
long before it is scheduled. Then comes lunch. Do not dare stand in the
path of office or factory workers on their way to lunch. Lunch hour is
followed by the afternoon coffee break. With the work day over, people
want a snack to quell pre-supper hunger pangs. Supper fills you up until
you get the munchies while you watch television. Finally, a perfect day
ends with a bedtime snack.
If a supermarket is located in a shopping center, the need for food
will bring at least one member of most American families to the
shopping center every week. Like the swallows that return to Capistrano,
food shoppers return relentlessly and predictably to their supermarkets
of choice week after week and year after year. Food buying pilgrimages
to shopping center supermarkets bring consumers close enough to be
tempted by such other familiar shopping center tenants as department
6. Darwin continues:
The dependency of one organic being on another, as of a parasite on its prey, lies
generally between beings remote in the scale of nature. This is often the case with those
which may strictly be said to struggle with each other for existence, as in the case of
locusts and grass-feeding quadrupeds.
But the struggle almost invariably will be most severe between the individuals of the
same species, for they frequent the same districts, require the same food, and are exposed
to the same dangers.
A corollary of the highest importance may be deduced from the foregoing remarks,
namely, that the structure of every organic being is related, in the most essential yet often
hidden manner, to that of all other organic beings, with which it comes into competition
for food or residence, or from which it has to escape, or on which it preys.
This is obvious in the structure of the teeth and talons of the tiger; and in that of the
legs and claws of the parasite which clings to the hair on the tiger's body.
But in the beautifully plumed seed of the dandelion, and in the flattened and fringed
legs of the water-beetle, the relation seems at first confined to the elements of air and
water.
Yet the advantage of plumed seeds no doubt stands in the closest relation to the land
being already thickly clothed by other plants; so that the seeds may be widely distributed
and fall on unoccupied ground.
In the water-beetle, the structure of its legs, so well adapted for diving, allows it to
compete with other aquatic insects, to hunt for its own prey, and to escape serving as
prey to other animals.
Id. at 158-60.
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stores, category killers, and shop space stores. They constantly stimulate
customer traffic for the shopping centers in which they conduct business,
and they function as catalysts for their cotenants.
Advertising is another reason why supermarkets are such desirable
tenants for community-type and neighborhood-type shopping centers.
Supermarkets tend to advertise profusely in newspapers. Enticing food
shoppers with bargain prices and discount coupons, newspaper
advertising magnifies the supermarket's power to draw customer traffic.
That gives department store, category killer, and shop space tenants
another reason to favor shopping centers with supermarket cotenants.
When a shopping center supermarket advertisement persuades
consumers to visit the supermarket, it also persuades them to visit the
shopping center. Once at the shopping center, the consumers drawn by
the supermarket advertising are within reach of the supermarket's
cotenants. Alert cotenants find ways to court them.
In turn, the supermarket's ability to attract consumers to the
shopping center, attracts other tenants to the shopping center. This
makes the supermarket an important building block of a shopping
center's ability to attract a diverse, but harmonious, mix of tenants, a
crucial element of shopping center success. A diverse, but harmonious,
grouping of retail and service businesses is the foundation of a shopping
center's ability to attract and keep a loyal customer base and to compete
with other shopping centers.8
Supermarkets are more desirable cotenants for department store and
shop space merchants than other large store (or big box) operations. For
department store and category killer cotenants, supermarket newspaper
advertising supplements the beneficial effects of their own newspaper
advertising budgets. For shop space tenants that do not advertise in
newspapers, being near a supermarket might be as close as the tenant
can get to the benefits of newspaper advertising.
2. Landlord Concerns About Supermarket Tenancies
Despite the benefits they confer on their landlords and cotenants,
supermarkets can also cause difficult problems for them. Supermarkets
are potential competitors for every business conducted in community
and neighborhood shopping centers. They can be fierce competitors

7. Some supermarkets substitute hand-delivered flyers for newspaper advertisements, and
some supermarkets do not advertise in newspapers or flyers.
8. See, e.g., EDWARD C. HAMPE, JR. & MERLE WrrrENBERG, THE LIFELINE OF AMERIcA:
DEVELOPMNT OF THE FOOD INDUSTRY 345 (1964).
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because they typically control large blocks of space, and they have major
league buying power.
3. The Impact of Shopping Centers on Supermarket Prosperity
Supermarket executives do not sign shopping center leases because
they love shopping center landlords or their cotenants. If shopping center
facilities and cotenants did not offer a significant economic benefit to
supermarket chains, they would not be interested in shopping center
locations at all.
If shopping centers provided no advantage to supermarkets,
supermarket tenants would limit themselves to freestanding buildings
with adjacent parking areas. Business operations can be much simpler
for a supermarket that conducts business from a freestanding building
that does not share parking and other common facilities with other
retailers. The store manager of a freestanding store need not cope with
landlord complaints about noise from truck deliveries. Home office
merchandise managers have fewer lease restrictions to cope with when
the company leases a freestanding store.9 The company's real estate and
construction departments usually have greater rights to change a
freestanding store's appearance, make alterations to a freestanding store,
and display signs on a freestanding store.
Despite these complications and many others, most supermarket
executives I know prefer shopping center locations to freestanding
locations. Why? Supermarkets prefer shopping center locations because
they prefer the company of department stores, category killers, and small
specialized shop space stores. My friends in supermarket real estate tell
me that their companies' sales per square foot tend to be higher in
shopping centers.
Supermarkets do better in neighborhood-type shopping centers than
they do in freestanding stores because some of the shop space stores
bring additional traffic within arms' reach of the supermarket premises.
Shop space stores are attractive to supermarket customers. They provide
products and services consumers cannot get in a supermarket, their sales
techniques differ from supermarket sales techniques, and they make a
shopping expedition more interesting. Even stores that do not draw
additional business to the shopping center on their own help a
supermarket draw additional business. Many supermarket shoppers
prefer the convenience of combining a trip to a supermarket with lunch

9. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text (discussing the restrictions on supermarkets
because of use and exclusive clauses).
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or coffee with friends. Others need to repair shoes, get clothing dry
cleaned, buy things from a merchant who will give them much more
personal service than they can get in a supermarket, or buy things
supermarkets do not carry at all. A luncheonette or shoe repair shop
might not be a consumer's principal destination on a shopping excursion
by itself; however, combining a supermarket excursion with lunch or
getting your shoes fixed is more attractive to many consumers than a
supermarket excursion by itself.
Community-type shopping centers usually provide supermarkets
with all the attractive features of neighborhood-type shopping centers
plus at least one very significant added attraction, another anchor tenant.
The other anchor tenant is often a discount or promotional type
department store or other big box merchant that advertises often. The
combined force of supermarket and department store advertising brings
more business to both stores than either could get without the other's
support.
II. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO SUPERMARKET LEASE USE AND
EXCLUSIVE CLAUSE PROPOSALS

This Part is a brief synopsis of popular supermarket use and
exclusive clause restrictions. I will review the restrictions in detail and
discuss the problems they might cause.
A.

SupermarketLease Use Clause Proposals

Without the restraint of a use clause restriction, a supermarket
tenant might decide to discontinue the sale of food altogether and change
the character of its store. As a result of this decision, the landlord might
visit his or her shopping center one day and find an entirely different
kind of store doing business from the store he or she expected would be
a supermarket. This new kind of store might make more money or lose
less money for the tenant, but it is not likely to bring nearly as many
consumers to the shopping center as a supermarket, and it might
compete eyeball to eyeball with one or more of the shopping center's
other tenants.
An artfully drafted use clause can protect the landlord against this
wretched prospect, but a supermarket lease use clause that restricts the
tenant's use excessively is not necessarily in the landlord's best interest.
A use clause that imposes excessive restrictions on a supermarket tenant
can stifle the tenant's business operations. Stifling tenants is a selfdestructive practice for a shopping center landlord because stifled
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tenants tend to become insolvent tenants, and insolvent tenants are not
the world's best rent payers.
A supermarket tenant cannot afford to treat a use clause negotiation
lightly. An overly restrictive use clause can have a materially adverse
impact on a tenant's ability to survive in an extremely competitive
environment. Since it was established around 1930, the modem
supermarket industry has traveled a long and circuitous road, and in the
future, supermarket owners anticipate confronting many more twists and
turns in the future. The supermarket business is complex and
unpredictable. Although the essence of the business has not changed
over the years, supermarket operators have changed the kinds of
products they carry many times, and they have changed the way they
conduct business many times. They have discontinued products and
ways of selling products after concluding they would be better off
without them. Later, they reintroduced the very products they discarded
years before and reverted to sales practices they discontinued years
before. New products and new practices are introduced with great flair
and later discontinued with great relief. With this in mind, a supermarket
tenant must be ready to make changes to meet the demands of the
marketplace. Tenants that cannot meet the demands of the marketplace
lose market share. If a supermarket tenant loses too much market share,
its sales volume and profits will decline also. Consequently, lease
negotiators representing supermarket tenants resist use clauses that
might prevent the tenant from making changes in its business practices
to cope with changes in the marketplace.
Community-type shopping center landlords and neighborhood-type
shopping center landlords cannot afford to treat a use clause negotiation
lightly either. An overly liberal use clause in a supermarket lease or a
supermarket lease without a use clause can have a materially adverse
impact on the shopping center's ability to attract tenants and customers.
With no use clause or only a slightly restrictive use clause to restrain it, a
supermarket could do many things to impair a shopping center's ability
to compete with other shopping centers for the favor of the consumers
and potential retail tenancies. Without a use clause to restrain it, a
supermarket tenant could drastically change the scope of its businessperhaps even discontinue the sale of food altogether. It could compete
directly with a department store or category killer tenant. It could
overwhelm one or more shop space tenants. Most importantly, it could
violate an exclusive clause in a cotenant's lease.
Although eager for the benefits thrust on them by a supermarket
cotenant, department store, other big box tenants, and shop space tenants
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seek to avoid the potential harm to which they might be subjected by
direct competition from a supermarket tenant. The principal way they do
this is by negotiating for exclusive clause restrictions against direct
competition from cotenants. Sophisticated landlords anticipate that other
tenants will demand exclusive clause restrictions in leases to be
negotiated after the supermarket lease is executed, and they try to reflect
future exclusive clause restrictions in the supermarket's use clause. As
you may imagine, they are not always successful.
It is a bad idea for a shopping center landlord to agree to an overly
liberal supermarket use clause or to execute a supermarket lease without
a use clause. However, it is much worse for a shopping center landlord
to agree to an exclusive clause in one tenant's lease that prohibits a type
of use anywhere else in the shopping center and then execute another
lease allowing another tenant to use its premises for the prohibited use.
A landlord who does that can find himself or herself in the
uncomfortable position of defendant in two separate and irreconcilable
lawsuits. When one tenant's use clause permits it to do what the
exclusive clause of another lease forbids, both tenants are potential
plaintiffs for future lawsuits against the landlord. At least one of them
will beat the landlord.
B. SupermarketLease Exclusive Clause Proposals
Although most supermarkets and shopping center tenants are
willing to curtail their own business activities to a degree by agreeing to
use clause restrictions, they demand something in return. They want the
landlord to curtail other tenants' operations too, and they do this in
exclusive clauses.
Supermarket executives have rigid views about the question
whether a community-type or neighborhood-type shopping center should
have more than one supermarket. They usually insist on barring a second
supermarket from the shopping center, and they do so for valid reasons.
Most community-type and neighborhood-type shopping centers are too
small to support two supermarkets. This kind of cohabitation seldom
works in a small shopping center. Leasing to more than one supermarket
in the same shopping center can distort the delicate balance of the
center's tenant mix. Shopping centers tend to prosper by leasing space to
many different kinds of tenants, and duplicating such an important type
of tenancy works against that principle. You are bound to find a few
shopping centers with twin supermarkets here and there, but you will not
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find many. Supermarket executives usually cringe at the thought of a
community-type shopping center with more than one supermarket.
C. Types of Use and Exclusive Clause Restrictions
1. Restrictions to and Against Supermarket Use
From the earliest days of the modem shopping center era,
community-type and neighborhood-type shopping center landlords have
had to walk on their tiptoes to reconcile the needs of their supermarket,
department store, and shop space (small store) tenants. Supermarket
tenants demand assurance against direct competition from department
stores and shop space stores. Department store tenants and other big box
tenants demand assurances from the landlord that the supermarket will
not invade their turf. Shop space tenants demand assurances from the
landlord that the supermarket will not overwhelm them by mimicking
their principal product lines and marketing formats.
Landlords try to appease department store tenants, other big box
tenants, and shop space tenants by limiting the use of the supermarket
premises. In their effort to please everybody, landlords have been quite
content to allow supermarket use restrictions to be vague. One of the
most popular deliberately vague use clauses proposed by landlord
negotiators limits the use of the supermarket premises to the conduct of
a supermarket business or a supermarket. Some landlords have taken a
little tougher line and have proposed limiting the use of the supermarket
premises to afood supermarket as opposed to a supermarket.
Similarly, shopping center landlords seek to appease supermarket
tenants with deliberately vague exclusive clauses restricting the extent to
which the department store, category killers, and shop space stores can
mimic supermarket operations. They look like deliberately vague use
clauses turned upside down. For example, the exclusive clause might
state the following: No part of the shopping center, other than the
demised premises (the supermarket premises), may be used for the
conduct of a supermarket business or as a supermarket. A slightly
milder restriction would prohibit the use of any part of the shopping
center other than the supermarket premises as a food supermarketrather
than as a supermarket.
I do not see much difference between restricting a tenant's use to a
food supermarket and restricting a tenant's use to a supermarket.
Similarly, I see little difference between an exclusive clause restriction
against a food supermarket and an exclusive clause against a
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supermarket. Consequently, I will treat restrictions against food
supermarkets as if they are restrictions against supermarkets.
2. Use for Any Legal Purpose
The ideal use clause for a supermarket tenant restricts the tenant's
use of the demised premises merely for any legalpurpose. Omitting the
use clause entirely amounts to the same thing and works just as well for
the tenant. With no use clause to restrict its activities, a tenant's use is
limited only by restraints established by law.
The ideal use clause from a supermarket tenant's point of view can
be destructive for a shopping center landlord. With the right to use the
demised premises for any legal purposes or no use clause at all, the
tenant would have the power to shift the use of its space from a
supermarket purpose to any other legal purpose. The landlord would be
powerless to stop the supermarket tenant from direct competition with
its cotenants. For example, without the restraint of a use restriction, a
supermarket tenant could convert all of its premises to a furniture store,
department store, catalog store, or an office supply store. By the same
token, without the restraint of a use restriction, a supermarket could
convert part of its premises to a flower shop, shoe store, restaurant, or
clothing store. If a supermarket tenant decides to shift the use of all or
part of its premises in any of these ways, one or more cotenants would
be forced to confront a new and unexpected competitor with enormous
financial and marketing power. The cotenants might not survive the
challenge.
3. Restrictions Against the Sale of Specific Products
Some supermarket use clauses are far more complex than
limitations on the tenant's use to a supermarket, to a food supermarket,
or for any legal purpose. These use clauses prohibit the sale of specific
nonfood products on the supermarket premises. Similarly some
supermarket exclusive clauses are far more complex than restrictions
against another supermarket in the shopping center. These exclusive
clauses prohibit the sale of food for off-premises consumption in any
part of the shopping center other than the supermarket.
Let's look at use clauses that prohibit the sale of specific nonfood
products in the supermarket premises. Some of them are vestiges of old
turf wars between discount department stores and supermarkets. Others
stem from the needs of some service-type tenants to have the exclusive
rights to perform their services in the shopping center, and still others
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stem from exclusive clauses in other tenants' leases that prohibit
obnoxious products and activities from the shopping center.
Turf disputes between department stores and supermarkets date
back to the early post-World War H period when the discount
department store emerged as a significant retailing force. In their early
days, some discount department stores incorporated in-store food
departments within their premises. Some of these departments were
operated by the department store owners themselves, and others were
operated by outsiders pursuant to license agreements.
Regardless whether their in-store food departments were companyowned or licensed to outsiders, discount department store executives
were concerned about the allocation of shelf space between products
sold in the food department and products sold in the general
merchandise departments. Like supermarket leases, department store
food department license agreements included use clauses and exclusive
clauses. The use clauses contained detailed restrictions against sales of
general merchandise items by the in-house food departments. The
exclusive clauses contained detailed restrictions against the sale of food
by the general merchandise departments."°
In the 1960s, many discount department stores that had
experimented with freestanding stores and in-house food departments
changed their ways. Disenchanted with the experiment, they closed
down their in-house food departments and migrated to shopping centers
with supermarket cotenants operating in separate buildings. This move
inevitably led the discount department stores to demand restrictions
limiting the sale of general merchandise items in supermarkets. These
restrictions went as far as specifying the maximum amount of
supermarket shelf space allocated to such general merchandise items as
toys. Conversely, the supermarkets demanded restrictions limiting the
sale of food for off-premises consumption in the department store.
Other specific landlord proposals for restrictions on supermarket
products or activities were designed to protect fragile shop space tenants
and avoid conflicts with exclusive clauses in cotenant leases. Examples
are restrictions against using part of the supermarket for a coin-operated
laundry or a dry-cleaning establishment; restrictions against use as a
bank, skating rink, or motion picture theater; and restrictions against the
sale of alcoholic beverages or firearms.

10. See infra Part V for more details on the relationship between discount department store
operators and early food supermarket department licensees.
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Despite the uncertainty caused by an exclusive clause prohibiting
the use of any other store as a supermarket, a community-type or
neighborhood-type shopping center landlord is lucky to emerge from a
supermarket lease negotiation with nothing worse. Some supermarket
tenants with massive bargaining power aim much higher. They propose
a challenging exclusive clause that has the potential to cause a landlord
far more heartburn than a restriction against the presence of another
supermarket." This clause bans the sale of food and beverages for offpremises consumption from any other premises in the shopping center.
A restrictive covenant against the sale of food or beverages for offpremises consumption is very nice for the supermarket tenant, but it is a
bitter pill for the landlord and the other tenants to swallow. It reaches far
beyond the notion that a community or neighborhood shopping center
should not contain more than one supermarket. It purports to regulate
food and beverage sales of every other kind of tenant and has great
potential for mischief. It can cripple a landlord's effort to organize a
vital and prosperous shopping center. It can also make it impossible for
many other kinds of stores in the shopping center to function properly. A
landlord who agrees to such a restriction without extensive qualification
might cause himself, or herself, considerable and unnecessary problems.
III.

USE CLAUSE RESTRICTIONS TO SUPERMARKET
USE AND EXCLUSIVE CLAUSE RESTRICTIONS
AGAINST SUPERMARKET USE

Getting a lease signed is the principal benefit of compromising a
use or exclusive clause negotiation. Getting a lease signed is not a minor
achievement. The execution of a supermarket lease usually adds millions
of dollars to the fair market value of a community-type or neighborhoodtype shopping center. It also usually results in substantially increased
profits for a supermarket chain.
Is this benefit worth the potential problems that might arise when
the parties compromise by adopting the word supermarket as the
standard for the restrictions? I think it is, but this compromise has a
serious drawback. Supermarket and shopping center people are not
necessarily on the same page when they talk about a supermarket. Like
so many other political and business compromises, each camp believes
what it wants to believe.
Some day, the parties might quarrel about what the use clause
permits the supermarket to sell or what the exclusive clause prohibits
11. See infra Part V.A.
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other tenants from selling. With nothing more than the word
supermarket to serve as their guide, the language of the lease might be
too vague to resolve the quarrel. Vague standards lead to controversies
that can be settled only with lawsuits. Without clear instruction from the
lease itself, the landlord, the tenant, or both parties might have no
alternative but to ask a court for its interpretation.
If the parties quarrel with each other about what supermarket
means, they are likely to scurry around looking for a definition that has
been generally accepted by industry-wide consensus, industry observers,
or the general public. Finding an appropriate definition will not be easy.
Although all supermarkets have some elements in common, they are
now and have always been very different from each other. Supermarket
industry organizations have defined supermarket, but never in a way that
makes complete sense to me. Industry observers have defined
supermarket, but their definitions differ widely." However, I cannot
swear that my definition or anybody else's definition has been adopted
or will be adopted by industry consensus. Despite their dependence on
supermarkets for the food they put on their tables and the products with
which they clean and maintain their households, for most people,
supermarkets are meant for shopping and not for explanations. The
general public does not care enough about supermarkets to even think
about what they are or how they differ from other stores.
Potential controversies arising from a use clause restricting the use
of a store to a supermarket or an exclusive clause prohibiting a store
from being used as a supermarket can be avoided. They can be avoided
by defining supermarket in the lease. To avoid the expense and
aggravation inherent in the litigation process, lease negotiators can
provide an agreed interpretation of supermarketthemselves.
Unfortunately, the word supermarket is not easy to define. Is it a
store that principally sells food and beverages? Is it a store that
primarily sells food and beverages? Is it a large food store? Since the
word supermarket entered our vocabulary in the 1930s, many kinds of
food stores have called themselves supermarkets. They were different
from each other in almost as many ways as they were similar to each
other, and they still are different from each other in almost as many ways
as they are similar. Although all supermarkets are large, some are
considerably larger than others. A large proportion of the floor area of
every supermarket is allocated to the sale of food and household
products, but some supermarkets allocate a much greater proportion of
12. See infra Part l.C.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss2/2

16

Halper: Supermarket Use and Exclusive Clauses
20011

SUPERMARKET USE AND EXCLUSIVE CLAUSES

their sales floors to food and household products than others. Nonfood
products are sold in every supermarket, but the percentage of a
supermarket's floor area allocated to nonfood products varies
considerably.
The supermarket industry was founded by mavericks who refused
to conform to the practices of the conventional food markets of the
1920s and 1930s. 3 Most of the industry's founders were too
individualistic to rigidly conform to anybody else's business model-not
even the business models of other industry founders.'4 Early
supermarkets came in all sizes and shapes.' 5 Their pricing strategies
differed from
each other considerably.' 6 Their product mix was
7
dissimilar.'
To draft a sensible definition of any retail business, a lease
negotiator needs to know a great deal about the business. Unfortunately,
few shopping center landlords and supermarket tenants spend any time
thinking about what a supermarket is or is not, and fewer shopping
center landlords and supermarket tenants worry about defining the word
supermarket precisely. Why? It is a challenging and time-consuming
task. When defiming a supermarket is on the table, the negotiators need
to know what goes on in supermarkets and how to distinguish
supermarkets from other kinds of retail stores. Despite the time and
trouble it is bound to take to negotiate a mutually acceptable defimition,
shopping center supermarket lease negotiators should accept this
challenge. It will help their clients in the long run.
The best path to a meaningful defimition of supermarket is to review
how the supermarket industry's founders and other supermarket pioneers
did business; the economic conditions to which the birth and growth of
the supermarket industry responded, and how latter day supermarket
entrepreneurs improved on the founders' business models.
In its first phase, the supermarket system was a new and
revolutionary system of food distribution based on a business model
devised by the proprietors of two revolutionary stores that opened in the

13. See infra Part II.A.
14. See M.M. ZMERMAN, THE SUPER MARKET: A REVOLUTON IN DISTRmmUTION 31-68
(1955) (discussing the beginning of the supermarket industry and the differences in each founder's
ideas).
15. See &L(noting that supermarkets opened in various states and ranged in size from 10,000
square feet to 50,000 square feet).
16. Seeid
17. See kL
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early 1930s." The new system was a radical departure from the latenineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century food market models of
tiny service grocery stores, service fruit and vegetable stores (also
known as green grocers), and service butcher shops.' 9 The business
model followed by service grocery stores, service fruit and vegetable
stores, and service butcher shops was based on customer service, credit,
home delivery, and prepackaged, brand-name products.2 The business
model formulated by the supermarket industry's founding fathers was
based on self-service. They perceived credit as an abomination, and
they discontinued home delivery services.2 In short, the new
supermarket system of food distribution is the antithesis of the service
food market system it displaced. 3
A.

Origin and Development of the American SupermarketIndustry

1. Birth and Early Growth of the Modem Supermarket
The modem supermarket, the place where most Americans do their
food shopping in the affluence of the twenty-first century, was born in
the misery of 1930.2 It was the first full year of the Great Depression, a
calamitous period in which our national unemployment rate was as high
as 20%.2' Given the vast concentration of wealth in the United States, the
world's great economic thinkers were bewildered by the Great
Depression. Shouldn't a nation so rich in human and natural resources be
able to cope with an economic downturn no matter how severe? The
1929 stock market crash had ended a decade of splendor and a hitherto
unimaginable capacity to generate wealth. 6 Only a year after the stock
market crash, America's businesses were failing, and its banking system
was near collapse.2
American farmers were having a hard time in 1930.2 The United
States was awash in a sea of cheap commodities looking for buyers in an
18. See HUGH S. PEAK
MANAGEMENT 13 (1977).
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

& ELLEN F. PEAK, SUPERMARKET MERCHANDISING AND

See id. at 14 fig.2.1.
See id. at 15.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 13.
See id.
See JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929, at 184 (3d ed. 1972).
See id.; RANDOLPH McAUSLAND, SUPERMARKETS: 50 YEARS OF PROGRESS 23 (1980).
See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 1.
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anemic market.29 Farm product sales declined, and crops rotted in the
field.30 Cattle and pigs were killed prematurely to save the cost of
feeding them.' Why should a farmer waste time harvesting vegetables if
the prospect of selling them was so chancy?
American food processing companies and food wholesalers were
having a hard time in 1930.32 Their warehouses were too full, and their
cash registers were too empty.33
American consumers were having a hard time in 1930. Consumer
income plummeted. 4 Most consumers had very little disposable income,
and too many consumers had no income at all.35 In February, 2000
people were queuing up on bread lines in New York City, and the city of
Milwaukee established a soup kitchen. 36 The Federal Council of
Churches proclaimed April 27 as "Unemployment Sunday."37 By
November, 6000 unemployed New Yorkers were buying apples on
credit and reselling them on the sidewalks for five cents. 8 Malnutrition
and mental illness were on the rise. 39 Although food prices declined by
17% that year,4° many people were hungry when they went to bed at
night. Hunger marches massed in Washington to petition President
Hoover for guaranteed employment at a minimum wage." The trend was
downhill. Economic conditions were deteriorating. The average U.S.
weekly wage fell to seventeen dollars between 1929 and 1932-a
decrease of more than one-third. 42 By 1932, 28% of American
households (including my own) had no employed family member. 3

29. See id.
30. See id.
31. Seeid.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See Don D. Lescohier, And the "Lucky" Who Kept Their Jobs, in 3 HISTORY OF LABOR IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1896-1932, at 92 (John R. Commons ed., 1935), reprinted in THE GREAT
DEPRESSION 7, 7-10 (David A. Shannon ed., 1960).
35. See McAosLAND, supra note 27, at 7 (discussing how individuals either had their pay cut
or were laid off without unemployment insurance).
36. See DIXON WEcrER, THE AGE OF THE GREAT DEPRESSION 1929-1941, at 16 (1948).
37. See id.
38. See id. at 19.
39. See id. at 39.
40. See SAFEwAY STORES, INC., 1975 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (1975) [hereinafter SAFEWAY
ANNUAL REPORT].
41. See Ryan Mathews, 1926-1936: Entrepreneurs and Enterprise: A Look at Industry
Pioneers Like King Kullen and J. Frank Grimes, and the Institution They Created, PROGRESSIVE
GROCER, Dec. 1996, at 39, 39.
42. See id.
43. See id.
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Retail food merchants were having a hard time in 19 3 0 .44 Even in
dismal circumstances, most people have some money, and people who
have some money will spend it on food before they spend it on anything
else. However, people who do not have much money cannot pay
much-not even for food. They pinch their pennies. The predominant
food markets of that era, service grocery stores, struggled in vain to
adapt to the circumstances and find a way to make food affordable. '5
They could not reduce their prices enough to match the decline in their
customers' earnings. 46 They could not accomplish that task because their
margins were too high, their operating expenses were too high, and their
sales volume was too low.47 Service grocery margins were increasing in
1930 despite declining consumer demand and mounting inventories.4
These increases were on top of a long series of prior increases. Grocery
store margins had been increasing for many years through good times
and bad. Margins increased between 1919 and 1929, from 16.92% to
20.65%, but many of these increases could be rationalized.49 That
eleven-year period included years of war and exuberant economic times.
With a depression on, food market gross margins should have dropped
in 1930, but they did not. ° Service grocery margins rose to 20.94% that
year' despite declining consumer demand and mounting inventories.
Service grocery margins rose because service grocery operating
expenses were high.52 Payroll expenses were huge when you consider the
size of their stores (very small).53 They needed to employ a crew of retail
clerks to wait on customers, and they needed a delivery staff to deliver
orders directly to customers' homes. 4 Unlike modem day supermarket
customers, service grocery customers did not wander through the store
past endless shelves stacked with food and other merchandise and select
what they wanted themselves.5 Customers did not retrieve the things

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 1.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 14.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See JAMES M. MAYO, THE AMERICAN GROCERY STORE: THE BusINEss EVOLUTION OF
AN ARCHITECTURAL SPACE 89 (1993).
54. See WILLIAM GREER ET AL., AMERICA THE BOUNTIFUL: How THE SUPERMARKET CAME
TO MAIN STREET 12 (1986) (citing the remarks of supermarket industry leader Jack Logan).
55.

See CHESTER H. LIEBS, MAIN STREET TO MIRACLE MILE: AMERICAN ROADSIDE

ARCHITECTURE 117 (1985).
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they wanted and place them in a shopping cart. 6 Retail clerks did all or
most of that for them. Retail clerks took customer orders, they gathered
the merchandise, they bagged the merchandise, and they tallied the
purchase price-often by hand."' Service grocery store customers did not
drive their food bundles home." Some customers bought only what they
could carry and walked home with paper bags full of food in their arms.6°
Other customers demanded that the service grocer provide home
delivery service.1 Service grocery store customers did not always pay
with currency or a bank-sponsored credit card.62 A very large percentage
of them departed from the store with food and household products
without parting with a dime. 63 Service grocery storekeepers extended
credit64 to their customers without the assistance of credit card
companies, they kept track of their customers' debts, and they hoped to
collect them periodically. Numerous customers did not pay at all, and
credit losses were a significant part of grocery store operating expenses
in the 1930s as they had been for centuries. 6
Many independent service grocers went out of business in 1930,
and others held on by the skin of their teeth. 6 Service grocery chain
stores did not have it easy either. Their sales declined considerably as a
result of the severe economic downturn. 67 To make things worse for
service grocery chain stores, politicians were frustrated by their inability
to cope with the economic crisis and looked for scapegoats.4 They
pointed their fingers at service grocery chain store organizations and
other chain store organizations. 69
Here was a paradox. From the farmer's point of view, food prices
had dropped precipitously] 0 From the consumer's point of view, food
was so expensive that some people could avoid hunger only by eating
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See iL
See RICHARD

LONGSTRETH,

THE

DRIVE-IN,

TRANSFORMATION OF COMMERCIAL SPACE IN LOS ANGELES,

THE SUPERMARKET,
1914-1941, at 87 (1999).

AND

THE

61. See LEEBS, supranote 55, at 118.
62. See PEAK & PEA, supranote 18, at 10.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 50.
66. See id. at 9.
67. See id. at 10 fig.1.3.
68. See MCAUsLAND, supra note 27, at 15.
69. See id. (noting that laws were passed to ensure that supermarkets carried out their
businesses fairly).
70. See GREER ErAL, supranote 54, at 29.
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dog food." Their inability to reduce their prices enough would destroy
many grocers, but it would also create opportunities for others. 2
America needed merchants who could cope with Depression-based
misery by creating a more efficient food distribution system that could
lower prices, feed people with reduced incomes, and still turn a profit.73
It was only a matter of time before a visionary entrepreneur appeared on
the scene.
In the midst of a nationwide economic crisis, a group of
businessmen with improbable credentials conceived of a new and
revolutionary7 5 type of food store.74 In time, it would be called the
supermarket.
a. Michael Cullen, the Founding Father
Michael Cullen was an unlikely candidate to propose a workable
solution to this monumental and bewilderingly complex problem.
Although he had accumulated lots of experience and knowledge in food
distribution by 1930, the food industry had granted him no recognition
and few rewards.76 When he was eighteen years old in 1902, Michael
began his food retailing career as a retail clerk for the Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Company (the company we know today as A&P). 7 He
departed seventeen years later after working his way up the A&P ladder
to become a divisional superintendent. When he left A&P, he joined
79
the Mutual Grocery Company and became its general sales manager.
After that, he worked for the Bracey-Swift stores in Illinois and
Missouri. 0
By 1930, Cullen was no longer a young man, and he certainly was
not a rich man.8' Despite twenty-eight years of hard work for food
companies, he managed to get no farther from his native New Jersey
than Herrin, Illinois where he was employed as an assistant branch

71. Seeid. at27.
72. See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 7.
73. See id.
74. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 16.
75. See id. at 17.
76. See MCAUSLAND, supra note 27, at 5.
77. See id. at 14.
78. See id.
79. See EDWIN P. HOYT, THAT WONDERFUL A&P! 155 (1969).
80. See Lloyd Singer, Michael J. Cullen: An American Innovator 1 (May 6, 1990)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Author).
81. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 31.
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manager by the Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.2 Although he had little
material prosperity to show for his years of service, he was confident
that he had the right stuff. Subsequent developments proved that he did.
As he discharged the daily chores of a grocery store assistant
manager, Cullen was thinking about the nation's economic crisis, how
the food industry business was floundering, and how the industry might
save itself by adapting to the new reality. 3 He mused about the
momentous changes in the food business during his twenty-eight-year
career." In his lifetime, he saw incredible changes in the way people
lived. Strange and new in 1902, automobiles had become an established
and accepted transportation mode by 1930." The advent of electric
refrigerators as routine kitchen appliances, at best a dream in 1902, was
very real by 1930.86 He was a food industry employee when brandnamed food packed in cans and bottles supplanted generic food scooped
from barrels and boxes." He was a food industry employee when the
service grocery store supplanted the general store as America's principal
food retail outlet." His life had intersected with grocers who lost
everything and grocers who amassed princely fortunes.
He mused about innovative techniques and more efficient facilities
that had been devised by iconoclastic merchants who were determined to
make food retailing more efficient with only partial success. Some of
them experimented with much larger storerooms, and others formulated
new techniques like cash and carry and self-service.Y Larger storerooms
had taken root here and there, but they achieved only a lukewarm
reception by the food industry. 0 A&P adopted cash and carry in 1912
and hitched its star to that system, but most neighborhood grocers
ignored it.9 After its introduction in 1916, self-service was adopted
92
enthusiastically but only by a small minority of America's grocers.
Could Michael Culen contrive a better way to sell food and lead
the food industry out of its morass? It was a worthy goal. However,
82. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 140; ZVIMERMAN, supranote 14, at 31.
83. See ZIMIERIAN, supranote 14, at 31.
84. See MCAUSLAND, supranote 27, at 5.
85. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 93-94.
86. See McAUSLAND, supranote 27, at 13.
87. See generally John Mugar, Preface to GREER ET AL., supra note 54.
88. See McAuSLAND, supranote 27, at 5.
89. See id. I discuss cash and carry and self-service in greater detail below. See infra Parts
III.B.4 and III.B.5.
90. See ZIMERMAN, supra note 14, at 44 (noting that legislation was introduced to forbid
selling food at or below cost).
91. See PEAK&PEAK, supranote 18, at7.
92. See id. at 13.
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given the food industry's resistance to any kind of change, it was also a
difficult goal to achieve. Nevertheless, Cullen formulated a plan he
fervently believed would be a practical solution to the food retailer's
problems. 93 The plan's centerpiece was a new kind of food store he
called a warehouse grocery.94 In his view, the warehouse grocery would
drastically reduce grocery store operating costs and prices, and it would
dramatically increase grocery store sales volume. 9
Here's how:
The new stores would be large-very large. 96 Larger stores would
save money in many ways. The share of each consumer dollar allocated
to labor cost tends to be lower in a large store than in a small store. 9
Cullen postulated that clusters of large stores would generate much
higher sales volumes than a vast number of small stores. 9 The sheer
mass of a large store's inventory would attract many more customers. 99
The higher sales volumes would make large quantity discount
purchasing possible.'0 Larger stores would also reduce warehousing
expenses.' 1 A larger grocery store can assume many functions of a
grocery warehouse, and it can do that advantageously.' 2 A small grocery
store cannot keep much in the store and depends on its wholesalers'
warehouses for restocking.' 3 Merchandise kept in a warehouse sits there
unprofitably until it is sold at wholesale prices to a retail store.' °4 A
larger food market can keep more merchandise in the store where it is
visible to consumers and available for immediate sale.03 The cost of
building one larger store per square foot is typically lower than the cost
of building a batch of smaller stores with the same aggregate floor
area."'° Consequently, a grocer with a larger store tends to pay less rent
per square foot than a grocer with a comparable smaller store.' Larger
stores also make it possible for a food merchant to carry a broader range

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

See McAUSLAND, supra note 27, at 5.
See id.
See id.; see also MAYO, supra note 53, at 140.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 140; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 32.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 140.
See id.
See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 35.
See id.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 140.
See id.
See id.
See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 1.
See MAYO, supra note 53, at 140.
See id.
See id.
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of product categories, and Cullen figured he could use the extra space to
the store's advantage. 3
Occupancy expenses would be cut drastically.' 9 Rent could be
minimized by leasing space in less expensive areas that were
nevertheless accessible by automobile."0 Frills would be eliminated.
Never mind if the stores looked like "industrial age barns.' Skip the
carpets and tile floor coverings, and save money." 2 People will walk on
concrete to save on groceries. Who needs beautiful counters and fixtures
anyway? Unpainted pine counters will do the job just as well, and they
cost much less."' Why bother stacking cans and cartons neatly on
cheaper
attractive but expensive shelving? Empty boxes were certainly
4
than conventional fixtures and could do the job well enough."
Operating expenses would be further reduced in other ways. Selfservice would reduce the payroll."' With a cash and carry policy, the
stores would not extend credit, and home delivery service would be
eliminated." 6 Cash and carry would further reduce the payroll, and it
would eliminate credit losses."
The cost of food would also be trimmed. Cullen would buy in very
large quantities, and he would pay cash."'
He figured that the size of the store, the self-service and cash and
carry techniques, the massive buying power, and the cheap rent would
produce big cost savings." 9 With big cost savings, the new store could
cut its prices in a big way.' 2 He expected to persuade consumers to
believe that shopping in his new stores would save between one and
three dollars per shopping expedition. 2' That was serious money when

108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Seeid. atl41.
111.LONGSTRETH, supranote 60, at 121.
112. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 141.
113. See ZmIIERMAN, supranote 14, at 1.
114. See HOYT, supranote 79, at 132.
115. See LONGSTRT , supra note 60, at 121.
116. See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 7.
117. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 141.
118. See Charles F. Phillips, The Supermarket, 16 HARV. BUS. REV. 188, 193 (1938).
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 34. "'I would convince the public that I would be able
to save them from one to three dollars on their food bills. I would be the 'miracle man' of the
grocery business. The public would not, and could not believe their eyes."' lId (quoting letter from
Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.).
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wages were going downhill and one in five Americans was
unemployed.'
The stores would carry a widely diverse range of merchandise-so
widely diverse that he called it one-stop shopping.' 3 Although the stores
he ultimately operated would miss their one-stop shopping goal by far,
they were to carry a much more diverse range of product categories than
the typical service-oriented food markets of that era.' As the store's
proprietor, he would sell national brand groceries for its own account9
Meat, produce, dairy, delicatessen, and household products would be
carried also.'2 However, these products would be sold by licensees who
would sublet space in the stores from him.' 7
Cullen's basic premise was that these policies would engender an
enthusiastic public reception, but even more was needed to achieve the
unusually high sales volume to which he aspired. In Despite their low
rent district locations, he projected that the stores would draw plenty of
customers because free parking would be available. 9 That made sense.
Although people did not have much money then, many of them owned
automobiles.'30 Free parking would extend each store's geographic
market."' With free parking available, people would be glad to drive a
few miles to get a food shopping bargain. 3 2 Always thrift conscious,
Cullen did not expect to provide or pay for an adjacent parking lot. 33 He
figured that locating the stores away from business districts would put
customers in a position to find free curbside parking spaces on their
own.' 34 Sales volume would be maximized by keeping the stores open at
night. 3 Sales would also be stimulated by aggressive advertising
campaigns.136 His advertisements would concentrate on a low-price

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See McAUSLAND, supra note 27, at 6.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 141.
See McAUSLAND, supranote 27, at 5.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 34.
See FRANK J. CHARVAT, PH.D., SUPERMARKETING 37 (1961).

131.

See LONGSTRETH, supra note 60, at 122.

132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See Phillips, supra note 118, at 198. Service grocery stores tended not to do business at
night in that era. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 58 (noting that most stores of that era closed at
6:30 p.m. while Dawson's Trading Post closed at 9:00 p.m.).
136. See McAUSLAND, supra note 27, at 14.
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policy and how shopping at Cullen's new kind of store would save
consumers money-lots of money.'37
In the hope of selling his employer, the Kroger Grocery & Baking
Co., on the idea, Cullen submitted a proposal letter to John B. Bonham,
Kroger's Vice President of retailing and Kroger President William H.
Albers 3 s The proposal outlined the most important aspects of his
revolutionary plan.'39 Fortunately for posterity, extensive excerpts from
Cullen's proposal still exist.' 4 Its underlying theme was that very large
stores with low overhead, a cash and carry policy, and a self-service
policy would lead to very low prices without sacrificing profits.' 4' Low
prices for 1000 basic food products 42 would draw unprecedented hordes
of people to very large and innovative stores 43 with a self-service policy.
Self-service would sharply reduce the need for store personnel, and it
would also encourage impulse buying.' 44 Shoppers would be free to
browse about, inspect the merchandise, and retrieve it from the shelves
themselves. 45 By the standards of that era, Cullen's new stores would
not be merely large or even very large. As Cullen put it, they would be
"'monstrous in size."" 46 Monstrously sized stores with merchandise
within easy reach of shoppers would further encourage impulse
See Phillips, supranote 118, at 197.
See ZMMEmAN, supra note 14, at 31.
See id.
See id. at 32-35.
See McAusLAND, supranote 27, at 14.
"The one thought always uppermost in mind-How can I undersell the other fellow?
How can I beat the other fellow? How can I make my company more money? The
answer is very simple-by keeping my overhead down, and only by keeping this
overhead down can I beat the other fellow."
ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 35 (quoting letter from Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.).
142. "'I want to sell 300 items at cost. I want to sell 200 items at 5% above cost. I want to sell
300 items at 15% above cost. I want to sell 300 items at 20% above cost."' Id. at 33 (quoting letter
from Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.).
143. Zimmerman continues quoting Michael Cullen's letter.
"When I come out with a two page ad and advertise 300 items at cost and 200 items
at practically cost, which would probably be all the advertising that I would ever have to
do, the public, regardless of their present feeling towards Chain Stores, because in reality
I would not be a Chain Store, would break my front doors down to get in. It would be a
riot. I would have to call out the police and let the public in so many at a time. I would
lead the public out of the high priced houses of bondage into the low prices of the house
of the promised land."
Id. at 33-34 (quoting letter from Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co.).
144. SeePEAK&PEAK, supra note 18, at 15.
145. See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 40.
146. Singer, supranote 80, at 2 (quoting Cullen).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
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buying.47 After quenching their thirst for the low-cost items that
attracted them to the store in the first place, affluent customers would
see enticing displays of another 1000 items with very healthy markups.9'
Temptation would be too much for many of them, and customers who
could afford it would emerge from the store with much more than they
planned to buy. 49 The proposal advocated sub-prime locations, a few
blocks away from the main drag. 5 ° Leasing space a few blocks away
from prime neighborhood shopping districts would accomplish more
than saving big rent dollars. 5' It would also provide an extra important
dividend. Free curbside parking was available in sub-prime
neighborhoods.'52
As he approached the end of his letter, Cullen pleaded with his
reader: "'[b]efore you throw this letter in the wastebasket, read it again
and then wire me to come to Cincinnati, so I can tell you more about this
plan, and what it will do for you and your company.'"' 53 Then, he
concluded with this question: "'What is your verdict?" '' Alas, the
verdict was negative. Bonham was not interested,'55 and the letter never
got to Albers.'56

147. See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 32.
148. See id. at 34.
149.
"Week days would be Saturdays-rainy days would be sunny days, and then when the
great crowd of American people came to buy all those low priced and 5% items, I would
have them surrounded with 15%, 20% and in some cases, 25% items. In other words, I
could afford to sell a can of Milk at cost if I could sell a can of Peas and make 2¢, and so
on all through the grocery line."
Id. at 34 (quoting letter from Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co.).
150. See id.
151. Seeid.
152. See id.
"Again you may object to my locating two or three blocks from the business center
of a big city. One great asset in being away from the business section is parking space.
Another is, you can get generally the kind of store you want and on your own terms. The
public will walk an extra block or two if they can save money, and one of our talking
points would be, the reason we sell at wholesale prices are that we are out of the high
rent district."
Id. at 34-35 (quoting letter from Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co.).
153. Id. at 35 (quoting letter from Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the Kroger Grocery
& Baking Co.).
154. Id. (quoting letter from Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co.).
155. See id.
156. See Mathews, supranote 41, at 39.
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Undaunted by Bonham's verdict, Cullen traveled to Kroger's
headquarters in Cincinnati in a last ditch effort to meet Albers.'57 Cullen
reckoned that, if he could only meet with Albers personally, Albers
would instinctively understand that Cullen's proposal for a very large
store with a low-cost and low-price structure would be the wave of the
get to see Albers 59 He
future.158 Despite his high hopes, Cullen did not'6°
you.
to
talk
was told, "Mr. Albers is too busy to
Even then Cullen did not give up. Believing in his business plan
passionately, Cullen quit his Kroger job to try his luck with other
potential backers.' 6' Quitting any job was a courageous act during the
Great Depression. So many people were out of work and looking for a
job-any job.
Cullen's next move was to look for another affluent company to
provide the financial muscle he needed to start a new business based on
his proposal.'62 First, he presented the proposal to A&P, but A&P
rejected it also.' 63 Then, he approached Harry Socoloff, a Vice President
of Sweet Life Foods Corp. of Brooklyn, New York and found a
sympathetic ear at last."M Socoloff was impressed.' 6 He was impressed
enough to open his wallet, and the new venture was launched with
Socoloffs backing.' 6 Socoloff and Cullen formed a new corporation,
King Kullen Grocery Co., to implement Cullen's plan.' 67 They did not
take a long time to get moving. The first store, appropriately called King
Kullen, was launched on August 4, 1930 from a vacant garage at 171st
Street and Jamaica Avenue in the Jamaica neighborhood of New York
City's Borough of Queens.'6 The rent was cheap, and curbside
69 parking
was free and plentiful-just the way he dreamed it would be.
Now, Michael Cullen had the chance to prove his theories.
Following his well-conceived plan, he advertised the new store

157. See ZuvmiERMAN, supranote 14, at39, 110.

at 39.
158. See id.
159. See id

160. Id.
161. See GREER Er AL., supranote 54,at 154.
162. See MCAUSLAND, supranote 27, at5.
163. See id.
164. See ZtMMERMAN, supra note 14, at35.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. See hL
168. See id.
169. See Arieh Goldman, Stages inthe Development of the Supermarket,J. RETAILING, winter
1975-76, at 49,59; see also ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 34-35.
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aggressively. '70 Although Cullen's advertisements were completely
unorthodox, they were very effective. 171 Using his favorite advertising
medium, a four-page newspaper supplement, the ad copy trumpeted his
very, very, very, very low-price policy. 72 It emphasized that King Kullen
customers would save money and plenty of it.'73 It stressed the store's
cleanliness and the availability of free parking. 74
Now that he was the boss and no longer inhibited by the restraints
that come with being a corporate employee, Cullen's charismatic
personality emerged. He was the king, King Kullen. The king of what?
Perhaps the king of the grocers. How did Michael Cullen come to call
the new business, King Kullen? Michael Cullen's wife, Nan Cullen, told
this story in a June 1937 interview:
Our son Bobby, who has a great gift for drawing, was sitting by his
table very eagerly engrossed in some sort of a drawing. His father
asked him what he was drawing, and Bobby showed him his drawing.
It was a picture of a globe, and on top of it a man was seatedBobby's idea of a man seated on top of the world. And across the
bottom he had printed the title KING KULLEN. Actually, it was
because Bobby thought Cullen was also spelt with a K. But the title
struck Mike at once.175
Cullen's advertisements queried, "King Kullen, the world's greatest
price wrecker-how does he do it?' 17 6 The public did not know how he
did it, and they might not have even known what he did. However, they
were interested enough to come by and see what was going on.'7 They
came. They saw. And they bought.
As he predicted, customers traveled longer distances to King
Kullen than any other grocer had the right to expect. 7 When they
finished shopping, they loaded their cars with enough food to last a
week, and they returned a week later to do the same thing. 79 Why should
they come to King Kullen and load their cars? Food cost much less
money at King Kullen than at neighborhood grocers." King Kullen
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 37.
See id.
See id. at 38.
See id.
See id. at 37.
Singer, supra note 80, at 6.
ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 37 (emphasis added).
See id
See LONGSTRETH, supra note 60, at 122.
See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 38.
See id.
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charged only four cents for a can of Campbell's tomato soup that usually
cost seven cents in neighborhood service grocery stores. 8' Drug items
that sold for ten cents in the neighborhoods cost only nine cents at King
Kullen.'2
Michael Cullen's euphoric theory yielded euphoric results. The first
King Kullen was a big winner. 3 The store opening drew such a large
crowd that police reserves were deployed to keep the bargain hunters in
check.' Roped aisles were used to keep the throng in line as they waited
for the chance to load their shopping baskets.'9 For its very first week,
the store's volume was described as "phenomenal."' 86
It was time to expand (aggressively). In only two years, seven more
King Kullens opened for business.'87 Like the initial Jamaica store, the
new stores were located close to densely populated residential
neighborhoods but not right in them. 8 He promoted each new store
assertively.' 9 Each new market was saturated with razzle dazzle
advertising featuring the Cullen philosophy and Michael Cullen
himself.9 0 Here's an excerpt:
"Who is King Kullen?...

What kind of man is he?

King Kullen is none other than Michael Joseph Cullen, born and
brought up in Jersey. Been in the grocery business all my life. Been
with some of the big chains for 20 years or more and finally decided to
try it by myself because I want to test out my own theories of
merchandising.... The grocery world was dumbfounded with my low
prices.... Today, my sales run into the millions. The big interests call
me the wildcat, the banks call me a miracle man. But who cares what

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 19.
See id.
See Mathews, supranote 41, at 39.
See Singer, supranote 80, at 2.
Seeid. at2-3.
ZmmiRMAN, supra note 14, at 37.
SeeMAYO, supra note 53, at 141.
See id.

189. See id.
190. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 37.
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they all say. It's you folks I want to please.... Are you with
me ....What is your answer?" ''
Cullen's message was not entirely commercial. With evangelical
fervor and a messianic tone, he attacked the service grocery chain store
organizations as the tools of Wall Street who oppressed the poor.192
Given the state of the economy in the 1930s, this was a potent message.
He refused to pull his punches and declared that the chain stores were
nothing less than a "menace to the nation. '9 3
His competitors hated the ads, but consumers loved them and came
to shop.' 9 In 1932, grocery department cash registers in the eight King
Kullen stores rang to the tune of more than $6 million in sales in the
aggregate.'95 Although that is a paltry volume now, it was a remarkable
achievement in the midst of the Great Depression with the flood of
business failures it caused. The annual sales volume of neighborhood
grocery stores of that era was $17,380.' Not content with eight stores,
an impressive sales volume, and an even more impressive reputation,
Cullen opened another seven stores before his untimely death in 1936 at
the age of fifty-two. 9 7 Some say, perhaps with good reason, that he died
of overwork. 99
His death was untimely for many more reasons than his age. He
was the founder of a new industry and the trailblazer of a more efficient
and more equitable system of food distribution.' 9 Consumers and
merchants alike benefited from his vision. William Albers, former
President of the Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., paid this tribute to
Michael Cullen at the Supermarket Institute's inaugural convention
in 1937:
Ladies and gentleman, why are we here today? We are here simply
because one man had a vision.
Yes, I know that California had large markets, had the advantages
of climatic and other conditions, and I know there were large markets
in practically every city in the country. However, I say there was only
191.
192.
193.
at 150.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 37-38 (quoting King Kullen's opening advertisements).
See id. at 38.
King Kullen newspaper advertisement (n.d.), reprinted in GREER Er AL., supra note 54,
See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 38.
See id. at 39.
See id. at 3.
See id. at 39.
See id.
Seeid. at31.
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one man who had the vision and the confidence to back up and build
what is today, ladies and gentlemen, the Super Market Industry.2
That one man was Michael Cullen. Nobody knows what Michael
Cullen would have accomplished if he had not died young. However, we
do know he accomplished more in his short lifetime than most people
who live into their eighties.
b.

Other Seeds of the Supermarket Movement

Although Michael ("King") Cullen was justifiably hailed as the
founder of America's supermarket industry, some commentators contend
that Cullen was not the first grocer to open a supermarket for business. 2 '
Even William Albers, who came to be an ardent Cullen admirer, pointed
out that King Kullen might not have been the first supermarket.
Large food markets with adjacent parking lots available for
customer use were doing business in California and Texas in the
1920s." 3 Lucius Flint reported that, in 1922, McDaniels Markets started
a chain of supermarkets in California's San Gabriel Valley.'$ Max
Zimmerman reported that supermarkets were doing business in the Los
Angeles area as early as 1927.20' Perhaps they included the markets
identified by Lucius Flint as the 7500 square footer opened by Roberts
Public Market in 1927, the 6000 square footer opened by W.H.
Crawford in 1927, and the 15,000 square footer opened by Morris
Weisstein in 1928.' Charles Phillips reported in a HarvardBusiness
Review article that twenty-five supermarkets were doing business in Los
Angeles in 1929.207 Phillips also maintained that thirty-nine supermarkets
were doing business in the Los Angeles area in 1930.203 In his book,
Supennarketing,20 Frank Charvat agreed with Phillips that supermarkets
had been established in Los Angeles before 1930 but disagreed as to
their number.210 He asserted that Ralph's Grocery Company, a prominent
200. W.H. Albers, Building Volume with Nationally Advertised Brands, SUPERMARKET
MERCHANDISING, Oct 1937, reprintedin ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 110.
201. See PAT WATTERS, FIFTY YEARS OF PLEASURE: THE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF PUBLIX
SUPERMARKETS, INC. 57 (1980).
202. See ZIMMEPAN, supranote 14, at 110.
203. See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 15-16.
204. See Lucius S. Flint, The Los Angeles Super, CHAIN STORE AGE, June 1950, at J34, J34.
205. See M.M. Zimmernan, Super-Markets,PRINTER'S INK, July 9, 1936, at 7, 10.

206. See Flint,supra note 204, at J34.
207.
208.
209.
210.

See Phillips, supranote 118, at 193.
See id.
CHARVAT, supranote 130.
See id. at 15.
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Los Angeles chain, had launched sixteen "large, well-developed
supermarkets" by 19292 and that Henke & Pillot, a prominent Houston,
Texas grocery chain had become "a full-fledged supermarket" operation
22
by 1929 (one year before the first King Kullen held its grand opening). '
I have no further information on the Los Angeles stores and wonder
whether they really were supermarkets. As to the downtown Houston
Henke & Pillot store, I do not know whether, and to what extent, the
store was operated on a self-service basis.
Other supermarket-like operations were doing business in 1930.213 I
do not know whether the other stores opened before or after the first
King Kullen or whether their founders were influenced by Michael
Cullen. I do know their stores followed many of the principles espoused
by Michael Cullen. A Market Basket food market opened for business in
a 7500 square foot storeroom in the Los Angeles area that year.2 4 Two
large food stores called Canners Warehouse opened for business in
15
Detroit.2 5 One was owned
by Scott Black, an advertising executive.216
The other was owned by one of Black's former colleagues named Ed
Coe.21 7 Both stores succeeded for a while.2 8
Regardless whether the first King Kullen was America's first
supermarket, it was Michael Cullen who codified most of the principles
that were to become the supermarket industry's theoretical foundation.2" 9
It was Michael Cullen who demonstrated that the supermarket model
was economically feasible." ° It was also Michael Cullen who gave this
new method of food distribution a heavy dose of public exposure.22'
King Kullen stores were living proof that supermarket sales per square
foot could be exponentially greater than service grocery store sales per
square foot. King Kullen stores were living proof that food prices could
be dramatically lower in supermarkets than in service grocery stores.2
King Kullen stores were living proof that the supermarket business

211.
in 1929.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. On the other hand, Lucius Flint indicates that only two Ralph's units had parking lots
See Flint, supranote 204, at J34.
See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 17.
See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 29 (discussing the rise and fall of "groceterias").
See Flint, supranote 204, at J34.
See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 29.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 32-34.
See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 18-19; MAYO, supra note 53, at 141.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 141.
See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 21.
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could be profitable.m The news traveled fast. It was good news for
consumers.
It was not good news for grocery store chains or independent
neighborhood service grocers.' The food industry quickly discovered to
its dismay that the early King Kullen stores were smash hits.2m Service
grocers learned that one King Kullen store did as much business as 100
traditional grocery stores. z 6 As Cullen's competitors lost customers, they
realized that consumers were willing to bypass traditional neighborhood
service grocery stores and travel long distances to buy food for less
money at King Kullen. m Competitors also learned that Michel Cullen
was determined to build on his early triumphs and expand his new retail
business rapidly. m Soon consumers would have access to more King
Kullens. Would the world's greatest price wrecker become the world's
greatest grocery chain wrecker?
Michael Cullen's well-publicized success did not irritate everybody
in the food industry. Here and there, creative merchants who had big
ideas of their own were intrigued by King Kullen.229 They were delighted
to know that such things were possible-even in the midst of the Great
Depression. m If Michael Cullen could make his supermarket work, why
couldn't any grocer do it?
Launching a new supermarket or, for that matter, any new retail
business is never easy. Even today, startup businesses usually have a
hard time gathering investment capital. Think about trying to raise
capital in the bleak economic climate of 1930. Few people had money to
invest then, and not so many people were left with abundant cash
resources after 1929's monumental stock market crash. In addition to
raising money, prospective storekeepers needed to lease space at a good
location, acquire fixtures, hire employees, and purchase inventory.
Raising money, finding a good location, negotiating a lease,
acquiring fixtures, hiring employees, and purchasing inventory were
barriers, but they were not impenetrable barriers. Audacious Cullen
disciples figured they could overcome these barriers despite (or maybe

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

See MAYO, supra note 53, at 141.
See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 21.
See ZIMiErMAN, supranote 14, at 38-39.
See id. at 38.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 144.
See TOM MAHONEY & LEONARD SLOANE, THE GREAT MERCHANTS 177 (rev. ed. 1974).
See ZIImmERmAN, supranote 14, at 54.
See id.
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because of) the Great Depression. 23' They could lease dilapidated vacant
industrial buildings with good locations.~2 Vacant industrial buildings
were plentiful in a nation gripped by anxiety and 20% unemployment.2'
They could substitute used and other cheap fixtures for the more
expensive fixtures used by grocery store chains.' Many retailers had
thrown in the towel by 1930, and their creditors were happy to dispose
of used fixtures lying around in abandoned storerooms." Cullen
disciples could be picky when they hired retail clerks and other
employees because so many people needed jobs then. 6 Better yet,
supermarkets needed fewer employees per square foot of selling space
than traditional service grocery stores." Supermarket operators were
able to buy plenty of distress merchandise. Manufacturers and
wholesalers with bulging warehouses were glad to get rid of the stuff at
huge discounts. 23' Low overhead and frugal operating expenses
combined to yield a low-cost structure.239 The supermarket's low-cost
structure made it possible for a clever and energetic food merchant to
make good money despite a low-price policy and a paltry investment in
plant, equipment, and inventory. 2 ° What was the toughest barrier? For
most of them, the toughest barrier was raising the investment capital
they needed. They managed to do that too.
A Denver grocer named Morris Miller was among the first.24' His
Miller's Super Public Market began doing business in 1931 and
instituted many of the policies Michael Cullen was advocating.242 Miller
was comfortable with the self-service principle and had already used it
to his advantage in his downtown Denver grocery stores.243 However,
Miller's Super Public Market added important new Cullen-like policies
to his downtown Denver grocery store model.2 It was bigger, it offered

231. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 39 (discussing how Robert M. Otis and Roy 0.
Dawson leased a vacant building to save money).
232. See Goldman, supra note 169, at 59.
233. See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 20; McAUSLAND, supra note 27, at 6.
234. See Goldman, supra note 169, at 59.
235. See id.
236. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 20.
237. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 145.
238. See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 49-50.
239. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 140.
240. See id. at 141.
241. See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 28.
242. See id.
243. See McAuSLAND, supra note 27, at 20.
244. See id.
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free parking, and it targeted a broad geographic area for prospective

customers. 245
A few established independent grocers were bitten by the
supermarket bug in 1932, and some regional grocery chains
246
experimented at least partially with Michael Cullen's business model.
Penn Fruit, a Pennsylvania-based grocery chain, launched a 16,000
square foot store in Philadelphia in 1932, but that store lacked parking
facilities. 47 Nevertheless, Penn Fruit must have liked the results. It
opened five more big stores in the next five years. 248 A California
grocery chain called Alpha Beta opened two supermarkets in 1932 but
did not call them supermarkets.249 To the Alpha Beta folks, they were
wholesale-retailmarkets.2' 0 Roberts, another California grocer opened an
8000 square foot market in 1932 in the Los Angeles area with an 8000
square252 foot parking lot. 51 It was classified as a supermarket by Lucius
Flint.

Four other noteworthy supermarkets opened for business in 1932.
September 24, 1932 was opening day for Portland, Oregon's Columbia
Markets.2 Columbia Markets' building was very large and modern by
1932 standards.5 Thirteen thousand square feet of floor area fit within
its four walls, and its customers had free parking privileges in a 4000
square foot parking lot.255

Sylvan and Alfred Goldman, 256 who, in time, would become
supermarket industry luminaries in their own right, opened a 7000
square foot unit in Oklahoma City in October of 1932.257 Although the
Goldmans' new building was smaller than Columbia Markets' building,
they displayed their food marketing insight by providing a more
generous parking lot than the parking lot provided by Columbia
Markets.258 The Goldmans' 7000 square foot unit had a 14,000 square
245. See id.
246. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 55 (describing several supermarket openings in
the 1930s).
247. See id. at 55-56.
248. See id. at 56.
249. See McAusLAND, supra note 27, at 21.
250. See id.
251. See Flint,supra note 204, at J34.
252. See id.
253. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 60.
254. See id
255. See id.
256. I have more to say about the Goldman brothers below. See infra text accompanying notes
1507-89.
257. See ZIMMEPmAN, supra note 14, at 58.
258. See id.
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foot parking lot.29 Ultimately, the Goldmans would add significant new
elements to the supermarket business model and make an indelible mark
on the food distribution industry.W
Sam Seelig, who had sold 263 southern California service grocery
stores to Safeway in 1925, reentered the fray in 1932 with a supermarket
in Hollywood, California. 6 '
On December 8, 1932, a new chapter in supermarket history began
when Robert Otis and Roy Dawson launched their new food market, the
262
Big Bear, in Elizabeth, New Jersey.
c. Robert Otis and Roy Dawson, Food Merchant Mavericks
Robert Otis and Roy Dawson were captivated by the first King
Kullen's success. 263 They too had earned their stripes in retailing with
little recognition or reward by 1930 when the United States was mired in
a depression and rewards were hard to come by. After years of
working for general merchandise retailers like Sears, Roebuck &
Company and food retailers, Otis and Dawson decided to start their own
retail business.26 5 They followed Cullen's footsteps and added a few
tricks of their own.
To accomplish that goal, they needed financial backing from a
powerful grocery store chain or a grocery wholesaler. 266 Early on,
Dawson took the same path as Cullen in the search for financial
backing. 267 He made a pilgrimage to Cincinnati to interest William
Albers, President of the Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., in the new
venture.m Unlike Cullen, Dawson actually got to see Albers, but he
could not convince Albers to provide backing for the new venture.'
Albers turned him down, a decision he was to regret in the years to
2' ° Ultimately, Otis and Dawson approached American Home
come.
a Hoboken, New Jersey wholesaler, and American Home
Grocers,
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Grocers liked the idea. 27' Once again, a wholesale operation was willing
to take a chance on backing a supermarket business.272 Otis, Dawson, and
American Home Grocers joined forces and started business operations in
1932, which was a very difficult year in which to start any business.273
They launched Big Bear, the world's second and New Jersey's first
supermarket. 274
Big Bear leased the Durant Motor Company's 50,000 square foot
vacant automobile factory in Elizabeth, Union County, New Jersey, and
converted it for retail use.275 The store was not pretty when they leased it,
and they did not do much to make it prettier than it was when they first
saw it.276 From the outside the Big Bear premises looked like the
dilapidated industrial building it was. 277 The interior probably did not
look any better than the exterior.278 It was described as having a
"'temporary bazaar-like appearance."' 279 Its ceilings were bare, its floors
were crude, and its signs were gaudy.2 0 Big Bear fixtures were not any
more impressive. 3 Cheap pine tables were used extensively. 2 No
matter! The prices were low, and that is what counted.
Big Bear's owners tried to imitate Michael Cullen's one-stop
shopping concept and improve on it.2 3 They combined groceries with a
heavier dose of nonfood merchandise and food items seldom found in
grocery stores of that era. 4 They loaded the store with nonfood products
and nontraditional food items in the belief that big crowds would be
attracted by the prospect of buying groceries at very low prices but
would not leave without also buying other items with higher markups. 5
Using traditional groceries as loss leaders, Big Bear's 15,000 square foot
grocery department was surrounded by eleven other departments selling
such diverse products as drugs, cosmetics, auto accessories, and paint.2 6
271. Seeid.at39.
272. See iL
273. See J.C. Furnas, The Super Market Basket, FORBEs, Dec. 15, 1941, at 24, 25.
274. See id
275. See JEFFREY R. PRINCE, SUPER MARKE INST., THE FIRST FORTY YEARs 2 (1977);
ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 39-40.
276. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 18.
277. See id.
278. See id.
279. MAYO, supranote 53,at 141 (quoting ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 40).
280. See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 18.
281. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 141.
282. See id.
283. See id.
284. See id.
285. See ZIMMEIAN, supra note 14, at 40.
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Michael Cullen, who believed free parking to be an essential
ingredient of his food retailing revolution, believed thrift to be a still
more important value.2" So, when he opened his first store, he did not go
as far as buying or leasing a parking lot for the customers of his first
store.2 8 Customers of the first King Kullen store depended on free
curbside parking along public streets near the store. 9 Otis and Dawson
took the free parking principle one step farther than Cullen.29° Their
customers did not need to cruise the public streets in search of curbside
parking because Big Bear provided an ample and convenient customer
parking lot.2 9'
Describing itself as a cut-rate self-service grocery store,' 9 Big Bear
was a true believer in the low-price policy principle and a fierce price
competitor.293 The low-price policy paid off handsomely.2 Its grand
opening was reported to have shattered all records for attendance and
sales volume.295 Its cash register tapes tallied $31,861.71 (really big
money for 1932) in the first three days of store operations.296 According
to one commentator, the Elizabeth store grossed almost $75,000 a week
between its opening day on December 8, 1932 through May 13, 1933.29
Another commentator estimated Big Bear's weekly volume at
$100,000,291 In the early 1930s, $100,000 was a phenomenal weekly
volume.299 That was approximately the aggregate volume of all the A&P
stores in the Newark and Elizabeth area, and A&P was very well
represented in that market.3" Despite the low prices, Big Bear's carefully
controlled cost structure and high sales volume resulted in very healthy
profits.3"' Net profit for the first year's operations was $166,507.47.3

287. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 38.
288. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 141.
289. See id.
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291. See id.; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 40.
292. See Mathews, supra note 41, at 39.
293. See LIEBS, supranote 55, at 126.
294. See id.
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296. See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 40-41.
297. See id. at 42.
298. See WILLIAM I. WALSH, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC
TEA COMPANY 47 (1986).
299. See id.
300. See id. (stating that a $100,000 sales volume per week "was equal to the total weekly
volume of the 100 A&P stores in the surrounding Newark/Elizabeth area").
301. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 43.
302. See id.
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Like King Kullen, Big Bear attracted consumers willing to travel
previously unimaginable distances for grocery shoppers. 303 Some came
from as far away as ten or more miles.3
Although Otis and Dawson's Big Bear quickly established a loyal
following among consumers, it inflicted severe emotional distress on its
competitors, the press, food processing company executives, and
government officials.3 5 New Jersey's grocers were so traumatized by the
specter of aggressive price competition that they organized protest
meetings all over that state where they vented their fury at what they
perceived as sociopathic behavior (price-cutting).6 They demanded that
wholesalers discontinue sales to Big Bear and other supermarket
operators! They complained vociferously to the Associated Grocery
Manufacturers of America, an organization of food processing
companies.3 The Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America
responded by condemning Big Bear's distribution practices and drafting
legislation to constrain loss-leader prices.30
They looked for and got help from friendly state and local
legislators.3 '0 New Jersey State legislators friendly to the interests of
service-oriented food markets introduced an Assembly bill to prohibit
sales at or below cost and a State Senate resolution to investigate
supermarkets.31 ' Local governments passed anti-Big Bear and antisupermarket ordinances.1 2
That was not all. The service grocers also pressured local
newspapers to refuse to carry Big Bear ads. 3 The newspapers
ads. 314
succumbed to the pressure and stopped running Big Bear
Undaunted by the dirty tricks, Otis and Dawson retaliated by
sidestepping the newspapers and substituting personally delivered
handbills for newspaper advertising. 5 Big Bear handbills, entitled "Bear
Facts" were delivered to every home in a ten-mile radius from the
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316

store. The handbills featured messages every consumer likes to see.
The first page shrieked, "more prices crushed. 317 The centerfold was
even more effective. It listed prices for featured items which were lower
than ever."8 The Big Bear snarled back eloquently at his detractors on
the back page.
"Now when the Big Bear store makes it possible for you to buy the
things you need and want at lower prices, these bulls are deliberately
attempting to deprive you of the benefits.
The bulls either can't or won't sell at lower prices.... The bulls
don't want you to know about Big Bear's Lower Prices-and they are
resorting to every trick they know how to prevent Big Bear from
'
reaching you."319
Consumers living in Big Bear's trading area were faced with a
moral dilemma.3 ° The neighborhood merchants from whom they
purchased food ever since they were children were in trouble. 32 The
neighborhood merchant's livelihood was threatened by a vigorous force
in a life-or-death struggle. 32' Neighborhood grocers knew their customers
personally. 3 They had extended credit to their customers when they
could not pay, and they had done many favors for their customers.3 24 All
right! Food costs more in neighborhood service grocery stores, but the
storekeepers were old friends and good human beings.3z Should we
consign them to the soup kitchen to shave a few dollars off the weekly
food budget?
In an America humbled by the Great Depression, a great many
people answered "yes" to this question. Consumers did not patronize
neighborhood grocers and pay higher prices to make sure the grocers
made a living. Neighborhood grocers were destined to lose the battle.
Consumers had their own problems, and they usually chose lower prices
over sympathy for neighborhood grocers. 3 Supermarkets helped
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consumers stretch their resources and survive the Great Depression, and
the supermarkets prospered. 27
32
Big Bear prospered more after the controversies than before.
Shortly after the controversies began, its weekly sales rose to more than
$80,000 and then to more than $90,000.329 Big Bear management now
had the courage to expand. Six more units were added in short order, and
Big Bear became a chain store organization.330
The controversy made headlines. Something strange, new, and
wonderful happened at King Kullen and Big Bear. Cullen, Otis, and
Dawson had released a powerful force that would radically change the
way people would buy food for decades and perhaps even centuries. 33 '
2. The Supermarket Movement Gathers Momentum
a. At First, Independents and Small Regional Chains Lead
the Way
The news of Big Bear's price policies and its struggles thrust the
supermarket before the public's eye.332 With the American economy
limping and widespread unemployment lingering, consumers were
trying hard to conserve food dollars. The birth of the supermarket was
welcome news to them. This new kind of food market was a source of
cheaper food and a tool for survival.3 4
On the other hand, chain store executives, independent grocers,
food manufacturers, and food wholesalers were puzzled, and many of
them were frightened. 335 Despite their blatant disregard of the
conventional wisdom, Cullen, Otis, and Dawson were making moneylots of money.336 Worse, their competitors were losing market share
quickly. 337 Were Cullen, Otis, and Dawson fly-by-night operators who
would fizzle in a short time? Maybe. On the other hand, maybe these
troublemaking entrepreneurs from Long Island and New Jersey had
327. See i. at 51-52.
328. See iL at 45.
329. See id.
330. See id.at 47.
331. See id. at 54 (highlighting the vigorous growth of supermarkets after the opening of King
Kullen and Big Bear).
332. See id.
333. See PEAK & PEAK, supra note 18, at 13.
334. See ZavMERmiAN, supranote 14, at 52.
335. See id. at 45.
336. See id. at 43.
337. See id. at 54.
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stumbled on a better way to sell food and were about to undermine the
service grocery store. It was time for food industry luminaries to
investigate the King Kullen and Big Bear business models and find out
what was going on. Curious food distribution moguls, national grocery
chain executives, food wholesalers, regional grocery chain operators,
and small time independent grocers made pilgrimages to King Kullen
and Big Bear stores from 1932 to 1937.338
The pilgrims returned with mixed reactions. A few visitors were
enthusiastic and began to hatch plans to start their own supermarkets.339
However, most of the visitors were naysayers and returned to their
headquarters with no interest in adjusting their business strategy to cope
with this new phenomenon.' " Some of them scoffed and concluded that
supermarketing was a fad.34' Others were impressed by this strange new
force but could not come to grips with it and prayed it would all go
342
away.
Chain store organizations were worried, and they had good reason
to be worried. At first, the supermarket's success took George Ludlum
Hartford and John Hartford, A&P's headmen, by surprise.34 3 In the early
1930s, most A&P branches were little more than neighborhood service
grocery stores, albeit very well-merchandised neighborhood service
grocery stores. 3" The year of 1930 brought the Hartfords both good news
and bad. The good news was that A&P branches were outdoing
neighborhood grocery stores.345 The bad news was that supermarkets
were outdoing the A&P branches by far.3" Despite King Kullen's
aggressively low-price policy (or perhaps because of it), the sales
volume of each King Kullen store was about the same as any ten A&P
units in the same general marketing area.34 7 George Ludlum Hartford, the
more conservative of the two, figured that the new format was merely a
passing fancy.348 Disregard it, and it would go away. George Ludlum
Hartford disregarded it, but it did not go away. 49
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John Hartford, George's brother and A&P's guiding light, was one
very worried grocer.350 John Hartford wondered whether King Kullen
had leapfrogged A&P, but he could not bring himself to believe it.351 He
comforted himself (at least temporarily) by assuming that King Kullen's
success was merely a fad and not the beginning of a revolution.352 He
expected life to return to normal after the sizzle subsided.353
Nevertheless, John Hartford was more adventurous than his brother, and
he decided to investigate. John dispatched a trusted executive named
Tom Fitzgerald to Detroit to observe early supermarket activity there. 4
Later, in 1934, A&P's Central Western Division President led John
Hartford on a tour of Detroit-area supermarket competitors.355 John also
toured the King Kullen stores in New York and was amazed at what
Michael Cullen had accomplished in such a short time. 356 He commented
on his reactions while testifying during an antitrust hearing in September
of 1945:
"Mhe first Super Market that came to my attention was in the
Eastern Division. We did not take it seriously at first, but the
competition was pretty aggressive. Independents got into it pretty fast
and I went to Detroit and saw an old freight house converted into a
Super Market. I talked to the personnel and made up my mind it was
necessary for us to adopt that kind of operation. Later, we had a
demonstration in Brooklyn of this-what this competition really meant
to us. We had a competitor there by the name of King Kullen, and
many independents who opened these stores very fast. We had a very
profitable operation in Brooklyn: In a very short space of time, they
forced the Brooklyn unit into deep red figures." 357
Nevertheless, A&P took no concrete steps to develop its own
supermarkets for many years after that.3 s
To George Jenkins, who would later found the Florida-based Publix
Supermarkets, the building in which Big Bear's store was located was
repulsive.5 9 The fixtures and the interior decor were also repulsive.
350. See HOYT, supranote 79, at 156.
351. Seeid.
352. See 1d.; WALSH, supra note 298, at 47.
353. See WALSH, supranote 298, at 47-48.
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However, Jenkins admired Big Bear's self-service techniques, its low
profit margins, its low prices, and (best of all) its big sales volume."W He
concluded early on that the supermarket was destined to provide cheaper
food for the consuming public and handsome profits for its merchants!"
In time, Jenkins would establish his own supermarket chain and advance
the supermarket cause with his own innovations. 62 However, he was not
ready for that step in the early 1930s.
Nevertheless, a modest but significant band of independent food
merchants and small regional grocery store chains were ready for that
step.363 Enthralled by the success of King Kullen and Big Bear, they set
the stage for another round of supermarket openings between 1933 and
1941.64 Convinced that supermarkets were destined to supplant the
service grocery and service-oriented food stores, they planned to
inaugurate new supermarket businesses.365
One way to go about it was to imitate the King and the Bear as
much as they could. King Kullen and Big Bear had established
3
reputations as consumer champions in the struggle against high prices. 6
Their successful battles against entrenched grocery chains and
politicians electrified consumers, and consumers came to identify
royalty and wild beasts with aggressive food merchants with low food
prices. 367 King Kullen's royal-sounding name and Big Bear's huge wildbeast-oriented names conjured the image of huge food markets, much
larger food markets than shoppers had ever seen before. King Kullen's
royal image and Big Bear's mighty beast image also projected power,
the power to bargain hard with food processing companies, the power to
compete with the older service-oriented food chain stores, the power to
lower prices, and the power to keep prices low.' Many newcomers
chose business names evoking these images too. 369 They too would be
kings, big chiefs, big beasts, and giants of all varieties.37 They figured
that the public would trust them and buy their food, in part, because of
their names.
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Accordingly, a batch of 1933 startups eagerly chose royal-sounding
and mighty beast names, and other names evoking huge size and power.
A Kingston, New York supermarket was named the Great Bull
Market.37' A Providence, Rhode Island grocer named his new
supermarket, Big Chief 1 2 A Newark, New Jersey merchant, Arthur
Rosenberg, decided that there must be room for more than one king in
the supermarket business.373 If Michael Cullen could be King Kullen,
Arthur Rosenberg could be King Arthur.74 His first King Arthur
supermarket was lodged in an approximately 10,000 square foot
building in Newark.1 5 If two supermarket kings could coexist in 1933,
why not two Big Bears? Another supermarket startup decided to call
itself Big Bear and dedicated itself to fight the "demon of high prices"
on behalf of America's downtrodden food shoppers.376 This Big Bear
found its den in Somerville, Massachusetts.3 7
Armed with a business plan that closely resembled the Elizabeth,
New Jersey Big Bear's business model, Somerville's Big Bear opened
for business in May 1933.378 Although the Somerville store's owners had
no relationship with Robert Otis or Roy Dawson, they were not
embarrassed about copying their business name.3 79 The resemblance of
the Somerville Big Bear to the Elizabeth Big Bear was no coincidence.
News of the Elizabeth Big Bear's struggles had traveled north, and its
reputation among consumers for price cutting traveled with it.380 The
Somerville store's management wanted to cash in on the Elizabeth
store's prestige.3 ' Thus, one Big Bear's success led to two Big Bear
supermarket operations with no connection to each other.
Dedicated to a low-price policy, a low operating cost structure, and
cheap rent, the Somerville Big Bear's owners imitated many of the
Elizabeth Big Bear's business methods too.382 They did not spend much
money on equipment, and the grocery department functioned on a strict
self-service and cash and carry basis.383 Big Bear customers selected the
371.
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groceries they wanted themselves.3 They carried their selections in a
basket to a checkout counter, paid the freight, carried their bundles to
their cars, and drove away.
The Somerville Big Bear's owners liked Otis and Dawson's loss
leader policy too. 386 After observing that the Elizabeth Big Bear's low
grocery prices attracted hordes of consumers who splurged on nonfood
3
merchandise with higher markups, they decided to follow suit.
Reportedly, the Somerville Big Bear's grocery prices were 12.8% lower
than the competition's grocery prices. 8 With most of their sales space
dedicated to nonfood merchandise, they surrounded their grocery
department with nonfoods.' 9 In addition to the grocery department,
Somerville's Big Bear had twenty-three departments. 3'0 The other
departments included a bakery, delicatessen, shoe repair shop, and a
"'
barber shop.39
Most new supermarket entrepreneurs copied Cullen, Otis, and
Dawson's business methods but were not interested in royal-sounding or
mighty beast names.392 William H. Albers was among them.393 He had
succeeded Bernard H. Kroger as President of the Kroger Grocery &
Baking Co. in 1928, and he had served in that capacity with much
distinction.394 He was still Kroger's President in 1930 when Michael
Cullen offered his supermarket plan to Kroger.39 5
Although Cullen's plan never got to Albers in time for him to adopt
it on Kroger's behalf, the news of Cullen's success with King Kullen
must have caught Albers' attention.396 In 1930, Albers left Kroger
himself.397 Then, he started his own grocery company. 398 Catching the
supermarket bug in 1933, he opened several new markets that year in
Cincinnati, Kroger's home base.3 9 His store openings were greeted by
Cincinnati's traditional grocers with the same kind of antics the Big Bear
384.
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had endured.4 Some rivals were so thrilled by the appearance of a
formidable competitor with a low-price policy that they pelted its show
windows with bricks.40'
Other noteworthy supermarket launches in 1933 included Food Fair
Stores, Packard-Bamberger, Empire Market, Von's, and Carty
Brothers.4 Food Fair Stores, a Philadelphia grocery store chain led by
Louis Stein, George Friedland, and Samuel Friedland, opened its first
supermarket for business in April of that year.4 3 That unit was called the
Giant Quality Food Price Cutter.4 Located in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
the store was lodged in an approximately 10,000 square foot converted
garage.40s A second unit was opened later that year in Reading,
Pennsylvania." Frank Packard's Packard-Bamberger supermarket
business was situated on a ten-acre parcel in Hackensack, New Jersey.4
In an earlier life, its 40,000 square foot premises had been the main floor
of a factory building.430 Schaffer Stores Co. was a small Schenectady,
New York grocery chain.4 Schaffer had gained valuable experience
gleaned from running self-service grocery stores since 1929.4'0 When it
inaugurated its first supermarket in 1933, Schaffer extended the selfservice principles, at least partially, to its meat and vegetable
departments.' Schaffer's first supermarket was called Empire Market.1 2
Was its name, Empire, an illusion to King Kullen's royal might, or was
41 3
it intended to evoke its New York State (the Empire state) origins?
Charles Von Der Ahe, another southern California grocer, who had sold
his service grocery chain to Safeway, returned to the retail food business
in 1933. 4 He opened an 8100 square foot unit for business in the Los
41
Angeles area and provided a fifteen car parking lot for his customers.
Another southern California grocery company called Carty Brothers cast
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its lot with the supermarket movement with a 9500 square foot Los
Angeles area store and a 18,750 square foot parking lot."1 6
U.S. industrial earnings improved a bit in 1934, and that affected
the fortunes of consumers and food merchants alike.417 As industrial
earnings improved, buying patterns shifted. Regardless whether the food
products they craved were nutritionally beneficial or detrimental,
Americans could afford to buy more red meat, fruit, green vegetables,
and dairy products. 48 Encouraged in part by increased food consumer
confidence, supermarket expansion continued. 41 9 By 1934, ninety-four
supermarket businesses were doing business in twenty-four cities .4 ,
Still another Big Bear enterprise (completely independent of the
Elizabeth, New Jersey and Somerville, Massachusetts operations) started
doing business that year in Columbus, Ohio.42 With the birth of the
Columbus Big Bear, four bears were snarling all at once at high-priced
service grocery stores and the Goldilocks of expensive porridge.4 2
Although none of them were joined by business or family ties, they were
joined in spirit. The Columbus Big Bear owner, Wayne Brown, copied
much more than a name from the merchants who made the Big Bear
supermarkets in Elizabeth, New Jersey and Somerville, Massachusetts so
prosperous. 42 He adopted their basic principles too. Doing business from
a monstrously large storeroom was one important Big Bear principle
Brown adopted. 424 His Columbus Big Bear premise was a 60,000 square
foot building.42' Like its New Jersey and Massachusetts counterparts, this
building had seen better days. It had already been a skating rink,
ballroom, and riding academy.426 Food processing companies and its
grocery store competitors were no kinder to the third Big Bear than they
were to the first two.42 7 Its detractors did what they could to thwart the
Columbus Big Bear, but this Big Bear kept selling food at low prices
and attracting a loyal following.428
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Three other significant supermarket industry pioneers got their start
in 1934.49 George Loft, who had already established his mercantile
reputation by founding a candy store chain, tried his hand in the food
market businessf His supermarket chain was inaugurated with a new
store in Mount Vernon, New York (just north of New York City).43' The
Cifrino Brothers started a supermarket business in Dorchester,
Massachusetts. 432 The Cifrinos were not newcomers to the food business.
43
Michael
They had been successful food merchants since World War I.
Cullen's good friend, William Golub, joined the supermarket fraternity
after a big push in the right direction from Cullen.43 Golub asked Cullen
to comment on Golub's service grocery stores and was surprised by
Cullen's answer.435 After reviewing Golub's stores, Cullen spoke frankly
and honestly, but not so politely. He told Golub that his service grocery
store operations were like "'[d]riving a hearse.' 4 36 Golub responded
with a new kind of store he called a large self-service store.4 37 Dubbed
the Public Service Center, it began doing business with the public in
Green Island, New York in November 1932.438 Public Service Center
sold a wide variety of food and off-premises merchandise. 439 At the
outset, only the grocery department was owned by Golub's company,
and all other departments were owned by concessionaires.4 Later,
Golub's company expanded its product lines to other food and nonfood
lines.4"
America was still plagued by the Great Depression in 1935 and
1936.,4 2 They were years of continued misery for consumers and keen
competition by food merchants for the consumer's food dollar."3
Michael Cullen died in 1936, but the process he, Robert Otis, Roy
Dawson, and other industry pioneers had ignited provided a ray of
hope.44 The supermarket had already succeeded beyond any reasonable
429.
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person's fondest expectation." America's food distribution system was
on its way to a complete transformation. 446
Launching a new supermarket was a constructive response to the
troubled times, and many regional grocery chains and independent
grocers took the plunge. 7 Despite the economic misery that pushed
America's unemployment rate to 25%, more than 1200 supermarkets
had begun doing business in eighty-five cities.448 Los Angeles led the
pack with 186 supermarkets." 9 Eighty supermarkets were doing business
in Detroit alone in 1936.40 New England and Southeast regional chains
and independents that opened new supermarkets in 1935 and 1936
included the Winn & Lovett Grocery Company, United Public Markets,
and Economy Grocery Stores. 45' The Winn & Lovett Grocery
Company's first two supermarkets opened for business in 1935 in
Jacksonville, Florida.452 United Public Markets initiated a 20,000 square
foot unit in Providence, Rhode Island in October, 1936. 453
A Boston area grocery company, known then as Economy Grocery
Stores, opened its first supermarket, R.H. White Food Market, for
business in Cambridge, Massachusetts that year. 454 Economy Grocery
Stores was Sidney Rabb's family's business, and he joined it after World
War 1.41' Although he first entered the supermarket arena in 1935, Rabb
had planned his supermarket venture several years earlier.456 His plans
were no secret, and they were ridiculed as Sidney's Folly.4 7 Despite the
jibes, he persisted. The R.H. White Food Market venture proved to be
very successful, 458 and its triumphs demonstrated that Sidney was no fool
and Sidney's Folly was no more of a folly than Seward's Folly. This
store was destined to be the mother store of the northeast region's
powerful Stop & Shop supermarket chain.459 An assertive and energetic
grocer, Rabb forged Stop & Shop into a significant competitive force in
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the marketplace.' His well-earned reputation as an innovator led Leo
Kahn, the founder of rival supermarket chain, Purity Supermarkets, to
proclaim that Rabb was a role model for up and coming supermarket
operators.4 1
In 1937 and 1938, supermarkets had become serious contenders for
the American consumer's food budget. 62 The industry's pioneers,
primarily independent grocers and regional grocery chains, could
justifiably conclude that their new way of selling food had become an
established institution. 463 They responded to their early successes by
expanding their operations.4 Economy Grocery Stores (precursor of
Stop & Shop) had opened nine supermarkets by then.45 Penn Fruit's
roster of supermarkets had grown to seven.4 Albers Supermarket had
become a nine-store supermarket chain, and the Columbus, Ohio Big
Bear had become a four-store supermarket chain.467 Sam Seelig's new
southern California chain had grown to three stores. 468 Pittsburgh's
Streamline Markets was operating seven supermarkets and prospering.411
George Loft and Morris Miller expanded their chains with new and
expensive buildings.4 0 Twenty supermarkets were open and doing
business in Chicago alone that year.47' Belvedere Gardens Market,
another huge modem facility, opened its doors to the public in Los
Angeles in a 50,000 square foot storeroom.472
In 1937, Roy Dawson, a singularly feisty independent grocer with
an impressive record, set out to trump his earlier achievements.47 3 Widely
known as a cofounder of the Elizabeth, New Jersey Big Bear, he had
resigned from that company.7 4 Despite his resignation, Dawson was
steadfast in his devotion to Big Bear principles. 475 He reentered the
supermarket business in Chicago with a new venture, Dawson's Trading

460. See Stein, supranote 455.
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Post.47 6 The formula he and his Big Bear colleagues applied so
successfully in New Jersey only five years earlier was put to the test
again in Mid-America. 7 Store operating expenses were slimmed, prices
were trimmed, and the storeroom was enormous.4 s
Dawson's Trading Post kept operating expenses down with a low
occupancy cost and innovative purchasing techniques.479 Occupancy cost
was low in part because the building in which the Trading Post was
located was an old industrial building that had once been a paper bag
factory. 4'0 He offset part of his occupancy cost by subletting space to
concessionaires. 4s' He could do that because the storeroom had ample
space available for subletting without curtailing the grocery
department."' Approximately thirty concessionaires paid rent for the
privilege of selling their wares near Dawson's grocery department. 3
Dawson's subtenants could make good money selling nonfood products
to Trading Post shoppers because Dawson's grocery department sold its
food products for a lot less money than the competition.4
Roy Dawson curtailed the cost of his groceries by buying them by
the carload, and he passed the savings onto his customers.4 The Trading
Post sold ten pounds of sugar for sixty cents and three cans of tomatoes
for nineteen cents. 4 6 A seventeen-ounce can of cranberry sauce sold for
12.5¢, a pound of sugar for six cents, and a fourteen-ounce package of
Quaker farina for seven cents.4 87 He did not keep his very low price
policy a secret. Razzle dazzle advertising informed the world that
Dawson's Trading Post hated high prices as much as it hated high
operating expenses. 48 He spent $120,000 a year (big bucks in 1937) on
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advertising.4 s 9 Much of this money was spent on a twelve-page circular
which he distributed to 100,000 households.4 90
Cheap prices were not all that Dawson offered. The Trading Post
kept long hours.49' Unlike its competitors who turned off their lights 4at
6:30 p.m., Dawson's Trading Post stayed open until 9:00 p.M. 1
Shoppers concerned about missing radio news and sports broadcasts
were placated by news and sports announcements on the Trading Post's
public address system.493
The formula worked again. Just like the Elizabeth, New Jersey Big
Bear, Dawson's Trading Post was a triumph. 94 Consumers flocked to the
site and loaded their cars with liquor, home furnishings, and menswear
as well as cheap groceries.4 5 The Trading Post attracted between 40,000
and 50,000
Great Depression bruised price-conscious consumers
496
weekly.
George Jenkins kept an eye on the supermarket movement through
the 1930s as it was transformed from oddball to feared competitor. 497 As
the proprietor of a couple of small grocery stores in Winter Haven,
Florida, Jenkins had admired many aspects of the King Kullen and Big
Bear operations. 498 He admired the supermarket movement so much that
he attended the second convention of the Super Market Institute, the
supermarket industry's first trade organization, in 1938.499 Although his
application for membership was rejected because his food markets were
not supermarkets, Jenkins learned much and made valuable contacts
there.5O Nevertheless, he hesitated casting his lot with the new food
retailing system. 0 ' His enthusiasm for the supermarket movement was
52
tempered by his distaste for ugly and dilapidated industrial buildings.'
Believing that his role was to do everything he could to make the
shopping experience pleasant for his customers, Jenkins kept his little
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grocery stores attractive and meticulously clean. t Shoppers appreciated
his efforts, and they were not the only people who did.5 4 His employees
also liked working in a well-kept storeroom.0 5 Remembering his first
day as a meat cutter in Jenkins' first little twenty-seven foot by sixtyfive foot grocery store in Winter Haven, Florida a long-term Jenkins
colleague recalled many years later that he enjoyed his new working
environment very much.50 6 He praised it as the prettiest store he had ever
seen.5 t 7 With his faith that attractive surroundings and good
housekeeping led to happy customers and good profits, George Jenkins
was not ready for his own supermarket in the early 1930s when the
supermarket was principally identified with makeshift fixtures and
derelict buildings.5 "3
Early supermarket store designs of the early 1930s were ugly and
disorganized by modem day standards. 0 9 Abandoned industrial buildings
provided a cheap rent solution for an industry based on keeping
expenses down.5"' Early supermarket shoppers were willing to tolerate
shabby-looking store buildings and overcome annoying barriers. 51' They
maneuvered around industrial columns, and they hunted for goods
stacked haphazardly throughout the store. 12 Sometimes, goods were
stacked so carelessly that they were almost impossible to find.5 ' 3 To
some supermarket pioneers, this was even seen as good marketing.5 4
They figured that shoppers would understand that the price slashing was
due to huge cuts in overhead rather than huge cuts in the quality of the
food. 5 5 The notion that a supermarket business could succeed only with
an extremely low occupancy cost made possible by the rock-bottom
rental rates available only in derelict buildings was widely accepted in
the early 1930s by most early supermarket industry pioneers and grocery
chain store executives.5 6 However, that notion did not stand up to the
test of time.
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It was food distribution efficiency that really enabled the
supermarket to sell for less, and food distribution efficiency demanded
better store design, better store layout, better store buildings, better trade
fixtures, and better store operating equipment. 1' 7 With that principle in
mind, some supermarket industry pioneers followed a completely
different path from the early supermarket pioneers who preferred
converting vacant warehouse and factory buildings to supermarkets." 8
George Loft and the Cifrino Brothers had bucked the trend in 1934."9
Customers of Loft's first supermarket in Mount Vernon, New York
shopped in a new and modem building designed for supermarket
operations.5 2 The building from which the Cifrino Brothers Dorchester,
Massachusetts supermarket operation did business was not only new, it
was, from a 1934 vantage point, futuristic.52' Unlike almost every other
1934 retail establishment, the Cifrino Brothers' Dorchester,
Massachusetts supermarket was air-conditioned.5 2
1937 became a good year for Andrew Williams, a prominent
California grocer when his Andrew Williams Super Market held a
successful grand opening in Oakland, Califomia 5 s Williams did not
slavishly imitate the Big Bear model.524 His storeroom was huge by
1930's standards, but at 30,000 square feet of floor area, it was not
nearly as huge as the humongous Big Bear storerooms. 5' Nevertheless,
30,000 square feet of floor area gave Williams ample room to serve both
food and nonfood consumers in the context of the 1937 marketplace.5
This early supermarket sold health and beauty aids and prescription
drugs. It also included a lunch room; an ice cream counter; a soda
fountain; a flower shop; a newsstand; and a doughnut, popcorn, and nut
department."' Williams was not interested in old industrial buildings.529
His supermarket was housed in what was then considered an

517. See, e.g., id. at 55-57 (explaining the new store designs and modem layouts that began
emerging in the supermarket industry).
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ultramodern facility!5 ° Used and outdated furniture, fixtures, and
" ' Everything was
equipment had no place in the Williams Supermarket.53
532
new, high-quality, and up-to-date.
The notion that a supermarket business could succeed only by
leasing derelict buildings had eroded by the late 1930s.533 By then, the
early supermarket pioneers realized that they could afford to lease space
in newly-constructed, modem, and well-designed buildings. Many of
them had cleaned up their act by modernizing their operations. Even
New Jersey's Big Bear was modernized. 35 Its new 1939 store was
lodged in a spiffy, up-to-date, and professionally-designed building.9
The late 1930s also saw much better store layouts. 37 Freezer cases
were designed for self-service for the first time.538 Produce was placed in
large islands for maximum exposure to customers. 39 The popularity of
nonfood departments owned by independent or semi-independent
concessionaires diminished, and company-owned nonfood departments
replaced many of them.' Cash registers and checkout counters were
organized in a more formal way.!"
The time was ripe for George Jenkins to make his move as 1940
approached, and he started laying plans for his first supermarket.M 2 He
wanted his first supermarket to be attractive, modem, clean, and
efficient, but even that was not enough.54 What Jenkins had in mind was
trying to design the "finest store in the world."5" That was no easy task,
and Jenkins described the effort this way: "We were sure the housewife
wanted a pleasant atmosphere in which to shop, and we constantly
sketched plans for the type of market we thought all the Mrs. Joneses
would like." 5
I cannot say whether Jenkins' first supermarket was the finest store
in the world. However, I can say that the store was very successful and
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that it became the mother store of the widely respected Southeast
regional chain, Publix Supermarkets.i
If nothing else, the first Publix supermarket was designed for
customer comfort. 7 This air-conditioned structure was distinguished by
such amenities as fluorescent lighting, customized dairy cases, frozen
food cases, and a chilled water fountain.' Supermarket customers take
these things for granted now, but they were daring innovations before
World War II0'
That was not all. The building's most innovative and unusual
elements were its automatic doors. 550 These doors opened as you
approached, and they closed as you passed. 55' Virtually all supermarkets
use them now, but the first Publix Supermarket was also the first
supermarket with automatic doors.5 2 These magical devices dazzled the
public and convinced customers who lived far away to visit the store.553
They could not resist the magic doors. Some came to the store just to
pass through them. They entered through the automatic doors, they
exited from the automatic doors, they entered again, they exited again,
and they bought nothing. Fortunately for Publix, the thrill seekers who
bought nothing were in the minority.
The first Publix supermarket was designed for more than comfort.555
It was also designed to look good. Unlike customers of early
supermarkets lodged in timeworn factory buildings and garages, Publix
supermarket customers could see what was going on inside before
entering the building through full-length windows. 56 They entered the
art deco building with white stucco exterior walls through a black,
marbled entranceway. 57 Interior walls were painted with pastel colors. 58
One was green, another cream, and still another pink.559 The Winter
Haven Herald proclaimed this store the "most beautiful and most
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modem grocery establishment in Florida, and one of the finest in the
5"'
United States.1
Flush with success from the first stores, early supermarket pioneers
tried a second store, then a third, and then more. They had become
supermarket chains. Before Michael Cullen died in 1936, King Kullen
had become a fifteen-store chain. 6 ' Elizabeth's Big Bear opened its
fourteenth unit in 1939.2 Food Fair had been impressed by the swift
pace of the King Arthur chain's expansion program.5 6 King Arthur's had
grown to thirteen stores in only six years (a rapid pace for a small
independent grocery company in the 1930s).5 4 Its $5 million sales
volume was enticing enough to Food Fair to induce it to swallow King
Arthur in 1939 . In the Los Angeles area, Von's had grown to twelve
stores,5 6 and Ralph's had grown to thirty-one stores by 1941.567
In its brief twelve-year history, this daring new form of food
retailing had captured an approximately 20% market share of the nation
with the world's largest and most affluent marketplace 6 Surprisingly,
the major grocery chains did not set the pace of this impressive growth
record. Most supermarkets were still owned by independents and small
regional chains then.5 69 However, that was changing rapidly. The big
grocery chains had begun to swallow their pride, they were entering the
supermarket business, and they were doing their best to make up for lost
time and lost opportunity. 70
b. National Chains Enter the Supermarket Business
Despite the market share inroads made in the early 1930s by the
independent grocers and regional grocery chains who established the
supermarket industry, the national grocery chain store organizations
were reluctant to get their feet wet.57' Instead, as the supermarkets
operated by the independents and regional chains became a potent force
in the marketplace, the national chains were content to make their
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.

Id. at 64.
See Phillips, supranote 118, at 193.
See id. at 126.
See id. at 127.
See id. at 55.
See id. at 127.
See LONGSTRETH, supra note 60, at 115.
See id. at 120.
See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 29.
See Phillips, supra note 118, at 194.
See id.
Seeid. at195.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss2/2

60

Halper: Supermarket Use and Exclusive Clauses
2001]

SUPERMARKET USE AND EXCLUSIVE CLAUSES

service grocery stores work better and steal market share from
each otherY
With the Great Depression continuing to inhibit consumer spending
in 1935, national service grocery chain owners were very troubled by the
supermarket's continued success. 5 3 They began to see their franchises
slipping away. Without a drastic change in store size and store
operations, the big national service grocery chains could not match
supermarket prices on a long-term basis.57 Service grocery markups
averaged 20%. 575 The service grocery chains were unable to lower their
markups because their operating expenses were not much lower than
their markups.576 Safeway's operating expenses were 18.5%, and
Kroger's operating expenses were 18.9%. 51 Supermarkets could afford
to limit their markups to approximately 12% because their operating
expenses were much lower than those of the national service grocery
chains." Moreover, the large store format made it possible for
supermarket operators to reduce or even eliminate occupancy costs by
subletting big blocks of space at handsome profits.579
After losing ground to the new supermarket companies for
approximately five years, the big service grocery chain store
organizations could no longer sit by and allow these upstarts to grab
market share without a fight. 80 The big service grocery chain owners
realized at last that they were contending with a robust competitive force
that would destroy them completely unless they came to grips with the
new reality and devised a way to cope with it.5 '
A&P was still mulling it over in 1935.82 Surprisingly popular with
consumers, the newfangled supermarkets' achievements exceeded the
Hartford brothers' worst nightmares.583 The Tea Company8" had plenty
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to worry about during the previous few years."' The world had changed
for A&P. It was no longer the only national service grocery chain store
organization that could keep its operating expenses down and maintain a
low price policy.8 Its buyers were no longer the only food market
representatives with enough financial clout to buy the fruit grown in an
entire orchard.5 Other service grocery chains were rich enough to make
massive bulk purchases too.5 81 Moreover, independent neighborhood
grocers could join forces and make joint efforts to do the same thing. 9
By imitating A&P's volume buying techniques, rival service grocery
chain store organizations and independent grocer cooperative buying
organizations achieved comparable operating cost savings.5 9 As a result,
they could afford to lower their prices to compete with A&P.91 Sensing
vulnerability, other powerful national grocery chains challenged its
numerous service grocery stores with renewed vigor.5 9 Kroger and
Grand Union were bent on stealing market share from A&P with loss
leader tactics.59 They would advertise delicious bargains on popular
staples at prices below their wholesale cost.5 9 They compensated for the
losses by enticing shoppers with higher priced merchandise once they
entered the store. 95
A&P still was not ready to fight fire with fire in 1935."' The Tea
Company's long-standing price policy had been to sell at a small profit
and never at a loss, and its senior managers were bent on sticking to their
principles.5 97 Although the Hartford brothers could not stand by idly and
let others eat their lunches, they were not ready to jump into the
supermarket business yet.59 8 Their response to aggressive competition
from rival national grocery chains then was to institute an aggressive
everyday low price policy at a select group of A&P stores. 99 These A&P
origins, A&P employees often referred to the company as the "Tea Company" over the years. Some
of them still do.
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stores would sell everything at very low prices and razor-thin markups
everyday.O Promotional sales and weekend price reductions were out. '
The everyday low price was low, but it was not low enough.
Supermarket prices were lower, and supermarkets were consistently
increasing their share of the market.i
Safeway Stores was beginning to realize that the service grocery
store business was tottering, but in 1935 it too was still reluctant to
plunge into the murky waters of supermarketing.60 Instead, Safeway
tried to meet the supermarket challenge by opening larger combination
service food stores and closing smaller service grocery stores.6 Seventy
recently acquired Piggly Wiggly stores were among them. '
Combination stores were much larger than the typical service grocery
stores of that era, and the merchandise mix of combination stores was
broader than that of typical service grocery stores of that era.6 The
additional space was used effectively by adding produce and meat
departments °7 Although they were much larger than their predecessors,
combination stores were no giants. 60" A typical combination store
occupied approximately 2500 square feet of floor area.6
Kroger was more adventurous than A&P and Safeway in 1935.610
That year, it converted fifty service grocery stores to a format it called
the new "supermarket style.,,61 ' However, only six of the converted
stores had parking facilities.612
Coming to grips with reality was not easy for the grocery industry's
wounded giant, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, and another
year passed without meaningful change. 6i" Although things were still
looking bleak for A&P in 1936, it was still reluctant to leap to a large
6146'
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competitors.6 Despite its successful experiment with a very large store
that opened for business in Philadelphia in 1930, A&P's leadership was
still determined to stick to the small store format.1 7 George Ludlum
Hartford was convinced that A&P could serve more consumers and
serve them better by sticking with small stores.6 8 As he saw it, larger
stores could not be as close together as smaller stores. With clusters of
small stores saturating a geographical market, A&P was represented
everywhere. 6 9 Larger stores could not be spaced so closely to each other.
With much larger stores, significant gaps in consumer coverage might
develop. He was afraid that some consumers, formerly served by a
nearby A&P small store, might be lost as A&P customers because they
would be too far away from an A&P supermarket.6l Moreover, George
Ludlum Hartford was unwilling to accept the burdens that would
inevitably accompany the benefits of big stores.62 ' He knew it would not
be easy for A&P to start leasing big stores without abandoning some of
its time honored leasing policies.6 2 In the early 1930s, A&P's traditional
leasing policies put very little on the landlord's plate. 6 3 For example, the
term of a typical A&P lease was one year, and a typical A&P lease
provided for nine options to extend the term from one year to the next. If
it wanted to lease larger stores, the Tea Company would be forced to be
much less stingy with its landlords. 6U
George Ludlum Hartford's younger brother, John, surveyed the
supermarket scene again, and he was not enthused about A&P's eroding
market position. 62 The new industry was flourishing and expanding. In
only two years the total number of supermarkets in America had grown
more than twelve-fold (from ninety-four in 1934 to 1200 in 1936).66
More painfully, John Hartford discovered that a supermarket operation
had captured 9.5% of the Cincinnati market with only eight stores.Y
A&P had fifty-six stores in that city then, but its market share trailed at
only 7.7% .62 Results like that could no longer be ignored. The challenge
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was simply too great. It was time for the Hartford brothers to reconsider
their fundamental business principles.
After almost six years of permitting numerous upstarts to gain
footholds, the Hartford brothers made a fateful decision. Realizing at last
in 1936 that the service grocery store was doomed and that destiny
belonged to the supermarket, they decided to take the plunge. 629 They
planned to start the ball rolling with 100 units, more than all
supermarkets doing business in America only two years earlier."0
Brother John asked Michael Cullen to take charge of A&P's new
supermarket division.' Perhaps Michael Cullen would have jumped at
such an opportunity if it had come his way ten years earlier. By then, it
was too late for anyone to expect realistically to hire Michael Cullen.632
Although opening 100 new supermarkets in a brief time frame was
an ambitious task, the Hartford brothers exceeded that goal by far.633
They jumped in with both feet, and they experimented with many
different kinds of supermarket formats. They did business from leased
storerooms in buildings built to suit. 5 They operated food departments
in variety stores.636 They did business from the ground floors of
warehouse buildings.637 By New Year's Day of 1938, A&P's
supermarket program had more than doubled its original goal, and that
was merely a prelude of things to come. 8 In 1938, A&P's supermarket
roster had mushroomed to approximately 1100.639 Fantastic
The Hartford brothers understood that they would have to do more
than build bigger stores to compete in this new environment.6
Supermarkets were big from the outset, but they meant much more than
that to the consuming public. The public wanted much lower prices, and
A&P was ready to give them what they wanted. 64' Moreover, A&P was
willing to spend big money on advertising to let shoppers know that they
would save money in a big way by shopping at the new A&P
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supermarkets.64 2 Detroit shoppers were enticed by A&P's announcement
that, on the average, they would save 29% of their annual food budgets
by buying all their food at A&P supermarkets. 643 Its principal competitor
in Detroit, Packer's, fought back with ads proclaiming that Packer's
shoppers could save even more.'
A&P's supermarket program was successful-very successful
indeed. Each new A&P super store did as much business as ten A&P
service grocery stores. 645 The spurt in sales volume flowing from the new
supermarket program justified closing a slew of old unprofitable
646
stores. For this purpose, A&P's old leasing policy came in handy after
all. A one-year lease policy does not work well when you want to
expand your store space quickly. 7 On the other hand, lots of stores can
be closed quickly and inexpensively if the remaining term of the leases
for the stores is one year or less. 64
A&P's rivals were moving too. They formulated their own
supermarket plans, and they opened new stores swiftly too. 649 In 1937,
Kroger started a chain of Pay'N Takit supermarkets in Cincinnati to
compete with its former CEO's Albers Super Markets. 60 It also opened
an 8000 square foot supermarket in Fort Wayne, Indiana in 1938.651
Safeway closed many of its 3527 service grocery stores and replaced
them with supermarkets.4 2 Acme Markets got its start in 1937 under the
auspices of American Stores Company.653 Before the year ended, Acme
was operating thirty-seven supermarkets in the Philadelphia area.6
Although the big chains were at last ready to swim in relatively
uncharted waters, they were still more cautious than they had to be in
1937.65 They might have been willing to do business from much bigger
units than their existing stores, but they were not willing to build Big
Bears or even medium-sized "bears. 656 Early on, the big national
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grocery chain versions of the supermarket usually ranged between 5000
and 10,000 square feet of floor area. 7 H.C. Bohack was one
exception. 8 Far more daring than other big grocery chains that year, it
opted for a much bigger store than other large grocery chain store
organization when it launched a 40,000 square foot supermarket. 9
The big chains shed more of their inhibitions around 1940.' Their
first wave of smaller supermarkets taught them that bigger is better and
that much bigger is much better. Ten thousand square foot self-service
supermarkets were better than 2500 square foot service-oriented
combination food stores which, in turn, were better, than 600 square foot
service grocery stores.6' However, they learned quickly that even 10,000
square foot storerooms were too small for the fixtures and displays
needed to move large quantities of food products. 2 Moreover, 10,000
square foot store rooms did not provide enough space to carry a wide
variety of nonfood merchandise, a merchandise category that promised
higher markups and greater profits.66 Consequently, the chains came to
adopt a larger prototype for their new stores.6
c. The Supermarket Gains a Foothold
After 1935, the number of supermarkets proliferated rapidly. 66
Americans could shop at approximately 1200 supermarkets in 1936.6
That number more than quadrupled before the end of 1938.67
As the United States prepared to enter World War II in 1939 and
1940, the supermarket had become an entrenched institution.' More
than 6000 supermarkets were doing business in America.669
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B. FundamentalFood Retailing Concepts Underlying the
SupermarketMovement
Most of the fundamental principles that would, in time, become the
backbone of the supermarket industry were enunciated in Michael
Cullen's letter to William Albers, then the President of the Kroger
Grocery & Baking Co.6 70 Although he was unable to convince Kroger to
fund a joint venture based on the plan, Cullen persisted, found another
backer, and proved that his theory worked.67'
Although Big Bear did not do business in exactly the same way as
King Kullen, Big Bear and King Kullen were much more alike than they
were different. Big Bear's founders, Robert Otis and Roy Dawson,
followed Cullen's business practices for the most part, but they added
their own twists. Then they demonstrated that, as refined by them,
Cullen's precepts worked better on a larger scale.
A second wave of supermarket pioneers adopted most of King
Kullen's and Big Bear's business practices but not all of them. 673 These
supermarket industry pioneers were not conformists. They were selfreliant people who challenged a well-established food distribution
system that was endowed with enormous political power in a wretched
economic climate. People with the courage to challenge powerful
institutions tend to be highly individualistic. Not only did they refuse to
follow the establishment slavishly, they refused to follow each other
slavishly. They adopted the King Kullen or Big Bear policies they
preferred, they rejected what they did not like, and they improved the
system.674

Nevertheless, common threads bound the business practices of
early supermarkets, and common threads bind the business practices of
most contemporary supermarkets. These common threads include six
fundamental food retailing concepts enunciated in Michael Cullen's
original plan. 675 They also include improvements and refinements
introduced by such subsequent supermarket industry pioneers as Robert
Otis, Roy Dawson, Sidney Rabb, Alfred Goldman, Sylvan Goldman,
and George Jenkins.
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The six fundamental food retailing concepts embodied in Michael
Cullen's plan were:
-low price policy and low-cost structure,
-large store size,
-diverse product mix,
-self-service,
-- cash and carry, and
-availability of parking facilities. 66
None of the six fundamental retailing concepts in Michael Cullen's
plan were originated by him.6" Creative food merchants of earlier
generations devised every one of them. s The contribution of Michael
Cullen was gathering these ideas, integrating them into a single
workable business model, and validating the business model by
establishing successful supermarkets.
The contribution of his disciples was to refine Cullen's plan and
add a seventh and very important new fundamental retailing concept to
the supermarket business model. The seventh fundamental food retailing
concept was an efficient merchandise movement system to maximize the
benefit of self-service. 679
These seven fundamental food retailing concepts provide the best
guide for understanding the supermarket and how it might be defined.
The question whether a retail store is or is not a supermarket depends on
the degree to which the store's business methods and facilities conform
to these fundamental food retailing concepts. Let's review each of these
fundamental food retailing concepts in detail and explore their origins
and development.
1. Price Policy and Cost Structure
When compared to most other forms of food markets, supermarkets
have always been low-price competitors.m Not only are their prices low,
they are not ashamed to tell the world that their prices are low." l
Supermarkets advertise their price policies aggressively.'

676. See id at 32-35.
677. Seeid. at31.
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Although supermarket prices are low, the supermarket business can
be very profitable.683 Efficient operations make supermarket profits
possible despite their low-price policies. 6 They have massive buying
power, and they keep their expenses down. 6 The profit on each product
they sell may be tiny, but they sell so many products to so many people
that their overall profits can be enormous. 686
2. Store Size
a. Store Size as a Component of the Supermarket Business
Model
A larger store was one of the pivotal components of the new
distribution method introduced by the supermarket industry's
founders. 6 They believed that larger stores would pave the way toward
a new, more efficient, and more profitable food market format.68
Bigger stores were perceived to be better than smaller stores by
supermarket industry pioneers for four principal reasons. 619
A larger store stimulates sales volume in many ways. The increased
space makes it possible for a supermarket to sell a broader range of food
and household products than a service grocery store. 690 Larger stores also
have room for nonfood products that food stores did not carry when the
supermarket industry was born. 69' Consumers appreciate the convenience
of purchasing a broader range of products under a single roof, and the
greater convenience stimulates sales volume. 69' Larger stores are big
enough to assume part of what used to be considered the grocer's
warehousing function.693 Shifting inventory from a food warehouse to a
food market has a salutary effect on sales. 694 Merchandise that would
have been sitting idly in a warehouse before the supermarket era now
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sits in the695 store on a shelf in full view and within reach of the
consumer.
A larger sales area reduces operating expenses in many ways. The
larger sales volume that accompanies a larger sales area reduces unit
costs. 69 6 Store operating expenses do not necessarily increase in
6 7
proportion to higher salesY.
Larger storerooms reduce the need for
65
external warehouse space. With more of the inventory in the store,
supermarket warehousing expenses are disproportionately lower than
service grocery store warehousing expenses.6" Cost savings made
possible by a larger sales area can also stimulate sales volume if the
supermarket operator applies some or all of the cost savings to reduced
markups. °
A larger sales area reduces capital expenditures in many ways. The
cost of building a larger store per square foot is usually cheaper than the
cost of building a smaller store per square foot.70 ' Building larger
buildings was also proportionately cheaper in the 1930s as the
supermarket supplanted the service grocery store as America's principal
food market.71 One reason why the larger supermarkets were
proportionately cheaper then was that the cost of a building's exterior
walls was a very big part of its total cost.70 3 If a large food market could
sell as much merchandise as ten little stores, a grocery chain would get
at least as much benefit from the exterior walls of one large food market
as it would have gotten from the exterior walls of the ten little stores it
would have occupied otherwise.7° The aggregate length and cost of the
exterior walls of ten little stores were much greater than that of one large
building's exterior walls.7 5 The difference in construction cost between a
larger and smaller building translated to a lower rent per square foot for
the larger building.7°6 Sometimes, the cost savings were dramatic, and
sometimes they were modest. Even a modest reduction in rental
expenses favorably affected the food market proprietor's cost and price
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structure. 7° Larger stores are more profitable than smaller stores. 7°3 Their
proportionally greater sales and their proportionally lower expenses add
a great deal to the bottom line.7" Profits are also enhanced because the
extra space can be allocated to products with higher markups.7'0 The
industry's founders maintained that the new type of food market not
only had to be bigger than the largest grocery stores of the 1920s but
much bigger.]" OK, you ask-much bigger than what? By current
standards, even the largest grocery chain stores were tiny in 1920.72 As
the 1920s began, the A&P store roster was largely composed of 600square foot units."' Safeway marched to the beat of the same drummer.
As late as 1926, the typical Safeway grocery store contained
approximately 1000 square feet of floor area.1 However, economic
conditions were good in the 1920s, and chain store attitudes about store
size began to change.715 Some chain grocery stores got larger.7 6 The
larger stores were called combination stores, and they occupied
approximately 2500 square feet of floor area. 7
Consequently, Michael Cullen's plan to build food markets ranging
in size from 5200 to 6400 square feet of floor area was viewed as daring
by some and foolhardy by others. 7 s Similarly, Morris Miller's 6250
square foot Miller's Super Market in suburban Denver was considered a
very big food market in 193 1.719
The courage displayed by Cullen and Miller in building food
markets with more than 5000 square feet, would soon be surpassed by
far.720 Robert Otis and Roy Dawson's Elizabeth, New Jersey Big Bear
was bigger than both combined and then some.72' The Otis and Dawson
Big Bear started doing business in 1932 in a building containing 50,000
square feet of gross leaseable area. 722 That was really big in 1932. Who
would dare to build a bigger one, and when would someone try?
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b. Large Food Market Configurations Before the Shopping
Center Era
As I pointed out above, even Michael Cullen's plan for 5200 to
6000 square foot food markets was perceived as a daring experiment in
1930.131 It was a daring experiment because most of America's grocery
stores were tiny in 1930.738 Grocery stores and their predecessors,
general stores, had been tiny for most of the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries as well as the first three decades of the twentieth century.739
Eighteenth and nineteenth century urban general stores and grocery
stores occupied around 600 square feet of floor area.74' They could have
been larger than 600 square feet, but they were not. Typical nineteenth
century commercial lots contained approximately 2500 square feet, and
builders of that day built on almost the entire lot. 4' However,
commercial buildings were commonly divided to accommodate a strip
of adjacent stores that were separated from each other by partition
walls.742
Late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century grocers were
happy with small stores.743 They believed that food markets should be
small but ubiquitous.7 4 That proposition made sense before the
automobile and the electric refrigerator changed America's food
shopping habits. 745 Without automobiles or electric refrigerators, most
consumers walked to grocery stores. 74 Consequently, they were not
inclined to walk very far or buy very much on each food buying
expedition.7 Service grocery chain store organizations figured they
would be better off with stores located within reasonable walking
distance of its geographic market. 74 That policy required a huge number
of small stores and, for the most part, ruled out large storerooms.74 9
Because of this policy, the chains opened new stores frenetically in the
early decades of the twentieth century (some of them operated thousands
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The Somerville, Massachusetts Big Bear's operators built an even
bigger supermarket than the Elizabeth, New Jersey Big Bear. 72 The
Somerville Big Bear storeroom was located in an abandoned five-story
factory building." The building conformed to the Otis and Dawson
doctrine that this new type of food market needs a very big storeroom,
but the Somerville store's management wanted to work in a much larger
space than the Elizabeth store. 72 They figured that much bigger meant
much better.726 The Somerville building contained approximately
150,000 square feet of gross leaseable area-approximately triple the
size of Elizabeth, New Jersey's Big Bear.7 7 Even now, a 150,000 square
foot supermarket seems gargantuan.7
Only a few years later, Roy Dawson, one of the Elizabeth, New
Jersey Big Bear founders, built a bigger supermarket than the Elizabeth,
New Jersey Big Bear in Chicago. 729 His Chicago area store, Dawson's
Trading Post, was housed in a huge building of which the ground floor
alone contained 72,000 square foot of floor area. 730 He provided parking
for 1000 vehicles.3
Neither Cullen's original plan for 5200 to 6400 square foot stores
nor Dawson's gargantuan 72,000 square foot store was adopted as
standard industry models.732 Supermarkets developed in the late 1930s
were much larger than the units envisioned in Michael Cullen's original
plans and much smaller than Dawson's Trading Post. 733 Many of them
were in the 5000 to 10,000 square foot neighborhood.7M They would get
larger, much larger, in the years to come. Most industry pioneers
preferred units that were larger than the ones Cullen originally planned
and smaller than Dawson's Trading Post.735 What unified the store size
aspect of the supermarket movement was that all of these stores were
cavernous when compared to the neighborhood grocery
stores and the
736
combination stores with which they competed at first.
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of stores), but the stores were very small. 7 0 By current standards, even
the largest service grocery stores were tiny in 1930.7"
As important as store size was to the supermarket movement, the
supermarket industry's founders did not originate the big food market
concept.752 Although very large food markets seemed to be new, daring,
and modem experiments in the United States in the 1930s, they were not
really new, daring, modem or experimental.753 Very large food markets
had been doing business for thousands of years.' They were well
known in developed ancient societies, in eighth century Baghdad, in
medieval Europe, and in early post-Revolutionary War Ameica.7 5
Although most Americans of the 1920s bought food from little food
markets occupying between 600 square feet of floor area and 2500
square feet of floor area, almost 2000 years ago, ancient Romans
shopped for food at the Market of Trajan (among other large market
buildings).756 Some ancient Roman food markets including Trajan's
Market were lodged in huge buildings that offered the widest assortment
of food imaginable in that era.757 Lewis Mumford observed that Trajan's
Market "vies with any American supermarket today. 758 It was
approximately 100 feet high and provided space for 150 individual
shops.759 It sold many different kinds of food products including meat
and fish." ° Although the Ancient Romans did not know how to
manufacture electric refrigerated cases to keep fish fresh, they had a
simple common sense way to keep fish fresher than any freezer case.
They kept them alive in a huge tank right in the market building. 6
Some eighteenth, nineteenth and early-twentieth-century Americans
shopped for food at large public markets. 762 Some of these food markets
were owned by municipalities, and others were privately owned. 63
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760. See MUMFORD,supranote 754, at 72.
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Municipally owned public markets were established long before the
American Revolution.7 6 Boston developed one in 1658 and another in
1742. 76' The 1742 market, Faneuil Hall, is still there for Bostonians and
tourists to enjoy.7 Three public markets were doing business in
Baltimore before the city was incorporated in 1797.767 The first New
York City public market might have opened for business as early as
1656. 6' New York's Catherine Market was established in 1766. 76
Municipally owned public markets came in all sizes and varieties' n o
They tended to be much larger than general stores and grocery stores,
and some of them were as big as twentieth century supermarkets.77' For
example, Mayor Quincy's Market opened in Boston in 1826 in a 27,750
square foot structure, and Northern Liberty Market was built on a 40,824
square foot pad in Washington, D.C. in 1875.772 Public markets sold a
much broader range of food products than general stores and grocery
stores did, and their prices tended to be cheaper. 773 Eighteenth and
nineteenth century Americans preferred buying produce at the public
markets, but they did not buy all their food there.774 For many people, the
public markets were far away from home, and dally trips to them were
impractical. 75 Although consumers were willing to travel to public
markets for produce and meat, they tended to buy dry groceries from the
more conveniently located neighborhood service grocery stores and
general stores.776
Both municipalities and private sector developers were still
building public markets in the twentieth century. 7" In 1918, 174 large
public markets were doing business in communities with more than
30,000 people.778 These market buildings were considerably larger than
general stores, little service grocery stores, and combination stores."'9
764. See id. at 22.
765. See id.
766. See generally Faneuil Hall Marketplace, at http://www.faneuilhallmarketplace.com (last
visited Jan. 17, 2002).
767. See GOODWIN, supra note 755, at 22.
768. See id.
769. See id.
770. See id. at 28-29.
771. See id. at 37.
772. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 8, 13.
773. See GOODWIN, supra note 755, at 21; MAYO, supranote 53, at 236.
774. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 19, 38.
775. See id. at 35.
776. See id.
777. See GOODWIN, supra note 755, at 27-28.
778. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 12.
779. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 236.
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The market buildings were leased to independent concessionaires who
did business from stalls that were separated from each other only by
aisle space."" Municipally owned markets were governed by government
officials or merchants' committees."' Likewise, some owners of
privately owned food markets would coordinate advertising, promotions,
and other joint business functions in their markets.782 Like contemporary
shopping center783tenants, public market tenants paid both minimum and
percentage rent.
Many privately owned public markets sprouted in the Los Angeles
area where automobile ownership outpaced most other American
cities.7 4 A 32,000 square foot White Arcade opened for business in 1914
at Main Street and Pico Boulevard in Los Angeles.785 The Hollywood
Public Market was big for its time when it opened for business in 1920
with 5000 square feet of floor area. 786 The Beverly-Western Public
Market, which started doing business in Los Angeles around 1921, was
much bigger than the Hollywood Public Market.7 7 Although it was also
much smaller78than the White Arcade, its 15,000 square feet made it seem
gigantic then. 1
San Francisco trumped the Los Angeles metropolitan area in this
respect in 1922 when the Crystal Palace Market opened for business
from a 68,000 square foot building.78 9 Although it was located in the
downtown central business district with the advantage of San
Francisco's trolley-based public transportation system, Crystal Palace
customers who preferred traveling there by automobile had free parking
privileges at a facility accommodating 4350 cars. 790 Almost everything
sold from the Crystal Palace was sold by approximately 110 sublessees
that conducted independent businesses in the premises. 91 The store
owners sold little;79 however, they imposed quality standards on the
sublessees and coordinated advertising. m
780.
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One year later, in 1923, a Los Angeles area project called Ye
Market Place was planned to provide space for twenty-three independent
food stores on a site in Glendale, California.79 4 According to the original
plan, each unit would have matched the twenty-foot by thirty-foot
dimensions of many early-twentieth-century chain grocery stores.79 '
However, that was not to be. The developer, C.L. Peckham, decided that
796
the building should project the image of a single integrated store.
Although he licensed the store's departments to separate food merchants,
the departments were not separated from each other by partitions. 97 The
store was operated under a single trade name, advertising was integrated,
and opening and closing hours were uniform.798
One year later, Newark, New Jersey's fathers took a giant step
forward with a vast building occupying the 74,750 square foot Centre
Market.79 Shoppers could choose among 250 separate stalls on the
market floor."o The 60,000 square foot basement was used for storage, s°'
and an upper floor was used at least partially for automobile parking.'s 2
A smattering of larger grocery stores were introduced early in the
twentieth century, and some of them were very large indeed. ' 3 At the
turn of the twentieth century, Henke & Pillot's downtown Houston,
Texas unit occupied approximately 50,000 square feet of floor area."
Do not assume that a great many food markets of that day were that big.
A 50,000 square foot food market that was not a public market would
8O
remain a rare exception rather than the rule for more than six decades.,
Nonetheless, combination stores gained in popularity as the years
passed, and their popularity accelerated in the 1920s.0 Few combination
stores had more than 2500 square feet of floor area, and many of them
were smaller than that.w In 1929, 115,000 combination stores were

794. See LONGSTRETH, supranote 60, at 33-34.
795. See id. at 36.
796. See id.
797. See id.
798. See id.
799. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 26.
800. See id. at 27.
801. See id. at 26-27.
802. See id. at 27.
803. See Carl W. Dipman, Merchandising Trends in the Food Trade, 3 J. MKTNG. 269, 271
(1939); see also LONGSTRETH, supra note 60, at 101.
804.
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806.
807.

See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 17.

See, e.g., LONGSTRETH, supra note 60, at 105 (citing that A&P's supermarkets were 6000
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doing business in the United States.803 By 1935, the number of
combination stores had increased to 165,000.' Although they clearly
were not supermarkets, they were much bigger than grocery stores had
been until then, but almost all of them were much smaller than King
Kullen's mother store.810
Although combination stores were first beginning to be popular in
most of the United States in the 1920s, the large grocery store concept
was well established in Los Angeles in the early 1920s.81' Neighborhood
food markets in Los Angeles had grown to approximately 2500 square
feet of floor area in the 1920s.812
After 1920, the trend toward combination stores accelerated, and
combination stores got larger too." 3 By 1925, the average new food
market opened by Sylvan and Alfred Goldman's Sun Grocery chain in
Tulsa, Oklahoma contained 5000 square feet of floor area. 14 Kroger was
operating 5575 food markets in 1929, and their average size was less
than 3000 square feet.8 5 Some combination store proprietors got the
additional selling space they needed by leasing two or more adjoining
stores of a multitenant building on a commercial block and removing the
walls that separated them."6 Although A&P had continued its preference
for little units modeled on its original 600 square foot economy stores"7
(of which I have more to say below) since 1912, its policies changed
quickly after 1925.18 The Tea Company operated 15,000 mostly little
stores in 1925, but, after that, it shifted into high gear. 9 It concentrated
on opening combination stores in the next seven years.820 A&P
combination stores were much larger than the little A&P groceries but
they were much smaller than an experimental A&P store that opened in
Philadelphia in 1930.' l John Hartford traveled to the City of Brotherly
Love that year to celebrate the opening of what was, by 1930 standards,

808. See Dipman, supranote 803, at 271.
809. See id.
810. See Goldman, supranote 169, at 54-55 & 55 tbl.1.
811. See LONGSTRET, supranote 60, at 82.
812. See id. at 81.
813. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 189.
814. See TERRY P. WILSON, THE CART THAT CHANGED THE WORLD: THE CAREER OF SYLVAN
N. GOLDMAN 38 (1978).
815. See LAYCOCK, supranote 394, at 37.
816. See LIEBS, supranote 55, at 123.
817. See infra notes 1099-1122 and accompanying text.
818. See HOYT, supra note 79, at 102-03.
819. See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 161.
820. See id. at 162-63.
821. See HOYT, supra note 79, at 135.
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an exceptionally large A&P store.2 Occupying 22,500 square feet of
gross leaseable area, the new store was a combination store and more.2
With its expansive sales floor, the new store could afford to experiment
with new ideas like a soda fountain and lunch counter. 8 4 By 1932, the
total number of A&P stores had hardly grown at all, but the aggregate
gross leaseable area of its stores had grown considerably.m Forty-five
hundred of its units were in the larger combination store category. 26
The grocery chains' shift to combination stores and other larger
grocery stores was influenced by important social and economic
trends.827 With some notable exceptions during the Great Depression and
World War II, these trends continued throughout the twentieth
century
8
and stimulated the supermarket industry's expansion as well. 2
These major trends included:
-the introduction and growth of the electric refrigerator;
-the growth of automobile ownership;
-massive advertising of brand named prepackaged food and
household products;
-pressure for more shelf space from powerful food processing
companies and household product manufacturers;
-new construction techniques that made large store construction
less expensive per square foot than small store
construction; and
-operating
cost efficiency made possible by consolidating
operations in larger stores. 29
The consumer's preference for larger stores was spurred in part by
83°
the introduction of electric refrigerators for the residential market.
General Electric and Kelvinator were prominent among electric
refrigeration pioneers.8 3' General Electric's early model, called the
Audiffren machine, was introduced in 1911.832 Kelvinator's first
refrigerator sale occurred in 1918.33 Electric refrigerator ownership
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
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spread dramatically in the late 1920s.3 More than 200,000 refrigerators
were sold in 1926, approximately 375,000 in 1927, more than 500,000 in
1928, and almost 800,000 in 1929.35 Despite the Great Depression,
Americans purchased almost 800,000 refrigerators in 1930, and
refrigerator sales continued at a healthy pace throughout the Great
Depression. 6 With electric refrigerators in their kitchens, consumers
could store much more perishable food than they could in ice boxes.3 7
People who could store more food tend to buy more food and more
varieties of food, and they tend to buy food less often."3
Massive advertising by food processing companies and household
product manufacturers whetted the consumer's interest in new and
interesting products. 9 Consumers were more likely to find these
products in combination stores and other big food stores than in small
food stores.8 " Larger stores carried many more merchandise categories
and a greater depth of inventory in each category than a little grocery
store could hope to carry."' Smaller stores with abbreviated sales floors
yielded much less shelf space than their larger competitors. M 2 With less
shelf space, the smaller stores could not stock as many merchandise
varieties, and they had a greater chance of being out of stock." 3 A
consumer who dropped in and left without finding a product he or she
needed or wanted was forced to look elsewhere. When frustrated too
often by a small grocery store's limitations, a consumer often decided to
shop elsewhere altogether. As a result of their popularity with
consumers, combination stores tended to achieve higher sales per square
foot and a much higher aggregate sales volume.8 " The much higher
aggregate sales volume made it possible for service grocery chain store
organizations to save money by closing several smaller and less
profitable stores every time it opened a big unit. 84"
Food markets also got larger because of pressure from food
processing companies and household products manufacturers.8 6 The
834.
835.
836.
837.
838.
839.
840.
841.
842.
843.
844.
845.
846.
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food processing companies and household product manufacturers were
very powerful. 7 The large fish in the food processing and household
product manufacturing sea had swallowed a great many small fish by the
1920s, and some of the large fish had become whales.m Then, the
whales swallowed the remaining large fish. When the whales paused
from their feeding frenzy, they controlled a very wide range of brandnamed products, and they quickly learned that they could increase their
profits by getting merchants to buy a broader range of their brands8 9
Growth opportunities for food processing companies and household
products manufacturers depended largely on the growth of food market
shelf space and how food markets allocated their shelf space among the
processors and manufacturers.85 Shelf space in retail stores was and still
is the life blood of food processors and food manufacturers5' Food
manufacturers, food processing companies, and household products
manufacturers vied with each other for shelf space in food markets, and
they prodded food market operators for more shelf space.2
Larger stores made it possible for a general storekeeper or grocer to
please the food processing companies and household products
manufacturers, and pleasing them made good sense for the merchants.f 3
A smaller store did not have enough room to carry a broad range of
merchandise categories or a sufficient depth of merchandise within the
categories. 8 4 Food manufacturers, food processing companies, and
household product manufacturers made it much sweeter for food
merchants willing to buy a broad range of products in large quantitiesthe broader and larger the order, the sweeter the deal. For this reason, a
larger sales floor resulted in a cost advantage to the merchant.f 5
Large food market construction expenditures and operating
expenses were lower than construction expenditures and operating
expenses for small grocery stores.f 6 In the 1920s, larger buildings were
much more flexible than smaller buildings.857 Innovative construction
techniques made it easier and cheaper to build larger commercial
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buildings.!" Steel and concrete structural elements gained favor with
commercial developers, and structural elements composed of wood lost
favor. 9 By using steel and concrete structural elements, grocery stores
could be deeper, and their interior layouts would be restricted by fewer
columns."'° More savings from larger stores came from cheaper
insurance premiums per square foot, and labor cost efficiencies that
resulted in lower payroll expenses."'
3. Product Mix
a. Product Mix of Early Supermarkets
Early supermarket pioneers used their gigantic storerooms to carry
a much broader product mix than traditional service grocery stores could
hope to offer from their cramped storerooms.86 2 With their huge
storerooms, supermarket pioneers did not feel bound by traditional
grocery product line boundaries. 3
Although groceries were the predominant supermarket food
category, most early supermarkets also included meat, dairy, bakery, and
produce departments. 6 Customers of such super stores as New York
City's King Kullen and Elizabeth, New Jersey's Big Bear could pick
from canned food, a refrigerated meat department, and an abundant
supply of fresh produce.m However, in the 1930s and 1940s,
supermarket meat and produce departments tended not to be operated on
a self-service basis,6 and many of them were not operated by the
storekeepers themselves. Most were operated by independent contractors
who leased concessions within the monster stores.867 Self-service policies
were extended to meat, produce, and dairy departments during World
War HI.' By the 1950s, self-service had become firmly established in
meat and produce departments&69
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The proportion of groceries, meat, and produce to total supermarket
food sales varied widely."7 Groceries were reported to be almost 50% of
the average gross sales in 1930s supermarkets.7 ' On the average, meat
sales were reported to be almost 20% of total food sales, and produce
was a little more than 14% of total food sales. 2 On the other hand, many
supermarkets of that day emphasized different departments from other
supermarkets of that day. 3 In some supermarkets, meat sales ran as high
as 50% of gross sales, and in others produce sales ran as high as 25% of
gross sales. 4
The supermarket pioneers carried such nonfood household products
sold routinely by grocery stores of that era as toilet paper and soap. 7'
However, supermarkets did not limit their nonfood items to household
products sold routinely by grocery stores.Y76 Proclaiming that they were
offering the world a new concept called one-stop shopping, the
supermarket pioneers did not flinch from carrying products formerly
considered to be within the exclusive province of pharmacies, stationery
stores, toy stores, furniture stores, or clothing stores.m A 1937 survey of
500 supermarkets revealed that 20% had drug departments and 25% had
cosmetics departments." 8 Only 30% of the Elizabeth, New Jersey Big
Bear's floor area was used for food sales. 9 The rest was sublet to other
merchants who sold such nonfood items as auto accessories, radios, and
drugs."' In addition to its food departments, the Somerville,
Massachusetts Big Bear sold liquor, electric refrigerators, paint,
clothing, and floor coverings among many other nonfood products.88 '
Other 1930s supermarkets, primarily markets with much smaller
storerooms than the Somerville Big Bear's mammoth storeroom,
dedicated almost all of their shelf space to food and household
products. s 2
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The proportion of the shelf space dedicated to nonfood items by
most supermarkets increased during World War H."' Supermarkets had a
hard time finding enough food items to fill their shelves during the
War 8 4 The government had mobilized America's resources, and
supplying the armed forces was the government's first priority.8 5 So,
supermarket operators adapted to the circumstances and filled their
shelves with nonfood items that had seldom, if ever, been combined with
grocery and household product lines before.886 Filling the shelves with
nonfood items proved to be a big success 2 8 Customers liked the things
they saw and bought them. By the 1950s, the idea of combining nonfood
items with food and household products became an established element
of the supermarket business model. 8
b. One-Stop Shopping Before the Shopping Center Era
The early supermarket operators did not originate the one-stop
shopping concept.8s9 Public markets, a type of food marketing that had
flourished for more than 2000 years, sought that goal too--especially
insofar as food products were concerned.8 " Already popular in America
in the seventeenth century, some public markets of the pre-shopping
center era, notably Philadelphia's Reading Terminal, also had nonfood
concessions.891
Nonfood products were routinely offered by both country general
stores and urban general stores. 92 General stores were the principal
source of groceries for the American family in seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries and much of the nineteenth century, but they also
sold anything else the storekeeper could buy at wholesale. 93
Who was the first private sector merchant with a large store to push
the one-stop shopping concept? I do not know who deserves that honor,
but I do know that Frank Munsey, a former publisher of a daily
newspaper, the New York Sun, deserves at least some credit. In 1896,
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Munsey launched the first Mohican outlet. 94 His store offered a wide
variety of both food and nonfood products.895 The Mohican's experiment
with one-stop shopping was a good idea, but it did not make a big stir. 96
The world was not ready for this new sort of one-stop food shopping
in 1896. 7
Although food sales predominated in San Francisco's 68,000
square foot Crystal Palace, a significant part of the premises was
allocated to nonfood sales.98 Without leaving the store, Crystal Palace
customers could make themselves more presentable at a barber shop
department or a beauty parlor department, and they could shop at a
drugstore department and a jewelry department!"9
c.

Traditional Grocery Store Product Mix Boundaries

In the waning decades of the nineteenth century most Americans
bought food from specialized small-service-oriented food markets.9
This practice continued into the twentieth century, but it waned
gradually after the early 1920s. 90' Specialized food markets concentrated
in one type, and sometimes two types, of food.m A specialized food
market might sell groceries, dairy, meat, produce, fish, baked goods, or
candy.03 Few of these stores sold more than one of these product
categories, and none of them had a monopoly on any product category.9
They competed with each other, and they competed with peddlers and
merchants who sold from horse drawn wagons. 90'
Supermarkets were not the first food markets to sell meat and
produce as well as groceries.9 The food market product mix boundaries
seen as traditional boundaries in the late nineteenth century were
blurring as early as the turn of the twentieth century, and in some cases
they had blurred materially before the supermarket burst on the retail
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scene. 7 Although most early-twentieth-century service grocers had no
interest in selling meat and only a small interest in selling produce,
Kroger was an exception."' Despite the diminutive size of its stores at
the turn of the twentieth century, Kroger was ready to tackle the meat
business in 1904.' It purchased Adam Nagel's butcher shop chain in
1904 and began selling groceries and meat under one roof soon after
that.9"0 Adding a meat department to a grocery was not easy in those
days.9 ' Meat cutters and retail clerks were uncomfortable as members of
a single team, but Kroger persisted and made the combination work."'
Other service grocery companies crossed the traditional nineteenth
century product line boundaries that separated grocers from butchers,
green grocers, and bakers in the 1920s.913 They added departments that
sold fresh meat, produce, and fresh baked goods.91 4 In some cases, each
department was a separate business although all of them did business
under one roof and the combination appeared to the general public as a
unified retail store.95 In other cases, a single company owned and
operated all three departments.9 6
Service grocery stores that added meat and produce departments
came to be known as combination stores.917 Some independents adopted
the combination store format early in the 1920s. 95" Many Los Angeles
food markets were among them. 9 9 Between 1920 and 1925, Sylvan and
Alfred Goldman's early venture in Tulsa, Oklahoma, Sun Groceries,
gradually increased the size of its stores and added fresh meat and
produce to their product mix.920 The movement gathered steam among
service grocery chain store organizations including A&P in the late
1920s.9 " By 1929, 191,876 grocery stores that did not sell meat and
115,549 combination food markets that did were included in America's
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roster of 585,980 food markets. 92 Thus, more than 37% of all grocery
stores and approximately 20% of all food markets in America sold
groceries, meat, and produce in 1929, the year before the supermarket
era began. 9
Do not assume that this was a linear trend. The pint-sized
nineteenth century type service-oriented food market did not disappear
in 1930.2 Although service-oriented food market specialization began
declining in the early 1920s, tiny service-oriented food markets that
concentrate on one or two major food categories continued to be a vital
9
force in the American food distribution system through the 1950s. 2
Despite an accelerated decline in the 1950s, the service-oriented food
market is not extinct. 926 Many little service grocery stores, fruit and
vegetable stores, and butcher shops are still doing business todayespecially in highly concentrated urban areas. The combination store did
not disappear either. It flourished for a while in the 1930s as the service
grocery store chains turned to them as a way, albeit an ill-conceived
way, of competing with the supermarket. 927 It declined when the service
grocery chains finally realized that the supermarket was destined to
dominate the food distribution system, but it never disappeared.'
4. In-Store Service Policy: The Self-Service System
The self-service system was a key element of Michael Cullen's
proposal to the Kroger Company and also in Robert Otis and Roy
Dawson's business model.929 Now, it is firmly embedded in the
theoretical foundation on which the supermarket industry rests. The selfservice system serves two vital functions in the supermarket business
model. 90 It materially reduces a supermarket's store operating expenses,
and it materially increases a supermarket's sales volume by bringing the
supermarket customer closer to the merchandise.93
Self-service reduces a supermarket's store operating expenses by
eliminating the need for retail clerks to fetch merchandise for the

922.
923.
924.
925.
926.
927.
928.
929.
930.
931.

See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 189.
See id.
See HAMPE & WITENBERG, supranote 8, at 316.
See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 24.
See id.
See id. at 17.
See id. at 18.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 141.
See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 15.
See id.
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customer.93 2 In service grocery store and other service-oriented food
markets, customers ordered most of the things they wanted from retail
clerks.933 They waited on line for service9 4 Then, they were served by
retail clerks who fetched the groceries, bagged the food, calculated the
total purchase price, collected the money, and arranged for delivery. 935 In
the supermarket, customers fetch most of the things they want
themselves. 6 By fetching merchandise themselves, customers do the
retail clerk's job without being on the payroll but not without reward.937
The supermarket customer's reward for fetching is a presumably lower
price and a chance to get closer to the things he or she buys. 938
Self-service also stimulates supermarket sales by bringing
consumers temptingly close to products they might need but did not plan
on purchasing while compiling a shopping list.939 They might never think
about these needs on a visit to a neighborhood service grocery store, but
the supermarket gets a second chance of selling them much more than
the items on their shopping lists. Supermarket customers get a close-up
view of the merchandise. 94' They can touch it, smell it, and stare at it if
they prefer.942 As they browse through the shelves, they are bound to find
many things they need and forgot to list. They also might to decide to
buy things they never thought about buying before.943
Although self-service was a crucial element of the King Kullen and
Big Bear business models, neither Michael Cullen, Robert Otis, nor Roy
Dawson played any role in originating the self-service system or
popularizing it.9 We don't know for sure who originated the self-service
system in American food markets, but we do have a very good clue. 945
We know that Clarence Saunders was the merchant who popularized this
process, and he did that fourteen years before the first King Kullen store
opened for business.946

932.
933.
934.
935.
936.
937.
938.
939.
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.
946.

See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 116.
See PEAK &PEAK, supranote 18, at 6.
See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 61.
See i&
See id. at ll6.
See hL
See Zimmerman, supranote 205, at 90.
See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 61.
See id.
See id.
See id
See id.
See HARIPE & WrrrENBERG, supranote 8, at 314.
See id.
See id.; GODFREY M. LEBHAR, CHAIN STORES IN AMERICA: 1859-1950, at 27 (1952).
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The seeds of the shift from service-oriented grocery sales to selfservice groceries were planted when Clarence Saunders opened the first
Piggly Wiggly store (the first of thousands) at 79 Jefferson Street in
Memphis, Tennessee for business in 1916.947 Although he was blessed
with a creative spirit and fertile imagination, he had little formal
education.9 After leaving school at the age of fourteen, Saunders found
a job in a general store and earned his living first as a retail clerk and
later as a drummer 949 for a grocery wholesaler for four years."' Although
he had been a retail clerk, Saunders concocted a new and daring process
that would markedly reduce opportunities for grocery store clerks and
the cost of employing them in the years to come. 9"
His new process bypassed the wall shelf and counter system, the
predominant service grocery store layout pattern of that era, in favor of a
new system with freestanding shelving fixtures arranged in a grid
pattern.952 That was revolutionary by itself, but another feature of the
system was equally, if not more, important. Saunders was interested in
more than a better store layout system. 953 Self-service was on his mind."4
Although retail clerk productivity had increased in the late nineteenth
century, the cost of employing retail clerks was still a heavy burden for
grocers.955 Reducing the number of retail clerks would reduce the food
merchant's cost structure, and the savings could be passed onto the
956
consumer.
957
Saunders organized his new store radically to achieve that goal.
Piggly Wiggly customers passed through a wooden turnstile when they
entered the store. 95 Instead of queuing in front of store clerks stationed
along a counter, customers promenaded through the store along a oneway path that led them past every shelf and refrigerated case. 959 As they
passed the shelves and refrigerated cases, they selected the cans, bottles,

947. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 22.
948. See id. at 21-22.
949. Drummers were salesmen who represented manufacturers and wholesalers and visited
retail store owners. See PEAK & PEAK, supra note 18, at 62-63. The most famous fictitious drummer
is Professor Harold Hill of The Music Man.
950. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 21-22.
951. See McAuSLAND, supranote 27, at 17.
952. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 89.
953. See id. at 89-92.
954. See id. at 89.
955. See id. at 92.
956. See id.
957. See id. at 89.
958. See id.
959. See id.; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 27.
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boxes, and perishables they wanted and deposited them in a basket.96
The path led each customer to the ultimate destination, a checkout
counter.96' The checkout counter was attended by a cashier who tallied
the total purchase price, wrapped the merchandise, collected the money,
and placed the money in another newfangled machine, a cash register.962
The checkout cashier was also on the lookout for shrinkage, a polite
retail term for shoplifting.963 Consumers of that era were not immune
from the evil inclination. Allowing consumers to touch, feel, and hold
the merchandise without direct interface with a retail clerk enhanced
temptation for our morally weaker ancestors. Saunders's new selfservice system needed to deter the larcenous heart.9 64 The checkout
cashier was carefully trained to observe customers as they exited to see
whether they decided to pocket a bit of the store's inventory without
paying for it.9 A turnstile at the end of the checkout counter aisle
insured that customers would not exit so quickly that the cashier could
not get a good look at them.9' 6
One important reason why self-service worked for Piggly Wiggly
customers was the early-twentieth-century transition from the bulk food
sales system to the brand-named prepackaged goods sales system.9 67
Self-service was not a real option for most of the nineteenth century
when gathering the food ordered by a customer in a grocery store or
general store meant scooping grain from barrels and boxes, pouring
liquids from casks, and cutting slices from large mounds of cheese."
The birth and growth of brand-name prepackaged goods changed all
that. By the twentieth century, most grocery stores and general stores
9 69
had shifted from selling food in bulk to brand-name prepackaged food.
Twentieth century grocery store clerks could gather the little cans,
boxes, jars, and bottles to fill customer orders easily and quickly.
However, Clarence Saunders realized that customers could do that for
themselves just as well and that they might prefer doing so.97 As a result
960. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 89.
961. See id.
962. See id.
963. See id. at 92.
964. See id.
965. See id
966. See id.
967. See generally ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 145-47 (discussing the increased use of
prepackaging in the early 1900s).
968. See PEAK & PEAK, supra note 18, at 5.
969. See ZtMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 145-47 (noting that by the end of 1953, approximately
91% of supermarkets were completely self-service due to prepackaging).
970. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 92.
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of heavy advertising by food processing companies and household
product manufacturers, food market customers knew as much about the
products as the clerks did, and they did not need advice from retail
clerks.7
Piggly Wiggly and other grocery stores of the era that adopted the
self-service system needed fewer retail clerks. 972 Retail clerks who
fetched things for customers were eliminated.9"3 The remaining clerks
ran the checkout counter, cleaned the store, and restocked the shelves.""
The need to trim store employees was exacerbated by World War I.9 5
The War started soon after Piggly Wiggly opened in Memphis and did
not end until November of 1918.976 Store clerks were not so easy to find
during World War I and the early years after the War,977 and self-service
grocery stores did not need to find as many of them as full service
grocery stores.
The most important long term benefit of Saunders's innovative
technique was a big reduction in the cost of selling groceries. 8 It
allowed him to institute a low-cost, low-price, and high-quality policy,
an important element of the supermarket industry's theoretical
foundation.979 Saunders figured that he hit on something big, and he
applied for a patent on his process. 980
Why call the store Piggly Wiggly? Some say the idea was sparked
by the nursery rhyme, This Little Piggy.9 ' Others maintain that Saunders
was inspired by watching pigs squeeze under a fence.9s 2 Saunders
himself testified that he chose the name to befuddle us.913 He wanted
people to ask: Why Piggly
Wiggly?"' He wanted to arouse curiosity and
95
generate public support. 1
He did a lot more to achieve that goal than provoke curiosity with a
cutesy trade name. Saunders promoted his new way of selling groceries

971.
972.
973.
974.
975.
976.
977.
978.
979.
980.
981.
982.
983.
984.
985.

See LIEBS, supranote 55, at 120.
See id. at 119-20.
See id. at 120.
See id.
See id. at 119.
See id. at 119-20.
See id. at 119.
See id. at 120.
See id.
See id. at 119.
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with evangelical fervor. He anointed himself, the self-service process,
and Piggly Wiggly as noble warriors on a mission to save the public
from the "demon of high prices."986 He could do battle with the "demon
of high prices" and still earn generous profits because he had reduced his
cost of operations drastically.987 His gross sales for the first six months of
operations were $114,000, and his store operating expenses were only
$3400.98s Very impressive. Saunders's low prices generated more public
support than almost anyone else could have possibly imagined.9 9 Not
Saunders-he expected success, and he got it. He had prepared for the
consumer avalanche that assembled at the store on opening day by
printing admission tickets.9
Although Clarence Saunders is considered the father of the selfservice principle by most commentators, he was not the only grocer of
his era to have conceived of that principle. 9 ' He might not have even
been the first grocer to organize a self-service market." 2 A California
food market named Ward's Groceteria was reported to have begun selfservice operations as early as 1912 9 If Ward's Groceteria was not the
first self-service food market, that honor might belong to California's
Alpha Beta chain and its owners, the Gerrard family.m One
commentator says that Alpha Beta introduced self-service in 1912 and
another says that happened in 1914."' The Alpha Beta trade name was
chosen because its products were filed on shelves in alphabetical order. 96
Thus, Alpha Beta customers knew, for example, they would find
minestrone soup near matzos and soda near spaghetti. M.B. Skaggs was
an early champion of self-service as he expanded the single store he
bought from his father in 1915 to the 428 store grocery chain that
became the dominant element of Safeway Stores, Inc. in 1926."'

986. McAusLAND, supranote 27, at 17.
987. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 92.
988. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 14.
989. See McAUSLAND, supra note 27, at 17 (describing how admission tickets were provided
to prevent an enormous opening day crowd).
990. See id.
991. See id.
992. See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 25.
993. See i.
994. See id.; see also MCAuSLAND, supra note 27, at 21.
995. See McAusLAND, supra note 27, at 21 (dating self-service back to 1914); ZnVMMERMAN,
supra note 14, at 25 (dating self-service back to 1912).
996. See MCAUSLAND, supranote 27, at 21.
997. See SAFEWAY ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 40, at 2.
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Franklin Davis, a Houston, Texas grocer opened a self-service
grocery store in 1916. 98 Davis' customers picked up baskets as they
entered the store and selected what they liked from the shelves.9 They
paid up at a checkout counter just as supermarket customers do today.'m
Davis was either inefficient or way before his time. His operation folded
in a couple of months, but his experiment impressed three important
Houston grocers to try self-service themselves.' Thus, Davis deserves
credit for planting the seed that later sprouted under the auspices of J.
Weingarten, Inc., Henke & Pillot, Inc. and ABC Stores, Inc.'M
Saunders's self-service system generated support among many
other food merchants& 3 He generated so much support that he was able
to sell licenses to other grocers who wanted to convert their stores to
Piggly Wigglies.' 4 Piggly Wiggly stores proliferated quickly., °5 A
second Piggly Wiggly was launched by Kessler & Dixon in Houston,
Texas around 1918.'006 Around that time, Piggly Wiggly stores also
opened for business in Chicago and Cincinnati.'m Soon the movement
spread to many southern and midwestern cities.' °° By 1929, the roster of
Piggly Wiggly stores had grown to 2600.'m However, Saunders's star
had dimmed by then. He lost a small fortune in 1923 trying to stem the
tide when the market value of Piggly Wiggly stock dropped
precipitously because of a concerted effort by Wall Street bears.' ° '°
Shortly thereafter, he filed for bankruptcy.'0 "
Other grocers found self-service very appealing and shifted their
operations to that method without applying for a Piggly Wiggly
franchise.10 12 Joe Weingarten converted his Houston, Texas grocery and
dairy departments to self-service in 1918, but other Weingarten
departments including the meat department continued to operate on a
service basis.' t 3 Henke & Pillot, another forward-looking Houston,
998.
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See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 26.
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Texas grocer, instituted self-service policies in its "#2 store"
approximately two years later. 01 4 Morris Miller adopted self-service
techniques in his Denver area grocery stores around 1920.'05 Miller's
Colfax and Corona Cash Carry market opened for business in 1921. l16
Morris Miller followed the self-service path again in the 1930s with his
Super Public Market.'017 Reportedly, some of southern California's
drive-in markets joined the self-service fold in the 1920s also, but I do
not know which drive-ins were converted to self-service and which were
not." 8 Sylvan and Alfred Goldman's early venture in Tulsa, Oklahoma,
Sun Grocery, shifted from service grocery to self-service food markets
around 1927, only one year after the chain was born. 119 Ralph's Grocery
Company, a southern California chain, tested self-service in 1925 and
adopted a self-service policy for all of its stores in 1929020 In 1929, the
National Grocery Company experimented with large self-service stores
in Detroit, but the experiment was a dismal failure.' 2' Most of its
inventory was sold to competitors, but some of its managers came up
with a creative idea.'0 After joining forces with an advertising
executive, they sold much of the remaining inventory directly to the
public at well-advertised deep discount prices.'m Combining self-service
with aggressive price point advertising drew crowds that could be
contained only by the police.'024
As important as trimming fat from the food market's cost structure
was, self-service conferred other meaningful benefits on Saunders and
his disciples. They observed a new retail phenomenon, impulse
buying.'0 At last, people could see the little cans and boxes containing
the food they ate up close. They could reach for them and grab them,
too. Most of all, consumers could be tempted by products they could
now reach and grab, and they tended to succumb to temptation."'
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Some early self-service pioneers were so ambivalent about whether
the public would accept the new system,1 7 they gave their customers a
choice and bisected the store with a five-foot-high shelf.' A clerk
presiding over a traditional service-type system fetched groceries on one
side of the store.' ° 9 The new self-service system prevailed on the other
side.' 30
Clarence Saunders's self-service principles were to influence food
merchants long after he died.'0 3 Latter day food merchants were more
convinced of the merit of Clarence Saunders's principles than many of
his early adherents.0 3 2 George Jenkins, the founder of Publix
Supermarkets was among them.' 33 Jenkins learned self-service on the
job.'0 4 He signed on as a retail clerk with a Tampa, Florida Piggly
Wiggly operator in 1925.05 He was soon promoted to store manager and
remained in that role until he started his own store in 1930.1036 Grateful
for what he learned there, he made this comment about Saunders's
principles many years later:
"I was lucky. I learned early at the source the fundamental of
retailing that Saunders had discovered and made the basis of his
operation.' ' 3 7
5. Credit and Delivery Policy: Cash and Carry
Although the earliest supermarkets maintained a cash and carry
policy, neither Michael Cullen, Robert Otis, Roy Dawson, nor any other
supermarket industry pioneer played any role in originating the cash and
carry process.0 3 8 Recognition for originating cash and carry belongs to a
few innovative grocers of an earlier era when most grocery store
operators routinely extended credit to customers, enticed customers with

1027. See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 24.
1028. See id.
1029. See id.
1030. See id.
1031. See id.
1032. See WAT'rERS, supranote 201, at 59.
1033. See id.
1034. See id.
1035. See id. at 35, 37.
1036. See id.
at37.
1037. Id.
1038. A grocery store with a strict cash and carry policy will not extend credit to its customer
offer gifts, premiums, or prizes to stimulate sales; or provide free home delivery. See Carl N.
Schmalz, Independent Stores Versus Chains in the Grocery Field, 9 HARV. Bus. REV. 431, 432
(1931). Until the early part of the twentieth century, service groceries routinely extended credit,
offered gifts and premiums, and provided free home delivery. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 80.
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gifts and prizes, and provided free delivery service.' 39 These innovative
grocers realized that extending credit to customers, enticing them with
gifts and prizes, and providing free delivery service significantly
increased the cost of food.'m A grocer who could devise a way to
eliminate these services could charge less for food and still make lots of
1041
money.
Although many layers of inefficiency had been wrung from
America's food distribution system by the later years of the nineteenth
century, the process of selling food was still inefficient and costly. 42 It
was to get less efficient and more costly as the nineteenth century
yielded to the twentieth century. 43 Food distribution got less efficient
and more costly because general storekeepers and grocers continued two
very costly practices they inherited from their predecessors and
instituted a new costly practice with which their predecessors were not
burdened.' ( " Late-nineteenth-century
and early-twentieth-century
grocers extended credit to their customers (one very old, very inefficient,
and very costly practice), and they distributed expensive gifts,
premiums, and prizes to their customers. '04 They also instituted home
delivery service, a new service with which their early-nineteenth-century
counterparts were not burdened.'0" The cost of extending credit and
providing premiums and prizes were folded into the grocery store's cost
structure, and the cost of providing free home delivery was also added to
the grocery store's cost structure.'04 7 The combined cost of credit,
premiums, and prizes, and home delivery impeded the efforts of grocers
to keep the cost of food down.' 48
Why did general storekeepers and service grocers do these things in
the first place?
General stores and other food markets had extended credit to
customers long before these institutions were established in North
America. '" This practice had persisted for centuries.'
Customers
depended on it and preferred buying on credit even when merchants
1039.
1040.
1041.
1042.
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.
1050.

See GREER Er AL., supranote 54, at 52.
See id.
See id.
See HOYT, supranote 79, at 100.
See id
See PEAK& PAX,supranote 18, at 10-11.
See id; see also GREER ET AL., supranote 54, at 52.
See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 7.
See HOYT, supranote 79, at 100.
See id
See LEwIs E. ATHERTON, THE PIONEER MERCHANT INMID-AMERICA 61 (1969).
See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 10.
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offered substantial discounts for cash payment.'051 Consumers had
rebuffed many nineteenth century general storekeepers and service
grocers who tried to wean
them away from credit by offering
052
significantly lower prices.
What about delivery service? Late-nineteenth-century and earlytwentieth-century service grocery stores provided expensive delivery
services to their customers that were not provided by their fathers and
grandfathers. 0 53 The need for delivery service arose from a change in the
pattern of residential development. 0 54 Early in the nineteenth century,
urban and suburban general stores and grocery stores were located near
their customers' residences.'0 5 Back then, most city and town dwellers
lived in residential neighborhoods in or near downtown central business
districts. 0 56 Not surprisingly, service grocery stores also tended to locate
in downtown central business districts. 0 7 The stores were close enough
to residential neighborhoods for customers to drop by several times a
week.9" As consumers moved uptown and to the suburbs, grocery stores
moved there too.' 0 59
At first, service grocery stores and their customers were close
enough to each other to facilitate frequent visits, but that did not last
long. Newer uptown and suburban neighborhoods were less densely
populated than their earlier counterparts. '0 After moving uptown or to
the suburbs, some people could no longer get to a grocery store without
a long walk."' 6' Facing longer walks than they liked, consumers preferred
shopping less frequently. However, shopping less frequently meant
carrying heavier bundles home unless the grocer delivered them.
Grocery stores instituted home delivery to accommodate these customers
and avoid losing them to a competitor who was willing to accommodate
them.3 62 To meet the need for home delivery service, grocery store
management employed delivery personnel, purchased wagons, and kept
stables of horses."' 63 Paying delivery personnel, buying wagons, and
1051.
1052.
1053.
1054.
1055.
1056.
1057.
1058.
1059.
1060.
1061.
1062.
1063.

See ATHERTON, supranote 1049, at 61.
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See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 7.
See id. at 10-11.
See id. at7.
See id. at 10-11.
See MAYO, supra note 53, at 71.
See id.
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See id.
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keeping horses added a new level of grocery operating cost.'1° 4 In 1908,
Kroger kept around 200 mules and horses in its stables, and they
provided the power for its delivery trucks.'m
The cost of promotion added another burden to the service grocer's
cost structure.'06 As the barter and bulk process that dominated
America's food distribution system for more than two centuries faded
and the brand-name prepackaged food system began to glisten toward
the end of the nineteenth century, clever food merchants sought new
ways of stimulating sales and maintaining customer loyalty."°7 Some of
them figured they could accomplish these goals by giving away
premium merchandise.'m
Despite its advocacy of the low-cost structure principle, A&P was
an early champion of premium giveaways.' 69 It got started with
°0 The
premiums even before it became a full-fledged grocery chain.'O
premium program was initiated in 1871 when the company was still a
tea company, literally a tea company." 7' The freebies started with free
tea for good customers. 7 2 They were extended first to full color
lithographs called chromos'° 3 and then to a wide range of
merchandise.'0 74 A&P's premium merchandise, including crockery and
other household items, were listed in an illustrated catalog.' °5 It gave
away so much premium merchandise in the 1890s that it was described
as "premium happy.'0 76
A&P was not the only food retailer to play the premium game."
Its competitors could not resist entering that arena. Grocery chains and
they
independent grocers alike rewarded loyal customers with vouchers
0 78
could later trade in for clothing, kitchen utensils, and jewelry.
Trading stamps supplanted single merchant-originated premiums in
the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the
1064. See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 15.
1065. See LAYCOCK, supranote 394, at 28, 48.
1066. See, e.g., HOYT, supra note 79, at 100.
1067. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 158.
1068. See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 306.
1069. See HOYT, supranote 79, at 97.
1070. See id.
1071. See id. at39-40.
1072. See id.
1073. See id.
1074. See id.
1075. See A&P, Past,Presentand Future,PROGRESSIVE GROCER, 1971, at 10, 10 [hereinafter
Past,Presentand Future].

1076. Id.
1077. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 80.
1078. See id.
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twentieth.'" 9 Department stores inaugurated trading stamps in 1891,0'° °
and many grocers followed suit in the 1900s when S&H Green Stamps
became popular.0 8' The Sperry & Hutchinson Company and its
competitors sold trading stamps to merchants, and they issued them to
their customers. °0 2 Trading stamps were more flexible and more
03
appealing to consumers than single merchant originated premiums.
Consumers could get the same kind of trading stamps from a shoe repair
shop and a butcher shop as they got in their favorite grocery store.'O'
With so many merchants willing to issue trading stamps, consumers
could accumulate the amount needed for the merchandise they craved
more rapidly than they could with premiums issued only by one
merchant.'°
Trading stamps worked better for merchants than buying and
distributing their own premiums. 0 6 Merchant-originated premiums had
resulted in increased payroll expenses because the premiums were
redeemed in the stores.'0° A store that issued its own premiums needed
to hire more store clerks because its store clerks divided their time
between selling food and redeeming premiums."° A store that issued its
own premiums also needed to set aside valuable shelf space for the
premiums.' 0 9 Some early A&P tea stores allocated as much shelf space
to premiums as to tea. 1°9 Merchants' love affair with premiums and
trading 1092
stamps was not to last forever.' ° ' The giveaways cost plenty of
money. In 1900, the value of A&P's premiums was more than onethird of its profits.' °3
Taken together, the cost of credit, home delivery service, and
premiums add appreciably to the storekeeper's operating expenses.'09

1079.
1080.
1081.
1082.
1083.
1084.
1085.
1086.
1087.
1088.
1089.
1090.
1091.
1092.
1093.
1094.

See id.
See id. at 180.
See id. at 80.
See id. at 180.
See id. at 80.
See id. at 180.
See id. at 80.
See id.
See Past,Present and Future,supra note 1075, at 16.
See id.
See id. at 17.
See id.
See MAYO, supra note 53, at 180.
See id.
See HOYT, supra note 79, at 100.
See id. at 100-01.
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Eliminating these burdens would lighten the storekeeper's load and pave
the way for lower prices. 5
Frank Munsey's Mohican stores experimented with cash and carry
policies in 1896.t6 Munsey tried to convince the public that lower food
prices justified parting with credit, home delivery service, and
premiums." They would not bite. Frank Munsey had innovative ideas,
but the public was not ready for them-not yet.' 98
John Hartford, the youngest son of A&P founder George
Huntington Hartford, also addressed these problems."" Immersed in the
family business since early childhood, John had become an
exceptionally insightful grocery store executive by 1912 when he
celebrated his fortieth birthday." ° He firmly believed that a retail
grocery store chain's principal business mission is to maintain efficient
operations and a low-price structure and pass the fruits of its efficient
operations onto the consumer in the form of low food prices.""' Given
this premise, it is easy to understand why reading A&P's financial
statements must have been a painful task for him then. The Tea
Company's cost of food, home delivery service, and premiums were
increasing."' Its credit losses were also increasing." 3 The increases in
expenses and credits losses were reflected in higher retail prices at A&P
and other grocery store chains. 0 4 Nationwide, the retail cost of food had
increased by 35% between 1900 and 1912."05 Reflecting on these
circumstances, John realized that A&P0 6 and other chain store service
grocers had strayed from their mission.1
Convinced that A&P's profits would be affected negatively in the
long run by the rising tide of food prices, John proposed a new prototype
store for A&P."0 7 The proposed new prototype store, called the Economy
Store to distinguish it from other A&P stores, would eliminate such
expensive services as credit, home delivery, and premiums."' With the
1095.
1096.
1097.
1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.
1107.
1108.

See id.
See ZI7mmETAN, supranote 14, at 21.
See id.
See id.
See HOYT, supra note 79, at 101.
See id.
See id.at 100.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 101.
See id. at 102.
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cost of these services purged from its cost structure, A&P could afford to
reduce prices dramatically without sacrificing its profits."'
His father reacted negatively-even incredulously-to what he
perceived as a crackpot scheme."' ° George Huntington Hartford had
come to believe that credit, home delivery, and premiums were the
cornerstones of A&P's business success."" Unlike his son, John, the
elder Hartford figured that food consumers were not price conscious-at
least not then."' 2 He also figured that they demanded convenience and
would not walk a few extra blocks to save a few cents on food."
John Hartford nagged his father to allow him to experiment with at
least one Economy Store, and he kept nagging until his father
relented.' 4 John's fuss and bother were rewarded but not lavishly.' 5 He
was allowed to develop one Economy Store," 6 but the only resources
allocated to the project were a $3000 appropriation and the services of
one A&P employee." 7 Nevertheless, the Economy Store was
successful." 8 It was successful beyond John Hartford's wildest dreams.
Its success proved that credit, delivery service, and premiums could be
eliminated from the food merchant's cost structure and that the savings
could be passed onto the consumer.
Only three years later, in 1915, 554 of A&P's 938 stores were
reconfigured as Economy Stores."' 9 Since none of its pre-1912 stores
were Economy Stores, it is clear that the great majority of its new stores
were Economy Stores. 20 It is also clear that the Tea Company had
shifted the emphasis of its expansion program
to the Economy Store and
2
adopted the new format wholeheartedly." 1
The merchandise premiums and prizes that were discarded by A&P
when it adopted the Economy Store cash and carry program in 1912,
never died completely." 2 Some A&P competitors responded to A&P's
cash and carry move by discarding their own merchandise premiums and
1109.
1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.
1116.
1117.
1118.
1119.
1120.
1121.
1122.

See Goldman, supranote 169, at 57.
See HOYT, supra note 79, at 101.
Seeid.
See id.
Seeid.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid.
See LEBHAR, supranote 946, at 25.
See HOYT, supra note 79, at 103.
Seeid.
See id.
See id. at 219.
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prizes and lowering their prices."2 Other competitors continued to offer
merchandise premiums and prizes."24 The cost of the giveaways was
reflected either in higher prices or lower profits. Paradoxically, food
merchants' interest in merchandise premiums and other costly
promotions was rekindled in the Great Depression."2' Carl W. Dipman,
Editor of Progressive Grocer,reported a material increase in the use of
merchandise premiums in 1938.126 The supermarket industry was not
exempt from this trend." 27 Many supermarket organizations stimulated
their sales with merchandise premiums and prizes of their own."2 They
did this despite their low-price policies and their need for a low-expense
structure." 9 From the outset, some supermarket operators gave away
automobiles, money, and refrigerators."3 More recently, they rewarded
customers with trading stamps, and still more recently, most of them
stopped rewarding their customers with trading stamps."3
Marion Barton Skaggs, founder of Safeway Stores, Inc., was
another important cash and carry advocate." 2 Skaggs's father, a Baptist
minister, was convinced that the prevailing credit system worked to the
disadvantage of local farmers."33 Buying food on credit made them
overly dependent on grocers and general storekeepers." M Grocers and
general storekeepers charged higher prices because they were willing to
part with merchandise today and get paid sometime in the future. 35 The
elder Skaggs built his own grocery store in American Falls, Idaho, sold
food for cash, and passed the savings onto his customers. 36 Skaggs
bought the store from his father in 1915 and adopted his father's
attitudes about selling groceries on credit. 37 Cash and carry was a
crucial element of the business methods that bolstered his rise to wealth
and prominence in the grocery business."3 Skaggs's aversion to credit
sales is exemplified by this admonition: "As an organization, let us
1123.
1124.
1125.
1126.
1127.
1128.
1129.
1130.
1131.
1132.
1133.
1134.
1135.
1136.
1137.
1138.

See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 65.
See id.
See GREER Er AL., supra note 54, at 27.
See Dipman, supranote 803, at 270.
See PEAK & PEAK, supra note 18, at312.
See id.
See id
See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 65.
See MAYO, supra note 53, at 180.
See SAFEWAY ANNuAL REPORT, supranote 40, at 2.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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imbibe not too freely of this present national frenzied optimism-but
rather let us lend every effort consistent with our positions and
occupations 11in39 combatting its offspring, the growing evil of installment
purchasing."
Despite the success of A&P's Economy Store business model,
credit remained firmly entrenched among American grocers. Many
service grocery stores and general stores continued to extend credit to
their customers and absorbed its heavy cost well into the twentieth
century."' George Jenkins, founder of Publix Supermarkets, recalled
that cotton farmers bought what they needed on credit year-round from
his father's general store in the early decades of the twentieth century." 4'
The elder Jenkins' customers would settle their accounts but only when
they brought their cotton crop to market." 42 The Jenkins general store
failed when the local farmer's cotton crops were annihilated by boll
weevils." 43 My grandmother, who was in the grocery store business in
the Bronx, New York around World War I, did not insist on cash
payment and kept careful records of her credit transactions. Her
customers paid her when they could. After a while, they could not pay or
simply did not pay, and her business failed too. Neighborhood
independent grocers continued to extend credit to customers throughout
4
the 1920s, and they did so to their disadvantage." The cost of carrying
their accounts receivable and their credit losses added materially to their
store operating expenses." 45 Ironically, some service grocers, who
steadfastly insisted on cash payments in the 1920s, were willing to
extend credit during the Great Depression of the 1930s.146 Their
Depression-plagued customers were short on cash" 47 but still needed to
eat. What else could a merchant of good will do?
Home delivery also persisted well into the twentieth century despite
the success of the Economy Store." 4 Even after giving effect to the rapid
increase in automobile ownership after 1915, only a minority of
American families had access to a motor vehicle until the post-World

1139.
1140.
1141.
1142.
1143.
1144.
1145.
1146.
1147.
1148.
1911, the

The FirstDecade, SAFEWAY NEWS, Feb.-Mar. 1976, at 1, 1.
See GREER Er AL., supranote 54, at 16.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Schmalz, supranote 1038, at 433.
See id. at 439.
See GREER Er AL., supranote 54, at 27.
See id.
See, e.g., LONGSTRErH, supra note 60, at 82-84 (noting that when Ralph's opened in
majority of its business was through deliveries).
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War II era."49 With few exceptions, early-twentieth-century general
stores, service grocery stores, and other food markets made no effort to
provide parking facilities for their customers." 0 Shoppers who owned
automobiles depended on the limited supply of curbside spaces near the
stores."" With the frustration of curbside parking in mind, many car
owners preferred leaving the car home and walking to the food
market."" It is no wonder that many food market proprietors figured53 it
was still in their self-interest to continue free home delivery services.
Home delivery still remained an important option for grocers in the
1920s, 1930s and 1940s. Southern California's Ralph's Grocery Stores
continued home delivery for most of the 1920s."I 4 It began dismantling
its home delivery policy slowly in 1925""5 but did not eliminate it
entirely until 1930.1156 In his 1931 HarvardBusiness Review article, Carl
Schmalz reported that, for the most part, service grocery chains had
discarded home delivery service by then. 5 7 On the other hand, he
pointed out that home delivery was very much alive around 1930 in
neighborhood service groceries owned by independents." 8 Sylvan and
Alfred Goldman's 1930s chain of five grocery stores in Oklahoma City,
happily delivered their customers' orders."59 The Goldmans favored
home delivery for these stores because most of them had no parking
facilities and many of their customers preferred6 to economize on
0
gasoline expenses by not driving to grocery stores.'
Buying food on credit and home delivery declined rapidly as the
supermarket ascended rapidly.16 ' The rise of the supermarket seemed
destined to kill food buying on credit and food market home delivery for
eternity, but old retailing concepts never really die."62 They are
resurrected by future generations that convince themselves that they
originated ideas that were discarded as outmoded by their grandfathers.
1149. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 38 tbl.3-5.
1150. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 133.
1151. See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 89.
1152. See id.
1153. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 134.
1154. See LONGSTRETH, supranote 60, at 86-87.
1155. See id. Frank Charvat maintains that Ralph's began dismantling free delivery in 1926. See
CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 15.
1156. See id.
1157. See Schmalz, supranote 1038, at 432.
1158. Seeid.
1159. See WLsON, supranote 814, at 56.
1160. See id.
1161. SeePEAK&PEAK, supranote 18, at7, 10.
1162. Seeid&at 15.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

105

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:297

Accordingly, internet food retailers now dream of competing with
supermarkets by offering that innovative new service, home delivery. " "
6. Availability of Parking Facilities
Free parking was an essential ingredient of the supermarket concept
from the outset." 64 It filled the vacuum created by the elimination of
home delivery when the cash and carry system was embraced zealously
by A&P and some of its competitors." 65 By adopting the cash and carry
policy, a grocery company improved its bottom line by avoiding the cost
of extending credit, offering premiums, and providing delivery
service."6 On the other hand, refusing to deliver a consumer's food
purchases to the home had a negative effect on the bottom line for some
grocers." 67 A cash and carry grocer lost customers who preferred
delivery service to low prices.'1 68 Worse, by refusing to deliver, a food
merchant limited the quantity of food and household products his
remaining customers would buy on a single shopping expedition."6 A
customer would buy no more than he or she was willing to carry
home." 70 So, the food merchant was faced with hard choices. On the one
hand, he could reduce his operating expenses by adopting a cash and
carry policy."7 ' With lower expenses resulting from the cash and carry
policy, he could attract price conscious customers by cutting his prices
materially. 72 On the other hand, cash and carry was bound to alienate
some existing service conscious customers. 73 They were willing to pay
a little bit more for food as long as it was delivered." 74 Here was a puzzle
waiting to be solved, and good fortune was bound to reward the grocer
who could solve it.
Michael Cullen was convinced that he was the grocer who found
the solution." 75 The solution was free parking facilities."7 6 He maintained
1163. See Damell Little, Peapodis in a Pickle, BUS. WK., Apr. 3, 2000, at 41,41.
1164. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 32 (noting that Michael Cullen implemented the idea
of parking spaces with his first supermarket).
1165. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 86.
1166. See Schmalz, supranote 1038, at 432.
1167. See id. (mentioning that many American women still valued and demanded delivery
services).
1168. See id.
1169. See LONGSTRETH, supra note 60, at 87.
1170. See id.
1171. See Schmalz, supranote 1038, at 432.
1172. See id.
1173. See id.
1174. See id.
1175. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 32 (detailing Cullen's recommendations to Kroger).
1176. See id.
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that shoppers would rather drive to a distant supermarket and ride home
with a full load of groceries than walk to a nearby grocery store and lug
heavy bundles in their arms."' While he was still a Kroger employee, he
enunciated this principle in his letter to William Albers, Kroger's
president at the time." 8
Cullen planned to locate the super stores he proposed in the letter,
as he put it, "'two or three blocks from the business center of a big
city."' 79 That is where rent was inexpensive and parking facilities were
easy to come by."t o While urban consumers with automobiles might
have to travel much farther to his super stores than they ever traveled for
food shopping before, he figured that convenient parking facilities would
help attract them."' In the 1920s, motorists were not enthusiastic about
driving to neighborhood grocery stores."82 In his view, grocery shoppers
would be willing to drive much farther to get to a Cullen super store and
take advantage of its much cheaper prices if parking hassles could be
'
avoided."83
Nevertheless, the first King Kulen super store (which probably was
America's first supermarket) opened for business in August of 1930 at
171st Street and Jamaica Avenue in New York City's Borough of
Queens with no parking lot of its own 4 Cullen did not choose that site
because of its off-street parking facilities."" What attracted Cullen to
Jamaica Avenue and 171st Street was its ample curbside parking." 6 This
super store had the benefit of free nearby parking without buying or
leasing an off-street parking lot."7
Providing free and convenient parking facilities was a crucial
element of the Robert Otis and Roy Dawson business model for the
Elizabeth, New Jersey Big Bear.""" Although they were just as stingy
with store operating expenses as Michael Cullen, they did not flinch at
the cost of leasing a parking lot near the former automobile plant that
1177. See PRINCE, supranote 275, at 2.
1178. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 32-35.
1179. Id.at 34 (quoting letter from Michael Cullen to the Vice President of the Kroger Grocery
& Baldng Co.).
at 34-35.
1180. See id.
1181. See PRINCE, supra note 275, at 2.
1182. See LRIBS, supra note 55,at 118.
1183. See ZrIMERMAN, supra note 14, at 34-35.
at 35.
1184. See id.
1185. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 141 (noting that Michael Cullen's objective was to rent a
cheap building).
1186. Seeid.
1187. See id.
tuARAN,
supra note 14, at 40.
1188. See Zmim
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housed Big Bear's mother store." 9 The parking lot proved to be well
worth its rent when Big Bear's grand opening hit the jackpot."9 ° In its
first year, the Big Bear grocery department's sales exceeded $2,100,000,
a stupendous volume for an early 1930s grocery store when Americans
were struggling with the Great Depression."9 '
Although most 1930s supermarket customers could park their cars
at free customer parking facilities maintained by the store owners, that
was not universally true." 2 Some early supermarkets, particularly those
operated by national grocery chain store organizations, were located in
densely populated or high-traffic areas where adding a parking lot was
too expensive and relying on free curbside parking was unrealistic. 93 To
lure motorists, some of these stores outsourced their parking services by
making deals with nearby commercial garages or commercial parking lot
owners." ' Others tried to make their new supermarkets work without
parking facilities altogether.""
These attempts to operate supermarkets without parking facilities
fizzled, and grocery chains (even the large ones) came to understand the
crucial link between the supermarket and convenient free parking
facilities."9 6 The Kroger Company tested this link in 1932 when it
opened a new unit in Indianapolis."97 The new unit, a freestanding
grocery store surrounded on all four sides by a seventy-five car parking
lot, was launched as a pilot project to measure the relationship between
the availability of free parking facilities and gross sales." 98 Kroger soon
learned the closeness of that relationship. The new unit was more
successful than anticipated. Its gross sales were 40% higher than the
company's projections. " 99 Sidney Rabb, a supermarket industry pioneer
and prime mover at Stop & Shop, learned that ample free parking was
essential to the supermarket concept from his first two super stores in the
Boston area." ° One had a parking lot with 1000 spaces, and the other
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See id.
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Seeid. at42.
See Phillips, supra note 118, at 192.
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had no parking facility at all.' 2 The store with the parking lot was very
successful, and the other was a dud."
Although Michael Cullen, Robert Otis, Roy Dawson, Sidney Rabb,
and the Kroger Company's management demonstrated the dramatic
impact of free parking facilities on the food supermarket's success, they
were not the first food market entrepreneurs to provide free parking
facilities for their customers 20 3
Houston, Texas area grocers and Los Angeles, California area real
estate entrepreneurs were among the first entrepreneurs to sense that the
proliferation of automobile ownership would result in previously
unimaginable opportunities for retailing in general and food retailing in
particular. °'4 Automobile ownership had been proliferating noticeably in
the United States since 191525 By 1920, more than nine million
automobiles were registered in the United States, six million more than
in 1915. 2 " The number of registered automobiles grew to almost twenty
million by 1925, more than twenty-six million by 1930, and more than
thirty-two million by 1932.'20 Proud new owners of these vehicles
wanted to use them on shopping expeditions but were often frustrated by
traffic jams and extended hunts for parking spaces in central business
districts and neighborhood shopping districts.' 23 These Houston grocers
and Los Angeles real estate people were determined to find a way to
exploit the automobile trend.'2"
A Houston, Texas grocery chain, Henke & Pillot, resolved to attract
the growing ranks of automobile owners early on and provided parking
facilities for its customers in the 1920s. 12'0 Henke & Pillot's first branch
store opened in 1923.12 Its customers could park in an adjacent 300-car
parking lot developed by Henke & Pillot itself.212 In one early 1920s
photograph, a big crowd of Henke & Pillot customers gather near their
automobiles in the store's parking lot. 213 Another 1920s photo shows a
1201.
1202.
1203.
off-street
1204.
1205.
1206.
1207.
1208.
1209.
1210.
1211.
1212.
1213.

See I.
See id.
See LONGSE, supranote 60, at 94 (noting that Henke & Pillot opened a facility with
parking in the 1920s).
See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 37.
See id. at 38 tbl.3-5.
See id.
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See id. at 16.
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Seeid. at94.
See id.
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Henke & Pillot parking lot swarming with automobiles.'214 Henke &
Pillot must have been satisfied with the results of its parking experiment
because it built a 450-car parking lot to serve a new store in 1926.1215
Los Angeles area consumers' interest in food market parking
2 16
facilities mounted in the early 1920s for four principal reasons.1
Perhaps the most significant reason was that Angelenos loved their
automobiles and they owned plenty of them. 217 Automobile ownership
was proliferating throughout America in 1927, but it proliferated
218
nowhere else as much as it proliferated in southern California.
Angelenos and other Californians were more likely to own an
automobile than other Americans.21 9 By the late 1920s, more than one
out of every three Californians owned a car.' ° The Auto Club of
Southern California indicated that, as of December 1, 1928, over
1,750,000 automobiles had been licensed in Los Angeles. 22' Dismal
public transportation facilities was a second reason. 22 2 The city's public
transportation was so bad that shopping by automobile was more of a
necessity than a comfort. 12 The third reason was the scarcity of parking
facilities. 224 Parking spaces were already scarce in downtown Los
Angeles in the 1920s.'" 2 The last and not necessarily the least important
reason was the Los Angeles area's benign weather.21 6 Unencumbered by
227
snow and ice, Los Angeles area residents spent more time outdoors.'
The warm climate also enabled food markets to operate without
expensive heating facilities.' 22 Some Los Angeles area food markets
operated with open doors and open store-fronts.229 Adjacent parking
facilities were natural adjuncts to open-front stores. 22 0
In 1923, an insurance executive named C.L. Peckham unveiled his
plan for a drive-in food shopping complex with adjacent parking
1214.
1215.
1216.
1217.
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1220.
1221.
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facilities in Glendale, California, a Los Angeles suburb.'23' As originally
conceived, the project, called Ye Market Place, was intended to be a Ushaped building with twenty-three small in-line food stores, an enclosed
mall connecting the stores, a freestanding building2 2 with a propeller
attached to its facade, and an automobile parking lot.
The Glendale site was far from a 100% location.1 3 Why did
Peckham plan a shopping complex there, and why was he so determined
to provide an automobile parking lot?
Peckham lived in Glendale and would drive by this site frequently
while running his own errands.'2 He was perturbed by the time and
effort it took him to park his automobile in that neighborhood.'235 His
problems were not unique, and he knew that. 36 Los Angeles area
neighborhood shopping districts were suffering from traffic congestion,
and curbside parking was scarce.'2 7 Traffic control regulations
exacerbated the curbside parking problem when no parking zones were
established at intersections in an effort to alleviate traffic congestion.' 38
Curbside parking was no picnic even after you found a parking space. In
this era, long before power steering became a commonplace feature of
the American automobile, parallel parking was a laborious and
unpleasant chore for most people.'2 9 Accordingly, Peckham concluded
that a retail complex that provided free off-street parking
would appeal
24
0
congestion.
traffic
by
frustrated
owners
to automobile
That was not the only attractive aspect of the site. Thousands of
automobiles drove past it daily."24' He figured that many drivers would
drop by on impulse as they approached the project.24 2 Moreover, a drivein food market had a much greater chance of success than a food market
in a neighborhood shopping district.' 43 A drive-in food market would
draw customers from much greater distances than a neighborhood food
market could hope for."
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After a while, Peckham changed the project's design radically. 245
Although he retained its most prominent feature, a courtyard with free
parking facilities, he abandoned the enclosed mall and decided not to
build partition walls between the stores.12 With no partition wall
separating one tenant from another, the entire redesigned building
seemed to the general public as if it were occupied by a single food
market-albeit a very large food market for the early 1920s.'24 7 Instead
of meandering along an enclosed walkway and dropping by the stores
they liked best, consumers would merely pass from sector to sector
through the building itself.248 They could walk through the building from
one end to another and buy the merchandise they wanted as they did.2 49
By coordinating their opening and closing hours and their advertising,
the tenants contributed to the illusion that the building was occupied by
a single retail enterprise.' 0 Peckham's efforts and his faith in the tie
between food shopping and customer parking were rewarded by a
gratifyingly successful grand opening on October
24, 19242.' Forty2
thousand people attended the grand opening. 1
Like almost every other food distribution innovation, Peckham's
drive-in market looked good to insightful entrepreneurs."z3 It was a new
way to make an honest dollar. Peckham disciples copied it, but they did
not clone it.' They borrowed what they liked and added their own
variations on the theme.'2 5 The next wave of drive-in food markets
reflected variations stemming from their locations and the personal
eccentricities of their developers.2 6 Three new drive-in food markets
opened for business in 1925, and another five opened in 19262217 The
movement gained in popularity in 1927, and a considerable number of
drive-in food markets were built that year along busy southern California

1245.
1246.
1247.
1248.
1249.
1250.
1251.
1252.
1253.
1254.
1255.
1256.
1257.

See id. at 35.
See id. at 36.
See id.
See id. at 33.
See id.
See id. at 36.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 37.
See id.
See id. at 57.
See id. at 37.
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arterial highways."" By New Year's Day of 1929, more than 100 drivein markets were doing business in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. " 9
Reacting to the success and popularity 26 of the drive-in food
markets, Ralph's Grocery Company, a California regional grocery store
chain, decided to join the parking lot movement. 261 It provided free
parking facilities for forty automobiles at its new Pasadena store in
1929.1262 After that, providing free parking facilities became standard
operating procedure at Ralph's.'2 63
Ye Market Place and subsequent drive-in markets validated
Peckham's theories about the link between successful food retailing and
free parking. 6 The drive-in's consequences were far reaching and
evident to astute observers like Michael Cullen and other early
supermarket pioneers.12 65 Drive-in food markets provided appealing
facilities that food shoppers could find nowhere else.'266 Like
contemporary shopping center customers, drive-in food market
customers parked their cars in off-street parking facilities provided by
the store owners, and the parking spaces were free.267 Although free
parking in front of a food market is commonplace now, it was new and
special in the 1920s.12 Motorists would travel farther to shop at food
2 69
markets that provided free and convenient parking facilities.'
Consumers would bypass congested neighborhood shopping districts
and drive to a food market where they could park easily.' 70 Some
customers living only one block away preferred driving to a food market
according to Walter Van de Kamp, President of the California
Advertising Agency that specialized in food industry advertisers. 2 1 ' The
parking lot provided a suitable way for consumers to transport heavy
food bundles home. 72 With a parking lot, a food market could adopt a

1258. See id.
1259. See Walter Van de Kamp, An Innovation in Retail Selling, MAG. BUs., July 1929,
at 42, 42.
1260. See LONGSTRETH, supranote 60, at 37-38.
1261. See id. at 88; Flint, supra note 204, at J34.
1262. See LONGSTREM, supranote 60, at 88.
1263. See id.
1264. See ia at 39.
1265. See id. at 121.
1266. Seeid.at37.
1267. See id. at 38.
1268. See id.
1269. See id. at 38, 40.
1270. See id.
at 38.
1271. See Van de Kamp, supra note 1259, at 42.
1272. See LONGSTRrH, supra note 60, at 39.
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cash and carry policy and save the cost of free home delivery without
fear of losing customers. 273
Unlike contemporary shopping center customers, some drive-in
customers could shop without even leaving their cars. 74 The merchants
would send retail clerks to greet them in their cars, take their orders, and
return with bags full of food. 2 5 What did these lucky customers do
while they waited? I do not know, but I am really curious.
Southern California's drive-in food markets declined soon after
they reached the crest of their popularity. 276 The decline was obvious by
1930, the first full year of the Great Depression, and it did not stop
then.' 277 Only one-third as many public markets opened for business in
1931 as in 1930, and only three new public markets opened for business
in 1932278 The drive-in's rapid descent did not detract from the validity
of its underlying theory. 279 The demise of the California drive-in market
was caused by a worldwide calamity.' 2'0 The Great Depression had
begun, and very few retail businesses were able to withstand the horrific
problems resulting from it!'9 With a legion of workers unemployed in
an age before unemployment compensation and other vital aspects of the
social safety net we take for granted today, money was scarce. 2 Even
money for food was scarce.
Under these circumstances, the food
retailer who could offer the lowest prices would get the business, and the
drive-in food markets did not or could not offer the lowest prices.1 '
7. Efficient Merchandise Movement
When food or other merchandise is delivered to a food market, it
becomes part of the store's inventory, and the store owner keeps it
somewhere on premises until it is sold. 21 Some of it is kept where
customers can see it, and the balance is kept in reserve in a separate
storage room.'286 All food markets need to plan how and where to store
1273.
1274.
1275.
1276.
1277.
1278.
1279.
1280.
1281.
1282.
1283.
1284.
1285.
1286.

See id.
See id. at 38.
See id.
See id. at 79.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 80.
See id. at 79.
See id.
See McAUSLAND, supranote 27, at 6.
See id.
See LONGSTRETH, supranote 60, at 80.
See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 96.
See id.
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inventory most effectively.'m They also need to design an appropriate
system for selling the merchandise, retrieving it from storage, moving it
through the storeroom, and then getting it to its customers' home storage
facilities.'n' Storekeepers do these things in very different ways. They
can be done expensively or inexpensively. The process can be
convenient or inconvenient. It can stimulate or inhibit sales.
Until the supermarket streamlined America's food distribution
system, the process of selling food in service grocery stores, fruit and
vegetable stores, and butcher shops and getting it to the customer's
home was unnecessarily expensive and time-consuming.' 9 Much of the
unnecessary expense and wasted time was attributable to formidable
barriers that impeded the process by which food products were sold to
the customer, retrieved from the food market's inventory, moved
2
The
through the store, and transported to the customer's pantry.2'
process was disadvantageous for food merchants and consumers alike. 9
Before the supermarket's ascent, most twentieth-century American
families relied on service grocery stores, service-oriented fruit and
292
vegetable stores, and service-oriented butcher shops for their food.
Each step along the path by which merchandise moved from the store's
inventory to its customer's home was subject to a pair of hands and other
formidable obstacles.' 293 These obstacles increased the storekeeper's
budget and the cost of food. 29 4 They also lengthened the time the
consumer spent on a food shopping expedition. 295 Although retrieving
merchandise from storage was more efficient in twentieth century
service-oriented food markets than it was in nineteenth century general
stores, the service-oriented food market merchandise movement process
was inefficient by today's standards. 296
One factor influencing the inefficiency of the service-oriented food
market's merchandise movement process was the storeroom's layout.2
The layout of pre-supermarket-era twentieth century service grocery
storerooms was usually based on the counter and wall system. 298 Where
1287.
1288.
1289.
1290.
1291.
1292.
1293.
1294.
1295.
1296.
1297.
1298.

See id.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 89.
See id. at 78.
See id. at 78-79.
See id. at99-100.
at 83.
See id.
See id. at 99-100.
See id. at 100.
See id. at 177.
See id. at 215.
See id.
See id.
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the counter and wall system prevailed, shelves lined the storeroom's side
and rear
walls, and a counter was placed a few feet away from each side
2
wall.' "
The process by which food products traveled from the service
grocery store's storage areas to the customer's pantry started with a
retail clerk carrying a carton of cans, bottles, boxes, or jars from the
storage space to the storeroom."' He would empty the carton and place
the cans, bottles, boxes, or jars on the shelves. 30 '
A shopper would enter the store and look for a retail clerk ready to
serve her. 302 Retail clerks were stationed between a counter and a nearby
side wall.'3 3 Customers gathered in a spacious center vestibule that
separated the counters. 4 If a retail clerk was not busy with someone
else, he or she initiated the sales process by approaching him.'305 If all
clerks were busy, he or she stood in line and waited.'3 When the
customer's turn came, he or she would recite his or her shopping list.'M
The clerk would take the order and retrieve the food and household
products ordered by the customer from the shelves and other places
where it was stored. 3 8 Some merchandise was stored on and under the
counters, but most merchandise was stacked on the shelves.'3 Cans,
310
cardboard boxes, jars, and bottles were piled high-very high.
Customers could not fetch things from the shelves.' 31 ' They relied on
retail clerks to do that for them. 31 2 Upper shelves were far beyond the
reach of the tallest retail clerks, and clerks used poles31 3 with metal
attachments to get at merchandise stored on upper shelves.'
After retrieving a customer's purchases, the retail clerk would
calculate the total purchase price manually with a pencil on a paper
bag.' 314 Sometimes the arithmetic was correct, and sometimes it was

1299.
1300.
1301.
1302.
1303.
1304.
1305.
1306.
1307.
1308.
1309.
1310.
1311.
1312.
1313.
1314.

See id.
See LIEBS, supranote 55, at 117.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Seeid.
Seeid. at 18.
See id.
See id. at 117.
See id.
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other bags with the
not.'3 5 Then, the clerk would fill that bag3 1and
6
groceries and other items he or she purchased.
Until they could shop at supermarkets, most twentieth century
urban and suburban consumers traveled to neighborhood serviceoriented food markets by foot. 31 7 With no motor vehicle available to
serve as a mechanized beast of burden, the weight and mass of food
bundles deterred most consumers from buying very much on any single
food shopping expedition." Most people bought only what they and
their children could carry home in their arms."' 9 Some consumers
brought little carts or wagons to ease the load. 32 With a cart or wagon, a
consumer could carry a little more; so he or she would buy a little more.
To encourage consumers to buy much more, many service grocery stores
and other service-oriented food markets provided home delivery
service.""
As the euphoria of 1929 yielded to 1930's grim reality, America's
service-oriented food markets were still firmly committed to their
merchandise movement process. 3"2 With all of its defects, it got the job
done.' 3z On the other hand, the process was costly, it alienated
customers, and it inhibited sales. 324 The human resources needed to
power this process were very expensive. The retail clerks and delivery
staff employed to make it work weighed heavily on the storekeeper's
payroll. 32 Despite all the attention they got from retail clerks, many
customers did not trust the clerks completely. 3 26 Clerks pushed private
label merchandise on customers who wanted national brands.'32 , Clerks
steered customers to slow-moving products they would never think of
buying without a sales talk. Clerks tried to influence customers to buy
more than they planned to buy. The counters and clerks served as
barriers separating customers from the cans, boxes, and bottles they

1315. See id.
1316. See id.
1317. See id.
1318. See id. at 118.
1319. See LONGSMr, supranote 60, at 87.
1320. See LIEBS, supranote 55, at 117.
1321. See id. at 118.
1322. See Goldman, supranote 169, at 58.
1323. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 89.
1324. See id.
1325. See William Mullen, The Shopping Basket was Nice-But Limited: Then Sylvan
Goldman'sWheels StartedTurning, CI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 1991, at 10.
1326. See infra Part III.C.
1327. See PEAK & PEAK, supra note 18, at 133-35 (discussing the benefits to supermarkets of
selling private label merchandise).
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wanted, and that inhibited potential sales. 1328 Maybe worst of all, when a
service grocery store was busy, its customers could not buy anything
without waiting on line. The lines could be very long, and the customers
hated them.'32 9
The supermarket industry's pioneers devised a more efficient
merchandise movement process. The process they devised relied partly
on techniques originated by grocers of earlier generations and partly on
techniques they originated themselves. 3 ' Taken together, these
techniques ended the grocer's reliance on counters and wall shelves for
merchandise storage. 33' Instead, the counter and wall shelf system was
discarded in favor of the freestanding shelf and grid pattern layout for
which we owe Clarence Saunders many thanks.11 2 Saunders used the
freestanding shelf and grid pattern layout advantageously to reduce
payroll expenses, reduce prices, and increase sales volume. 333 Sales
volume increased at Piggly Wigglies only partly because of the lower
prices. 334 Customers also bought more on a Piggly Wiggly visit because
they were close enough to the merchandise to be stimulated by its look,
touch, and feel. 33 Despite the benefits they derived from this aspect of
the freestanding shelf and grid pattern layout, food merchants realized
that they could do even better if they found a way to overcome a
significant barrier. As customers passed through the aisles and selected
food and other merchandise from the shelves, they could not possibly
carry all they wanted in their arms. 33 6 The quantity of groceries they
were buying was much smaller
than the quantity they were able to take
3 37
automobiles.
their
home in
The supermarket industry's founders understood at the outset that
they could not maintain an aggressively low-price policy without finding
a better method for moving merchandise from a storeroom's storage
facilities to customers' home storage facilities.' 33 Supermarkets needed a
way to make it easier for shoppers to retrieve food and other
1328. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 89.
1329. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 61.
1330. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 169, at 57-58 (stating that except for the lower prices,
A&P's economy stores were similar to earlier stores).
1331. See id.
1332. See id.
1333. See id. at 58.
1334. See LIEBS, supra note 55, at 120.
1335. See id.
1336. See Mullen, supra note 1325.
1337. See id. (noting that once a housewife filled her basket with groceries, she would have to
stop shopping).
1338. See id.
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merchandise from store shelves, to transport the merchandise they
retrieved to the checkout counter, and to move themselves and their
accumulated bundles first through the supermarket's exit door and then
to their automobiles. 339
One supermarket industry founder, Sylvan Goldman, invented the
first practical shopping cart a few years after the first supermarket
opened for business, and the other supermarket operators adopted the
shopping cart quickly.'3 The shopping cart was such a powerful
influence on supermarket operations that it prompted the industry to
refine the grid pattern layout popularized by Clarence Saunders. George
Jenkins, another supermarket industry founder, contributed to the
supermarket's merchandise movement process by introducing automatic
doors to the supermarket industry.'' These techniques eliminated the
bottlenecks impeding the process by which food product traveled
between supermarket shelves and shoppers' automobiles.M They would
become crucial elements of the system that helped many American
the most
families survive the Great Depression and ultimately became
1 343
age.
industrial
the
in
devised
system
distribution
food
efficient
a. The Freestanding Shelf System and Grid Pattern Layout
The freestanding shelf system was a byproduct of Clarence
Saunders's effort to reduce the number, and consequently the cost, of
employing retail clerks inside the store in 1916'" Although grocery
store clerks did not earn big money in the second decade of the twentieth
century, their wages were a very significant part of the total cost of store
operations."' Grocers yearned for a way to eliminate this cost or reduce
it severely. 11 6 Clarence Saunders, founder of the Piggly Wiggly grocery
chain, conceived of the self-service system as a practical way to
accomplish that goal. 347 Where the self-service system prevailed,
customers bypassed retail clerks and retrieved the merchandise they
wanted from in-store storage facilities themselves.' 4

1339.
1340.
1341.
1342.
1343.

See id.
See WILSON, supranote 814, at 3-4.
See vATrERs, supra note 201, at 61.
See id.
See id. at 64.

1344. See Goldman, supranote 169, at 58.
1345.
1346.
1347.
1348.

See MAYO, supra note 53, at 89.
See id.
See Goldman, supranote 169, at 58; see also PRINCE, supra note 275, at 1.
See Goldman, supranote 169, at 58.
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Saunders realized that self-service would not work unless the
counters and vestibule that occupied so much storeroom space were
discarded.' 349 Wall shelving was retained in his new system, but the
counters and the very wide center corridor that occupied valuable selling
space were scrapped. 3 10 The space formerly allocated to counters and the
expansive center corridor in which customers gathered was reallocated
to freestanding shelving fixtures and adjacent aisles arranged in a grid
pattern.135' The wall shelves and the freestanding shelves were loaded
with merchandise-much more merchandise than service grocery stores
could stock with the wall and counter system.3 12 The retail clerks who
had previously guarded the wall shelves and retrieved merchandise
from
53
13
them in conventional service grocery stores were also scrapped.
With the success of his freestanding shelf and grid pattern layout,
Saunders achieved his principal goals. 3 - Store operating expenses were
reduced materially.'3 5 That made it possible for Piggly Wiggly and its
imitators to reduce prices and increase sales volume without sacrificing
profits. 35 6 Better yet, by devising his freestanding shelf and grid pattern
layout, Saunders eliminated significant layers of inefficiency in grocery
store operations. 31 Ultimately, it would become a cornerstone of the
modem supermarket. 358
Significant sales and merchandise movement barriers were
eliminated by the freestanding shelf and grid pattern layout.1359 No longer
burdened by the need to stand on line and hang around while store clerks
fetched the merchandise, Piggly Wiggly customers could stroll about as
quickly or as slowly as they wished along a one-way path passing
shelves full of merchandise within easy reach.1 30 They could touch the
cans, bottles, and little boxes on the shelves up close. 13 61 They could
examine the cans, bottles, and boxes. 3 62 They could fetch what they liked

1349. See LIEBS, supranote 55, at 119.
1350. See id.
1351. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 89, 92.
1352. See id.
1353. See LIEBS, supranote 55, at 119.
1354. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 89.
1355. See id.
1356. See id. at 92.
1357. See id.
1358. See, e.g., ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 18 (recognizing that service must be on a selfservice basis in order to be considered a supermarket).
1359. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 89.
1360. See id.
1361. See id.
1362. See id.
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by themselves without waiting on line.' 363 They placed their selections in
them to another segment of
a basket provided by
3614 the store and lugged
Saunders's system.'
Piggly Wiggly customers paid for their purchases at checkout
counters.' 3 Although Piggly Wiggly checkout counters resembled the
checkout counters used by contemporary supermarkets in many respects,
they were different in some respects. One difference is that Piggly
Wiggly checkout counters included a turnstile through which customers
passed as they exited. "3 Another difference is that some Piggly Wiggly
customers entered the checkout counter through an aisle that sat parallel
to the storefront and perpendicular to the aisles separating the
freestanding shelving fixtures.'3 67 When they reached the end of that
aisle, shoppers made a ninety-degree left turn into another aisle before
reaching the cashier.'3 Contemporary checkout counters are usually
formed
perpendicular to the store front and extend the rectilinear pattern 1369
by the aisles separating the store's freestanding shelving fixtures.
Saunders's self-service system and his freestanding shelf and grid
pattern layout were admired by many grocers. 370 Some grocers admired
them so much that they were willing to pay for the privilege of doing
business as a Piggly Wiggly franchisee and with Clarence Saunders's
guidance. 137' They licensed the Piggly Wiggly name, its self-service
policies, and its layout.' 372 Others admired Saunders's methods and
simply copied them.' 373 Still others adopted some of Saunders's ideas in
their own stores but rejected others. 374 Henke & Pillot, a Houston Texas
chain adopted the self-service principle only a few years after Piggly
Wiggly popularized the concept, but it did not adopt Piggly Wiggly's
grid pattern layout.'3 75 Henke & Pillot's merchants contrived a unique
layout for the company's first self-service store.' 376 They stored

1363.
1364.
1365.
1366.
1367.
1368.
1369.
1370.
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1372.
1373.
1374.
1375.
1376.

See id.
See id
See LIEBS, supranote 55, at 119.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 89.
Seeid at91.
See id
See id. at 171.
See ZMIMERMAN, supranote 14, at 22.
See Goldman, supra note 169, at 58.
See ZIMERMAN, supranote 14, at 27.
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See id
See id.
See id
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77
everything on shelves and arranged the shelves in an M formation.'
Store employees stocked the shelves from outside the M while
customers browsed along inside the M and picked what they wanted. 3 7
The M formation might not have been a huge success. I never saw it
used, and I never heard of its use by another grocer.
Saunders's admirers were in the minority for many years.1319
Despite the obvious merits of self-service and the grid pattern layout,
most grocers doing business between 1916 and the Great Depression of
the 1930s were not impressed by them. 80 The vast majority of grocery
stores in America during this period were service-oriented stores with a
counter and shelf layout. 3 1 The service grocery and its counter and wall
3 2
shelf layout dominated food retailing until the supermarket was born.
Then, the freestanding shelf and grid pattern layout surpassed the
counter and shelf layout,
and America's food distribution was
383
streamlined for good.

b.

Folding Basket Carriers and Shopping Carts

Despite significant advances in sales and merchandise movement
techniques incorporated in the business model conceived by Michael
Cullen, Robert Otis, Roy Dawson, and other early supermarket industry
pioneers, significant merchandise movement barriers remained.13 4 Try as
they did to find techniques or devices to overcome these barriers, the
solution eluded Cullen, Otis, Dawson, and their disciples.9 The
remaining barriers impaired the supermarket's competitive advantage
over service-oriented food markets, irritated supermarket customers, and
inhibited supermarket sales growth. 386 Unlike service grocery store
customers, supermarket customers needed to lug heavy bundles of food
and household products from the store shelves to a checkout stand where
they could pay for what they bought.3 7 The freestanding shelf and grid
1377. See id.
1378. See id.; see also WILSON, supra note 814, at 83.
1379. See Goldman, supra note 169, at 58.
1380. See id.
1381. See id. (explaining how stores continued with a counter system in addition to a selfservice system).
1382. See id.
1383. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 22.
1384. See WILSON, supra note 814, at 77-117 (explaining how customers needed a more
efficient way to carry their groceries from the store to their homes).
1385. See id. (stating that many individuals tried to cure the limits on grocery purchases through
various failed inventions).
1386. See WILSON, supranote 814, at 85.
1387. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 40.
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pattern layout brought the customer within feeling, smelling, and
grabbing distance of the food they served their families and the everyday
household products they need to clean and keep house."38 s Without
relying on a retail clerk's intercession, it was so tempting and so easy to
was that consumers
simply take what they wanted. 3 9 The problem
39
0
wanted to buy much more than they could carry.
Although the shopping cart is indelibly associated with the modem
supermarket now, early supermarket shoppers had to cope without
them. 391 ' Transporting cans, bottles, jars, and boxes of groceries from the
shelves to the checkout counter was not easy for 1930s supermarket
customers, and transporting heavy bundles between the store and a
waiting automobile was no easier. 39 2 The earliest supermarkets provided
baskets for customers as they entered. 39 3 They filled the baskets with
food, household products, and other merchandise as they meandered
through the aisles. 39 4 Since carrying a big load of groceries and dairy
products was physically taxing, customers would not buy more than they
could handle without excessive discomfort. 395 These physical limitations
were barriers to the supermarket industry's ability to serve consumers,
and they deterred the growth of the industry's sales volume. 396 Although
they arrived at supermarkets in automobiles that could carry home all the
food, household products, and other merchandise they might dream of
buying, they knew that they were destined to schlep all they selected to
397
the checkout counter, through the store, and then to the car.
Consequently, they wouldn't buy more than they could carry in their
arms without excessive discomfort.
Customers who bought less paid less. So, in the days before the
folding basket carrier and the nesting shopping cart were invented, the
average supermarket cash register receipt was much smaller than it had
to be. 3 9 Food merchants knew that their customers would buy much
more on each shopping expedition if someone invented a better way to
1388. See id.at 152.
1389. Seeid.at4O.
1390. See id. (noting that once the baskets were full customers stopped shopping and paid for
their purchases).
1391. See Mullen, supranote 1325.
1392. See id.
1393. See kL
1394. See WATrERS, supranote 201, at 49.
1395. See Mullen, supra note 1325; Lawrence Van Gelder, Sylvan Goldman and How He
Changed U.S. Life, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 8, 1975, at 16.
1396. See WtLSON, supranote 814, at 85.
1397. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 150.
1398. See WNISON, supranote 814, at 85.
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move food and household products from the shelves to the checkout
counter, from there through the exit door, and finally to a waiting motor
vehicle. 399
The effort to invent a contraption to alleviate the need for a food
market shopper to carry heavy loads of food and household products
from food market shelves to checkout stands began many years before
the supermarket industry was born." ° Progressive grocers like the
Cifrino Brothers, Henke & Pillot, and J. Weingarten devised such
contraptions and put them to work.' 4° However, their contraptions did
not work well. 1
The Cifrino Brothers of Boston, Massachusetts are reputed to have
been among the first to tackle the problem.493 They devised a chain belt
system that relieved the need for customers to carry groceries through
the store entirely.40 Cifrino did not use the self-service system then.'4
Its customers ordered groceries and other merchandise from retail clerks
stationed at counters around the store.' 4 6 The clerks filled customer
orders but did not hand the merchandise to the customers.' Instead, the
customer received order slips listing the things they bought.' 4 The items
they purchased traveled to the checkouts over a conveyor belt.'4 So,
until the last segment of the journey through the store, the path between
the checkout counter and the exit door, Cifrino shoppers carried nothing
more than their children and their handbags.1410 Why wasn't Cifrino's
system adopted universally? One reason was that it didn't work all the
1
time.141 1 Like all mechanical objects, the chain belt needed servicing.

1399. Van Gelder quoted Sylvan Goldman:
"In watching customers carrying baskets on their arms ... the thought came to me if
there were some way we could give that customer two baskets to shop with ... we could
do considerably more business, because usually when the housewife got her basket full it
was heavy for her to carry and she would stop shopping."
Van Gelder, supra note 1395 (quoting letter from Sylvan Goldman to the Department of Cultural
History at the Smithsonian Institution).
1400. See WILSON, supra note 868, at 82.
1401. See id. at 82-83.
1402. See id.
1403. See id. at 82.
1404. See id.
1405. See id.
1406. See id.
1407. See id.
1408. See id.
1409. See id.
1410. See id.
1411. See id. at 82-83.
1412. See id. at 83.
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Unlike most mechanical objects, the chain belt was out of action
frequently. 4 3 It often chose to break down when the store was at its
busiest. 41 4 Moreover, conveyor belts were expensive.14"5 They were
expensive to fabricate, install, and maintain. 416 In addition, they were not
easily adaptable to self-service. 41 7 Worse, this system depended on retail
purchases on order
clerks who fetched the groceries, listed customer
418
belt.
chain
the
on
purchases
the
slips, and placed
Like other early self-service grocers, Henke & Pillot issued a basket
to each of its customers. 419 Unlike other grocers' baskets, Henke & Pillot
baskets had little wheels on the bottom.' 20 Also unlike other self-service
grocers, Henke & Pillot installed a fifteen inch wide and thirty-inch-high
track against its shelving units. 42' The baskets' little wheels fit on rails
set on top of the track, and customers pushed the baskets along the
track.' 4 2 Customers found that much easier than lugging a basket around
the store in their arms . 42 Although Henke & Pillot's system made some
of its customers happy, it was not widely imitated. 44 The rail system
was tied to an M-shaped shelf configuration that had mixed reviews.
The upside was that most shoppers were delighted to avoid lugging
heavy loads of groceries around the store. 426 On the down side, the rail
forced all shoppers to traverse the same route, and they had to follow
each other in a long line.' 427 Slow moving and picky shoppers held up the
4
line, and impatient shoppers standing behind them were resentful.' 2
Nevertheless, the rail system proved there was much to be gained by
finding a way to make it easy for grocery store customers to select
merchandise, bring it to a checkout clerk, and get it home.42 9
Joe Weingarten, founder of Houston's J. Weingarten, Inc.,
contended that his company was the first to provide its customers with
1413.
1414.
1415.
1416.
1417.
1418.
1419.
1420.
1421.
1422.
1423.
1424.
1425.
1426.
1427.
1428.
1429.

See id.
See iL
See id.
See id
See id
See id at 82.
See id. at 83.
See iL
See id
See id.
See ZIMMERMAN, supranote 14, at 27.
See id at 28.
Seeid at27.
See kL at 27-28.
Seeid. at27.
See WILSON, supranote 814, at 83.
See Zr MPRMAN, supranote 14, at 27-28.
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moveable vehicles for transporting purchase merchandise around the
store and to their automobiles.43 The Weingarten vehicle, described as a
"'kiddie' car on wheels," was introduced in 1918.1'43 Joe Weingarten
remembered looking to one of his employees, Ellis D. Tumham, for a
way to alleviate the food shopper's plight.1432 Described as a
"mechanically minded gentleman," Turnham devised a rolling basket
carrierthat seems to have been a crude version of a contemporary
shopping cart. 433 Weingarten stated that his rolling basket carrier was
based on a "toy express wagon[] .,',4' The contraption was "made of steel
with a handle to push it around."' 435 Surely, the basket carrier made life
easier for Weingarten customers. 436 Pushing or pulling almost anything
4 37
on wheels is less taxing than carrying a heavy basket full of food.
However, the rolling basket carrier did not help that much. 4 8 It was
much smaller than the modem shopping cart and could not carry enough
food and household products to satisfy the needs of an average family
for a week. 1439 Worse than that, Weingarten's carts did not fold or
stack.' 40 Consequently, they occupied large blocks of space that could
have been used more profitably.' 44'
Early supermarket operators also tried their best to contrive
something or other to make it easier for the customer to bring the
merchandise selections from the shelves to the checkout counter and
beyond. 442 King Kullen tried a basket on wheels, but it caused much
more trouble than it was worth.' 4 3 Although most King Kullen shoppers
used the wheeled baskets for their intended purpose, their children had
something else in mind. The wheeled baskets looked like great fun to
them, and they used them for joyriding.'" Inevitably, they injured
themselves and others.' 4 5 The Big Bear introduced a food taxi modeled
1430.
1431.
1432.
1433.
1434.
1435.
1436.
1437.
1438.
1439.
1440.
1441.
1442.
carrying
1443.
1444.
1445.

See id. at 27.
Id. at 152.
See id. at 28.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See WISON, supra note 814, at 83.
See, e.g., id. at 82-83 (listing the various inventions created to alleviate the burden of
heavy baskets).
See Furnas, supra note 273, at 38.
See id.
See id.
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on a soap box wagon."" I do not know why that contraption did not
make it, but it did not.' 447
The problem remained unsolved until 1938 when Sylvan Goldman
made it one of his priorities. " 4 Like other prominent food merchants of
the 1930s, Sylvan Goldman, an Oklahoma City supermarket operator,
sought to ease his customers' physical burdens.' 449 He too decided that
what the world needed was a practical contraption to move the food and
household products selected by the shopper through the store.45 Sylvan
Goldman devised the contraption.4 5 It solved
the problem, and it
145 2
changed the course of food retailing forever.
Before we focus on Sylvan Goldman's solution to this problem, we
should learn more about this supermarket industry pioneer and his
family.
Sylvan Goldman was immersed in retailing all his life, and he must
have inherited a creative merchant gene. 453 His father, Michael
4 4
Goldman, a Latvian Jew, immigrated to the United States in 1880. 1
After a brief stint as an apprentice retail clerk in an uncle's dry goods
store in Baltimore, Michael Goldman trekked west.45 He journeyed to
Oklahoma around 1890 for a shot at acquiring a little piece of the two
million acres of government land just made available for
homesteading.'4 56 Michael managed to buy 160 acres of farmland when
he got to Oklahoma, but he was not cut out for farming. 14 7 He realized
that a little too late. He had already bought the land. 45 8 Nevertheless, he
was sensible enough to leave the farm in search of a better
opportunity. 459 To this end, he headed for Gainesville, Texas where he
found work more suitable to his training and disposition.' 460For the short
run, he found a good job with Kahn Brothers Wholesale Groceries,
Produce and Dry Goods Company.' 4 ' In the long run, it was more than a
1446.
1447.
1448.
1449.
1450.
1451.
1452.
1453.
1454.
1455.
1456.
1457.
1458.
1459.
1460.
1461.

See iL
See iaL
See WILSON, supra note 814, at 90.
See id. at 82.
See id.
See iL at77, 90.
See id. at 77.
See id. at 4.
See id. at 77.
See id.
See id. at 4-5.
See id. at 5.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id
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good job. After a few years with his new boss, he married the boss's
niece, Hortense Dreyfus, in 1894 and became a member of the
Kahn/Dreyfus family.' 462
Michael's new status as family member came with new
responsibilities and new adventures. The family shipped him off to
Native American territory to manage a poorly performing general store
owned by family members.' 463 His mission was to turn the store around,
4
and he accomplished the feat.6'
One additional mission was
accomplished before he left Indian territory but not entirely by Michael.
Hortense Goldman gave birth to the newlyweds' first son, Alfred, in
1895 .16
His next assignment took Michael Goldman, his wife, and his son

to Ardmore, Oklahoma to wrestle with the problems of another pathetic
general store in which the family had an interest.'4 The Ardmore
assignment brought him to still another general store and, more
importantly, another son.'4 7 Sylvan Goldman was born in Ardmore in
1898.'4 He lived there, attended school there,
469 worked in his father's
store there, and became a Bar Mitzvah there.
When Sylvan was fifteen years old in 1913, Michael sold the
Ardmore store and moved his family to Tulsa where his wife's brothers
lived. 470 The Dreyfus brothers were in the wholesale grocery and
produce business then, and they were doing well.'47 Shortly after they
arrived in Tulsa, Sylvan Goldman started working for his uncles. 47 2 Like
his father before him, the family business dispatched him to a branch
store in another town. 4 73 This town was Sapulpa, Oklahoma.' 74 Unlike
his father before him, Sylvan was not to be the store manager.'4 75 He
spent the next four years in a Sapulpa, Oklahoma grocery store learning

1462.
1463.
1464.
1465.
1466.
1467.
1468.
1469.
1470.
1471.
1472.
1473.
1474.
1475.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 5-6.
See id. at 6.
See id.
See id. at 7-8.
See id. at 9.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 10.
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the grocery business
under the watchful eye of his uncle and boss,
47 6
Samuel Dreyfus.'
Even a World War did not interrupt Sylvan Goldman's connection
to the retail trade in general and to food retailing in particular.'477 Imbued
with patriotic fervor, Sylvan Goldman lied about his age (he was too
young for military service) and signed on with the U.S. Army in 1917.478
Oddly, the U.S. Army, Company D of the Second Battalion of the 11 th
Engineers recognized his merchant's talent and experience in the food
479
business.
Goldman became a food specialist with a mess sergeant's
1 40
rank.
Whoever put Sergeant Goldman in charge of procuring his unit's
food supply had the wisdom of Solomon. Reportedly, his comrades-inarms praised his meals' 43' which, I must say, was an unusual event in the
life a U.S. Army mess sergeant.
When the 11 th was stationed in France at the front lines in
September 1918, Goldman confronted new and difficult problems in his
effort to procure enough good food to feed his Company. 4 2 His
Company was attached to other Army units, and that made it dependent
on other units for its food supply. 4 When the other units' commanders
were reluctant to share their food, Sergeant Goldman turned to the kind
of impromptu tactics that make the difference between winning and
losing a war, or, for that matter, any contest."m He dispatched soldiers in
horse drawn wagons to hunt for food at night, and the wagons returned
with plenty of food night after night.s'5 They scrounged food from
supply depots, and they diverted food supplies from convoys headed
4
elsewhere. 4, 6 Needless to say, the men of Company D were well fed.
1476. See id
1477. See id.
1478. See id. at 10-11.
1479. See id at 12.
1480. See id. The Army decided I was a food specialist too when I was transferred to the 214th
Quartermaster Company of the 77th Infantry Division forty-three years later. Since my only
previous experience with food had been several stints as a grocery store delivery boy and a hotel
dining room busboy, I have always questioned the wisdom of the nameless person who decided I
was a food specialist and assigned me to a bakery unit. Other food specialists in my unit questioned
his wisdom too. Some of them insisted that the Army decided they were bakers because of a
typographical error. In civilian life, they were bankers.
1481. See id
1482. See id at 18.
1483. See id
1484. See id
1485. See id.
1486. See id.
1487. See id.
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As for Sergeant Sylvan Goldman, he returned to America after the
Armistice with the valuable lessons he had learned about
improvisation.148 8 He was honorably discharged from the U.S. Army in
1919.1489
His brother Alfred Goldman also served in the U.S. Army during
World War I, but Alfred was discharged early because of a medical
disability.' 490 After his discharge, Alfred found a job with a San Antonio,
Texas based wholesale grocery and produce business and hung out there
until Sylvan's tour of duty with the U.S. Army ended' 49 Then he
proposed that the brothers join forces and start their own food
business. 492 Sylvan was glad to do that, and the Goldman brothers began
a collaboration that would end only with Alfred's untimely death in
1937.493 They started with a wholesale grocery and produce business in
Cisco and Stephens Counties in Texas in 1919 where oil was gushing
and money was flowing. 494 Initially, they were very successful, but their
success lasted only as long as the oil boom lasted. 495 The market for oil
waned in 1922, and the Goldman brothers' first venture496 together was
buried under a mass of uncollectible accounts receivable.
Disillusioned with their prospects in Oklahoma, Alfred and Sylvan
headed for southern California where they found jobs with produce
wholesalers. 497 California was growing fast, and like other young people
of their generation, they viewed Los Angeles as the land of
opportunity.'498 They intended to start a wholesale food business there
themselves as soon as they accumulated enough capital to make the
move. 4" However, their uncles who were still doing well, very well, in
Oklahoma, had other plans in mind for the Goldman brothers.'" The
uncles wanted to start a new retail grocery chain in Tulsa, and they
needed a couple of bright, energetic, and trustworthy men to manage the
new business.'50' They could not think of a better place to look for talent
1488.
1489.
1490.
1491.
1492.
1493.
1494.
1495.
1496.
1497.
1498.
1499.
1500.
1501.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 25.
See id. at 25-26.
See id. at 26.
See id. at 26, 73-74.
See id. at 26.
See id. at 29.
See id.
See id. at 29-30.
See id. at 30.
See id.
See id. at 30-3 1.
Seeid. at31.
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than their own family, and they made an offer the Goldman brothers
could not refuse. M The uncles would put up all the money and would
get 75% of the new company's stock in return."" 3 The Goldman boys
would split the balance of the stock but would not be required to invest a
nickel of their own in the new company. 5 ' Other benefits were in store
for them too. They would learn more about the retail grocery business by
working for Los Angeles area grocers.5 5 Then they would launch the
new company and manage it."06
It was a deal, and Sun Grocery was born 50 7 Its first store opened
for business with the public on April 3, 1926.150S Sylvan and Alfred's
performance justified their uncles' faith in them.'59 Sun Grocery was a
very successful business, and it expanded rapidly.'5 0' In only three years,
the chain was operating fifty retail stores.5 Its success was noticed by
Skaggs-Safeway Stores, Inc. 512 Early in 1929 and a few months before
the New York Stock Exchange's cataclysmic crash, Safeway agreed to
buy both Sun and the uncles' wholesale business. 513 When the deal
closed, Sylvan and Alfred Goldman were
rich men on paper in an
51 4
America enthralled with the stock market.
People from all walks of life were playing the stock market in 1929.
Ordinary people invested much more money in the stock market than
they could afford to lose. 515 To make matters worse, investors were
buying on margin routinely, and the minimum margin was 10%.1516 So, if
you bought $10,000 worth of stock, you parted with no more than $1000
in cash. Your broker would lend you the rest. 517 With a 10% margin, you
could make a fortune quickly. 151 If the stock you bought for $10,000
appreciated by only 10%, you would double your money. On the other

1502.
1503.
1504.
1505.
1506.
1507.
1508.
1509.
1510.
1511.
1512.
1513.
1514.
1515.
1516.
1517.
1518.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 33.
See id.
at 33,75.
See id. at 33-34.
See id.
See id.
at 42.
See id.
See id.
Seeid. at44.
See id.
See id. at 44-45.
See id. at 46; see also GALRA1TH, supranote 26, at 26.
See WILSON, supranote 814, at 46.
See GALBRArrH, supranote 26, at 26.
See WMSON, supranote 814, at 46.
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hand, you would lose all of your money if the stock price dropped
by 10%.
The profits that inured to the Goldman Brothers from the Safeway
deal did not last long.5 9 They risked it in the stock market. 5 20 Although
they were more conservative than most investors were, and borrowed
from their broker much less than the average
person did, they sustained
15 2
heavy losses when the stock market crashed. '
Sylvan and Alfred Goldman left Tulsa for Oklahoma City in
5
1929. 522 By then, the grocery business had permeated their psyches.' 2
Despite the pessimism that had permeated American business as a result
of the stock market crash, the Goldman brothers yearned for new
opportunities.' 5 Tulsa was one place they could not look for new
opportunities because a restrictive covenant in their contract with
Safeway prohibited them from doing business in any community in
which Sun Grocery did business.'15 2 However, the restrictive covenant
did not extend to Oklahoma City, and the brothers bought four suburban
grocery stores and one urban grocery store in the Oklahoma City market
from a bankrupt grocery chain. 5 26 The urban store was located in
7
downtown Oklahoma City and was named the Standard Grocery.1
Although it became the mother store of the new food market chain the
Goldmans were about to create, the downtown store was no prize.
Compared to the innovative stores they had developed for Sun Grocery
in Tulsa, it was not much to work with. 52 It was tiny by today's
standards with only 1250 square feet of sales floor area, and it had no
parking facilities. 529 The suburban stores had no parking facilities
either. 530 At first, the Goldmans ran them as service groceries and
offered free home delivery. 1531' That did not last long. As the suburban
store leases expired, they replaced them with new and larger units.15 3 2 By
1934, the Goldmans were reintroducing the policies that had made the
1519.
1520.
1521.
1522.
1523.
1524.
1525.
1526.
1527.
1528.
1529.
1530.
1531.
1532.

Seeid. at50.
See id. at 46.
Seeid. at50.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 51.
See id. at 54-56.
See id. at 52.
See id. at 56.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 61.
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Sun Grocery chain so successful.1 3 3 In 1934, Standard opened a new
store with 7000 square feet of floor area and its own parking lot. 5" Also
in 1934, Standard acquired its bankrupt competitor, Humpty Dumpty, a
small chain of self-service stores, from its receiver. 535 For approximately
nine years, Standard and Humpty maintained their separate identities.1536
The operations were merged in 1943, and the combined operation came
to be known as Standard-Humpty Dumpty 7
The Standard and Humpty Dumpty chains grew despite the dismal
economic climate of the 1930s and the Great Depression, and the
Goldmans returned to the self-service policies they had adopted for their
Sun Grocery stores in the 1920s.'538 Although some of these stores were
too small to be called supermarkets, the Standard and Humpty Dumpty
stores opened after 1934 were self-service stores.5 9 Like other selfservice food markets of that era, the Standard and Humpty Dumpty
grocery departments were operated on a strict self-service basis.4
Unlike many other self-service food markets of that era, Standard and
Humpty Dumpty produce departments were also operated on a selfservice basis.4'"
Their dedication to the self-service principle influenced the
Goldmans to try their hands at overcoming the most difficult barrier to
the smooth operation of the self-service system, the hardship imposed on
the stores' mostly female customers by the weight of hand carried
baskets loaded with heavy food packages." 42 After Alfred Goldman died
in 1937, Sylvan Goldman shouldered this burden alone as well as all the
other burdens of being the sole chief executive officer of a rapidly
expanding food market chain store organization.- 3
Sylvan Goldman's first scheme to cope with the limitations
imposed on the self-service system by the weight of market baskets
loaded with heavy food packages was distinctly low tech. His retail
clerks were directed to eyeball shoppers as they traipsed about the store
selecting merchandise from the shelves and loading their shopping

1533.
1534.

See id. at59-61.
See id. at 61-62.

1535. See id at 63.
1536.
1537.
1538.
1539.
1540.
1541.
1542.
1543.

See iaat65.
See id. at 65, 67.
See id. at 56, 63.
See id. at 56.
See id.
See id. at 63.
See id. at 77-78.
See id. at 74, 76.
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baskets. 5"44 As the contents of a basket approached the physical limits of
the shopper carrying it, a retail clerk would come to the rescue. "5 He
would carry the basket to the checkout counter for her.'- 6 There it would
sit until the shopper dropped by to retrieve it.'5"47 It was a good scheme
for consumers because it made food shopping less taxing.'m It was a
good scheme for the merchant because it made it possible for shoppers
to buy more than they could have bought otherwise.'4 9 Nevertheless, it
was only a stopgap measure.""
Prior contraptions devised to make it easy for a shopper to transport
food and other merchandise from the shelf to the checkout counter or
further had failed for one reason or another. The Cifrino Brothers'
conveyor belt kept breaking down.15 1' Henke & Pillot's rail and basket
system frustrated impatient shoppers because they were forced to follow
a fixed path past the shelves and stay in line.5 52 The rail prevented
aggressive shoppers from passing slow moving shoppers. 5 3
Weingarten's shopping carts failed because they occupied too much
floor space, floor space that could be put to better and more profitable
use.' Goldman's own attempt to help shoppers by dispatching retail
clerks to carry their shopping baskets worked, but it kept payroll
expenses higher than a cost-conscious merchant could tolerate.' 5 Now
what?
Sylvan Goldman must have been obsessed with shopping carts.
One day, while he glanced at a folding chair in his office, the vision of a
foldable rolling shopping basket carrier on wheels materialized in his
mind's eye. 5 56 He figured that, if the basket carrier's skeletal support
elements were based on the design of a folding chair, they could be
folded and stacked like folding chairs.55 7 When the basket carriers were
needed, store personnel could unfold them and insert wire shopping

1544. See id. at 78.
1545. See id.
1546. See id.

1547. See id.
1548. See id. at 77-78.
1549. See id. at 78.

1550. See id.
1551.
1552.
1553.
1554.
1555.
1556.
1557.

See id. at 82-83.
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See id.
See id.
See id. at 78.
See id.; Van Gelder, supra note 1395.
See WILSON, supra note 814, at 78; Van Gelder, supra note 1395.
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baskets in preset grooves in the skeletal supports." 8 Presto, the wheeled
basket carriers would be ready for action. Conversely, when they were
not needed, store personnel could remove the baskets, compress the
skeletal supports, and stack them again.""
Goldman figured he could contrive a foldable rolling basket carrier
by adapting the design of his folding chair. 56 The seat itself would be
replaced by a skeletal support for a wire basket. 5 6' By raising the skeletal
support element that replaced the chair's seat a bit, he could create room
for a skeletal support for a second wire basket.5 6 2 A removable wire
basket would be inserted on each skeletal support element. 563 With wire
shopping baskets attached, the new contraption would become the
customer's personal vehicle for the entire shopping expedition.564 The
customer could select all the cans, bottles, boxes, and jars he or she
wanted from the supermarket's shelves and plop them in the baskets
supported by the vehicle. 5 Then, he or she could gently push it through
the store and its parking lot to an automobile. 566 There, the customer
would transfer the merchandise to his or her automobile and drive home
without having to lug a heavy load until the last leg of the journey. At
home, (hopefully, with the family's aid) he or she would carry the stuff
from the automobile to the pantry and refrigerator. With the foldable
rolling basket carrier, the entire process of transporting a customer's
merchandise from the supermarket shelf to his or her home could be
completed without the assistance of store personnel other than a
checkout counter clerk. 6 7 The checkout counter clerk's role would be
limited to retrieving the merchandise from the basket carrier, bagging
the merchandise, resetting the bags in the shopping cart, and collecting
the money."5 6 If you wanted to take the self-service principle a step
farther and shave a few pennies more from your operating expense
structure, you could ask the customer to do the bagging too.
It was a great idea, but would it work? Goldman decided to seek the
answer to that question by designing and building a prototype."" It was
1558.
1559.
1560.
1561.
1562.
1563.
1564.
1565.
1566.
1567.
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a mission he could not accomplish alone. Sylvan Goldman was a
merchant, albeit a creative merchant, but he was not a craftsman. 7 ° He
could conceive of a folding basket carrier on a wheeled platform and he
could conjure a hazy vision of how it might look. 5 7 ' However, he did not
have the skill to fabricate it. That task was assigned to a StandardHumpty Dumpty maintenance employee named Fred Young, and he
proved to be a worthy collaborator.572 With only general ideas to work
with, Young built a working model by trial and error. 5 73 As you may
expect, it had many flaws, and it did not work well at first.57 4 It needed
this, it needed that, and it encountered many problems. 575 Goldman's
role was to figure out how to eliminate the flaws and overcome the
problems. 576 Young's role was to make Goldman's ideas work. 577 Their
persistent efforts bore fruit and resulted in a practical foldable basket
carrier that supported two wire baskets.'5 71 It could be rolled through a
supermarket without great effort. 57 9 Foldable basket carriers were made
available for customer use in Standard and Humpty Dumpty stores, but,
at first, customers were reluctant to use them. 50" However, after a brief
period, the folding basket carriers were enthusiastically accepted.""'
Goldman soon realized that he and Fred Young had created much
more than a gadget that would enable Standard and Humpty Dumpty
stores to excel in a highly competitive marketplace. The foldable rolling
basket carrier proved to be the world's first practical device for
transporting merchandise retrieved by customers from supermarket
shelves to their automobiles. 58 2 Although the foldable rolling basket
carriers were different from contemporary nesting shopping carts, they
served the same function as contemporary nesting shopping carts. Every
supermarket in America needed foldable rolling basket carriers. ' True
to his entrepreneurial spirit, Goldman organized the Folding Carrier
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Company to manufacture and sell his new invention to his food market
competitors. 5
Goldman also deserves credit for the nesting shopping cart. It was
introduced by the Folding Carrier Company in 1947."5 The nesting
shopping cart was even better than the foldable rolling basket carrier and
supplanted it.1586 Storage space for the nesting shopping carts was
minimized because the back panel of each wire basket could be nudged
forward and up to a horizontal position.'587 Consequently, another
shopping cart could be inserted through the back panel.588 This
arrangement could be repeated in a long daisy chain that permitted the
carts to be stored in a compact area.1589
c. The Grid Pattern Layout
The foldable rolling basket carrier came to be an essential element
of the American supermarket.'590 It retained that status until it was
replaced and superseded by the nesting shopping cart. 59' In time, every
supermarket customer came to expect to find one or the other before, or
as, he or she enters a supermarket.1 5 2 The foldable rolling basket carrier
and its successor, the nesting shopping cart became the customer's
lot. 593
personal vehicle for use in the supermarket and its parking
Customers entered and left the parking lot in an automobile. An
automobile could get them near the supermarket efficiently and
comfortably, but it could not make their shopping experiences efficient
or comfortable. They needed another vehicle to pick up where the
automobile left off. At first, that vehicle was the foldable rolling basket
carrier. 5 ' Later, it would be the nesting shopping cart.'595
The salutary impact of folding basket carriers and nesting shopping
carts on supermarket operations led supermarket operators to reconfigure
the layout of their stores.'596 Checkout counters were modified to make it
1584. See WILSON, supranote 814, at 89.
1585. See id. at 103.
1586. See id.
1587. See id.
1588. See id.
1589. See id.
1590. See ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14, at 153.
1591. See WILSON, supranote 814, at 103.
1592. See ZIMERMAN, supra note 14, at 153.
1593. See MAYO, supra note 53, at 150.
1594. See WILSON, supranote 814, at 103.
1595. See iL Professor James Mayo compared the shopping cart to a railroad car. See MAYO,
supra note 53, at 150.
1596. See WSON, supranote 814, at 93.
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easier for checkout clerks to unload merchandise from the foldable
basket carriers. 97 Supermarket aisles were also widened to
accommodate these vehicles. 98 Aisles had to be at least as wide as two
basket carriers or shopping carts standing side by side, and eventually
they became much wider than that.' 599
Shopping cart traffic completed the process that molded the
supermarket's interior layout in a grid pattern that resembles the grid
pattern of streets in a modern urban central business district.'6 The
aisles were configured like streets to accommodate the free flow of
traffic of the shopping cart, the supermarket's internal vehicle.' 6 ' Just as
a highway leading to a bridge flows directly into the toll booth's driveup lanes, supermarket aisles spilled into lanes that led the customer to
the checkout counter.
Shopping carts and their use would be embellished in time. Baby
seats were added.' The wire baskets were expanded.' 6 Wheels became
sturdier.'6 Some supermarkets, including Publix Super Markets, added a
personal twist to the supermarket's otherwise impersonal merchandise
movement system.' 60 Bag boys stationed at the checkout counter would
load the cart and roll it through the store's exit door and the parking lot
to the customer's car.'6 Then, they would load the car.'W Publix
customers were not concerned about increasing their food cost by the
6°
need to tip the bag boys ' At Publix, tipping was strictly forbidden.'6
d. The Automatic Door
After the folding rollable basket carrier was firmly established, one
formidable barrier still impeded the shopper's effort to move food
purchases between the checkout counter and his or her automobile. After
paying for the merchandise and leaving the checkout counter, the
shopper still needed to pass through the exit door with a shopping cart.
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In the 1930s, supermarket exit doors were much like exit doors people
had been using for a few thousand years. 610 A customer could open the
it.'6"
door by pushing it, and he or she could open the door by pulling
Some exit doors were more flexible and would open when pushed or
pulled, but no supermarket exit doors could decide to open by
themselves in the 1930s. 612 Regardless of whether the shopper pushed or
pulled the door open, he or she needed to keep it open as the cart passed
through the doorway. In some cases, the shopper pushed the door open
with the cart and kept it open with one hand. In other cases, he or she
parked the shopping cart momentarily, opened the exit door manually,
maneuvered past the open door, and dragged the shopping cart through.
Pushing the door, pulling the door, and parking the cart all had one
thing in common. They frustrated shoppers-at least momentarily.
Almost every shopper who entered a supermarket building entered with
a shopping cart. 613 Unless a store had a magical way to move the
shoppers' accumulated purchases through the exit door to the parking
lot, almost every shopper who left the store had to roll a shopping cart
through the exit door.
Supermarket entrance and exit doors in the 1930s functioned like
highway toll booths. A shopper approaching the exit door brought the
shopping cart to a halt to open the door. That forced every shopper
behind him or her to halt also. The result could be a line of frustrated
shopping cart pushers with the same kind of emotions as frustrated
motorists lined up at a toll booth with a defective toll barrier.
Contemporary supermarkets and contemporary supermarket
shoppers owe many thanks to George Jenkins, founder of Publix Super
Markets for the device that overcame this obstacle.61 4 On his way home
to Florida from a New York journey around 1940, Jenkins made his way
to Pennsylvania Railroad Station from the Statler Hotel where he was
staying.161 5 At Pennsylvania Station, Jenkins passed through a door that
opened for him before he had a chance to push it open. 616 This was such
a novelty that Jenkins decided to walk through the door again. After
inspecting it carefully, he concluded that learning about this door was
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more important to his future than catching a train headed for Florida. 161 ,
After walking through the door repeatedly, he realized that a door like
this one would remove the last barrier to the efficient flow of
supermarket merchandise from its shelves to its customers'
automobiles. 61 9 If he could install an electric door in his new
supermarket, his customers would not have to push a door open as they
moved their accumulated purchases from the checkout counter to their
automobiles.'6
When he noticed that the manufacturer was New Britain,
Connecticut-based Stanley Works, Jenkins postponed his homeward
voyage to Florida and returned to the Statler hotel. 62' He lodged there
until he could board a train for New Britain.' 6" Stanley Works agreed to
provide an automatic door for his new supermarket, but put a $1,300
price tag (big money for a door in 1940) on the job.' 62 Jenkins bit the
bullet, signed on for the door, and never regretted it.1 62 Years later, he
stated that his competitors really paid for the door because so many of
their customers shifted to his store just to walk through the automatic
doors.' 62
C. Defining the Supennarket
Albers Super Markets is reputed to have been the first company to
use the word supermarket in its trade name.' 626 Does that mean that
William Albers, founder of Albers Super Markets, coined the word
supermarket? Max Zimmerman, a respected supermarket industry
observer from its earliest days in the 1930s through the 1950s and
founder of the Super Market Institute, stated that the words "super
market" were already in use when he worked on his first supermarket
study between 1934 and 1936.1627 Zimmerman reported that Neal
Ramsey, president of Market Basket, a California-based supermarket
company, believed that motion picture promoters originated the word in
the 1920s. ' 62 Also, according to Zimmerman, T.A. Von Der Ahe,
1618.
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founder of Von's Grocery Co., another California-based supermarket
company, maintained that Easterners visiting large California food
markets were so impressed with the markets they saw that they named
them "supermarkets."'6 9
Does that mean that the large California food markets were
supermarkets? Not necessarily. The answer to that question depends on
how you define supermarket.
Max Zimmerman, tried to compose a definition of supermarket
several times. At first, he defined a supermarket as a store meeting these
criteria:
-The store would be highly departmentalized;
-The store would sell food and other merchandise;
-The store would have a self-service grocery department;
-It would also have other departments, and these departments
might be wholly owned by the storekeeper or operated by
concessionaires;
-It would have adequate parking space for its customers;
-Its annual sales volume would exceed $250,0002m
Later, he amended his definition. As of the 1950s, to be a
supermarket from Zimmerman's point of view, a food market's annual
volume needed to be at least $400,000.'631 Zimmerman's definitions were
well meant, but they missed the mark. Zimmerman himself alluded to
significant criteria that were not mentioned in his definitions. In his 1955
work, The Super Market, A Revolution in Distribution,163 2 he pointed out
that self-service was the "heart" of the supermarket industry.633 He also
asserted that the cash and carry principle was adopted by the earliest
supermarket pioneers and then incorporated in its industry's underlying
structure."M
Frank Charvat, an Associate Professor of Marketing at Emory
University, defined a supermarket as a "departmentalized retail food
store having four basic food departments-self-service groceries, meat,
produce, and dairy-plus any number of other departments, with the
establishment doing a minimum yearly volume of $500,000. ' 63s
Charvat's 1961 book was published after Zimmerman's most
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comprehensive work, which was published in 1955.1636 Charvat had the
benefit of Zimmerman's wisdom and eyewitness reports, but his
definition is less insightful than Zimmerman's. Although Charvat made
sure that his readers understood that super means "'above,' 'over
beyond,' [and] 'that which surpasses,"' he said nothing about a
supermarket being super in size or even dramatically larger than other
food stores. 163 7 One of Charvat's points was that supermarkets had at
least four departments including groceries, meat, and produce.16 ' That
was not necessarily so, and having these departments did not distinguish
supermarkets from service-oriented combination stores and some
service grocery stores. Many self-service grocery stores and combination
stores that clearly were not supermarkets had been carrying meat,
produce, and dairy for at least a decade before the first supermarket
opened for business.1 639 It was a common practice for service-oriented
combination stores and some service groceries to carry meat, produce,
and dairy since the 1920s. 6 ° Kroger began selling meat in its grocery
stores much earlier (around 1904).' 64' Combination stores carried all four
food categories and almost all of them did this from stores that were tiny
(approximately 2500 square feet of floor area) compared to even the
earliest supermarkets.1642 Charvat's definition is also flawed in that it
does not mention the supermarket's low-cost and low-price structure, its
cash and carry policies, and other significant elements of the
supermarket business model.,643
James Mayo, a Professor of Architecture at the University of
Kansas, wrote an excellent treatise on the American grocery store, but he
did not even try defining supermarket. He concluded that the task was
difficult because "its meaning has changed over the years."' 644 Instead, he
referred his readers to the following definition he asserts was adopted by
the "grocery trade":
"A Super Market is a highly decentralized retail establishment, either
wholly owned or concession operated, with adequate parking space,
1636. See generally CHARVAT, supranote 130; ZIMMERMAN, supra note 14.
1637. CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 6.
1638. See id. at7.
1639. See, e.g., id. at 12-13 (examining the characteristics of Crystal Palace Market and
comparing it to the current definition of a supermarket).
1640. See, e.g., id. (noting that the Crystal Palace Market, established in 1922, had such
departments).
1641. See LAYCOCK, supranote 394, at 47.
1642. See WILSON, supranote 814, at 38.
1643. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 7.
1644. MAYO, supra note 53, at 117.
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doing a minimum of $250,000 annually. The grocery department,
however, must be on a self-service basis." Over the years the dollar
volume specification has changed, but this definition is generally
applicable for today's supermarkets.'" 5
I disagree. This definition is not applicable to today's supermarkets,
and it was not applicable to yesterday's supermarkets. It omits such
fundamental supermarket attributes as the low-cost and low-price
structure, the cash and carry principles, the grid pattern layout, and the
use of shopping carts as in-store vehicles.646
The most insightful definition of supermarket I have seen in print
was formulated by Richard Longstreth, a Professor of American Studies
at George Washington University. He puts it this way:
Conceptually, the supermarket was structured to meet the demands of a
large trade. Sustaining that trade was essential to the life of the
business, and was achieved by offering products of dependable quality
and in wide variety at low prices-prices often lower than those of
major chain stores. The pricing schedule meant a low profit margin on
any given item; only through high-volume sales could the supermarket
function as a financially sound operation.... The building itself had to
be larger than most, if not all, other food stores of previous years.
Since the supermarket depended on motorists for much of its clientele,
a tangent parking lot of substantial size became a standard feature at an
early date. 1647

As insightful as Longstreth's definition is, it does not distinguish
the supermarket from the large public markets and some exceptionally
large service-oriented combination stores. Large public markets and
some exceptionally large combination stores had been doing business
long before the supermarket business was born.'" 8 Like supermarkets,
they were "food stores," they were lodged in buildings that were "larger
than most," some of them had "parking lots," and some of them had
"low prices."' 9 However, they were not supermarkets. Unlike
supermarkets, the large public markets and combination stores were not
operated on a self-service basis, and they were not cash and carry
stores.' 65"

1645. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting ZMisMEa!A,, supranote 14, at 17-18).
1646. See id.
1647. LONGSTRETH, supranote 60, at 78-79.
1648. See id. at 79-80.
1649. See id. at 80.
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Zimmerman, Charvat, Mayo, and Longstreth were only three of
many observers who wrestled with this problem unsuccessfully. Mayo
may have taken the wisest path by not defining supermarket.
Longstreth's definition was accurate as far as it went, but it was not
completely successful. Zimmerman's and Charvat's definitions were
unsuccessful too. One reason why they were unsuccessful was that
Zimmerman and Charvat were not trying to define supermarket so that
shopping center landlords and tenants would be able to draft use and
exclusive clauses more intelligently or understand them better. They
were not defining supermarket so that these super food stores could be
distinguished from any other stores for the purposes of a licensing
statute, a tax law, or government regulation. Zimmerman and Charvat
were defining supermarket so that they could count supermarkets,
compile statistics with respect to supermarkets, and decide which food
market was the first supermarket.'6 They seem to have felt that it was
important to count the number of supermarkets in the world, and the
statistics they compiled depend on their definitions. 1'6 2 This was clear to
Charles Phillips. In his 1938 HarvardBusiness Review article, Phillips
complained of widely divergent statistics as to the number of
supermarkets.6 3 He insisted that the divergent statistics were probably
due to widely divergent views as to the definition of supermarket.'6
When Carl Dipman, Editor of Progressive Grocer,'6s5 addressed the
American Marketing Association in May 1938, he complained that6
everyone listening (a big crowd) had his own definition of that word.'
Dipman's view is supported by Lucius Flint, former Field Editor of
Chain Store Age magazine.16 7 In his article, The Los Angeles Super,
Flint commented that "the 658meaning of the term, 'supermarket' has
always been a flexible one."'
I am inclined to think that Dipman and Flint came closest to the
truth. I am unaware of any consensus among retail food industry
professionals, academics, lease negotiators, and consumers as to the
definition of a supermarket. The precise boundaries of the word,
1651. See CHARVAT, supra note 130, at 7.
1652. See id.
1653. See Phillips, supra note 118, at 191 n.10.
1654. See id. at 191.
1655. In the 1930s, Progressive Grocer's audience consisted largely of service grocers who
were less than enthralled by the competition they were getting from supermarkets. See Dipman,
supranote 803, at 270.
1656. See id. at 269-70.
1657. See Flint, supranote 204, at J34.
1658. Dipman, supra note 803, at 269, 270.
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supermarket, are still hazy after more than seven decades. Supermarkets
are not only different from their service grocery store and other serviceoriented food market predecessors, they are different from each other
despite many common characteristics.659 Supermarket storerooms are
very large, much larger than grocery stores were, but some supermarkets
are much larger than others.'6 Self-service prevails in supermarkets, but
customers are served by retail clerks and butchers in parts of many
supermarkets.'6' Although the supermarket's primary mission is to sell
food and household products, supermarkets differ considerably in the
kinds of food they sell and the food categories they emphasize.662 Within
the broad framework of a low-cost structure and low-price policy, some
supermarkets can brag of lower expenses and can afford to charge lower
prices than others.' 663 Although convenient parking facilities are
consistent with the supermarket concept, and home delivery is
inconsistent with the supermarket concept, free parking is often
impractical in urban settings.'6 Consequently, some supermarkets
located in urban settings where free parking facilities are out of the
question need to adapt to their surroundings by offering home delivery
services. Supermarkets can be so different from each other that it is easy
to understand why a general consensus for a precise definition has been
so elusive.
One question remains. How do I define supermarket?I cannot give
you a perfect definition. A perfect definition should embrace every store
I believe is a supermarket as well as exclude every store I believe is not
a supermarket. People use this word to describe retail operations that are
so different from each other that a perfect definition is not possible. A
food market that conforms to all aspects of the business model devised
by supermarket industry's pioneers is a supermarket, and a food market
that conforms to the business model devised by the industry's pioneers
preponderantly, but not completely, is also a supermarket. When a food
market conforms to less than all aspects of the supermarket business
model, I make a value judgment to determine whether it is or is not a
supermarket. I do that by weighing the degree to which the store's size
and business practices conform to the supermarket business model
against the degree to which it departs from the model. For example, a

1659.
1660.
1661.
1662.
1663.
1664.

See Phillips, supranote 118, at 188.
See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 96-97.
Seeid. at24
See id. at 125.
See Phillips, supranote 118, at 190.
See PEAK & PEAK, supranote 18, at 89.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

145

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 30:297

large self-service food market doing business in a downtown central
business district that offers a diverse mix of food and household
products can be a supermarket even if it does not provide free parking
for its customers. Similarly, although some contemporary supermarkets
depart from self-service principles with such service departments as
butcher shops and fresh fish counters, they remain supermarkets because
self-service predominates in the store.
Without a general consensus as to the definition of supermarket, a
landlord negotiating a supermarket use or exclusive clause with the
vision of a very specific kind of food market in his head should propose
that supermarket be defined in the lease. He or she should not assume
everyone else has the same vision of a supermarket as he or she does.
Here is a brief review of the basic elements of the supermarket
model. Lease negotiators can use them or any combination of them to
concoct their own definitions in use and exclusive clauses if they really
feel the need to define supermarket.
1. Store Size
Supermarkets are big stores. Early supermarkets were big-usually
much bigger than the service grocery stores of the 1920s and 1930s.
They are even bigger now.
2. Price Policy and Cost Structure
Low prices and low operating expenses are basic to the supermarket
movement. Early supermarkets kept their expenses way down and sold
groceries at rock bottom prices 665 Although contemporary supermarkets
can be very different from each other in price policy and cost structure,
they tend to sell food more efficiently and less expensively than other
kinds of food stores.
3. Product Mix
Although the primary mission of a supermarket is to sell food and
household products, the supermarket's product mix is much broader than
that.' 666 From their earliest days, supermarkets sold nonfood products.'6 7
Supermarkets allocated a greater percentage of shelf space to nonfood
merchandise during World War II and a still greater percentage after the
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War.'6 They sell more nonfood products now than they did in their
early days.'" 9
4. In-Store Service Policy
Unlike customers of service groceries, supermarket customers fetch
most of the things they buy from open access shelving.' 670 To the extent
they could, early supermarkets dispensed with store service and relied on
customer self-service. 67' That is still the basic principle. However, some
early supermarkets did not extend the self-service policy to meat, fish,
bakery, deli, and other departments.' 672 World War II labor shortages led
many supermarkets to convert their meat departments to self-service. 673
Many supermarkets resurrected meat department service later.'674 The
pendulum swings back and forth between service and self-service
policies in meat, fish, and deli departments. 67 5
5. Credit and Delivery Policy
Unlike their rivals, the service grocery stores, early supermarkets
refused to extend credit, and they refused to deliver groceries to
customers' homes.' 67 6 For the most part, these policies continue to this
day.' 67 Although almost all supermarkets honor bank-sponsored credit
cards, they do not take responsibility for their customers' accounts
receivable.'678 Supermarket executives do not have to worry about
customers not paying their credit card bills. Credit losses will be
absorbed by the credit card issuers.' 679 Some supermarkets in urban areas
provide delivery services, but, on the whole, supermarket delivery
services are rare."'

1668.

See id. at 262-63.

1669. Seeid at263.
1670. See 1d. at 204.
1671. See id.
1672. See id. at 24.
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1674. See id. at 178.

1675.
1676.
1677.
1678.
1679.

See id. at 179.
See id. at 15.
See Id.at 50.
See k
See i.

1680. See id. at7.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

147

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 2
HOFSTRA L4W REVIEW

444

[Vol. 30:297

6. Availability of Parking Facilities
Early supermarket customers had access to convenient nearby
parking facilities.'"' That is still a crucial element for almost all
supermarkets. The exceptions to this rule are a small minority of
supermarkets located in urban areas where store provided parking is
impractical. ""2
7. Efficient Merchandise Movement System
Supermarkets provide large nesting shopping carts to facilitate
browsing, purchasing large loads of food and other merchandise, and
transporting food and other merchandise from the stores to the parking
facilities and customers' vehicles.'6 3 Store layouts are organized in a
grid system to accommodate self-service policies and facilitate shopping
cart use. ' "4 Almost every shopper passes through a checkout counter
where his or her purchases are tallied by a retail clerk.' 65 Then, he or she
pushes a shopping cart to and through an automatic exit door and then
through a parking1 lot
where the contents of the shopping cart are shifted
6
to an automobile.

IV.

RESTRICTING THE USE OF THE DEMISED PREMISES TO USE FOR

ANY LEGAL PURPOSE
A.

The GeneralPrinciple

Supermarket lease use clauses have become less restrictive than
they were in the 1950s and early 1960s. As early as the late 1960s,
formidable supermarket chains with ample bargaining power and
considerable expertise in lease negotiations resisted landlord demands
for extensive restrictions on the use of the supermarket premises. They
insisted on softening or even eliminating use clause restrictions proposed
by their landlords.
Supermarket executives of the late 1960s foresaw the potential for
continued expansion of the supermarket's nonfood sector. They sought
to avoid restrictions that might impede the nonfood sector's growth.
They wanted to be sure that no lease restriction would bar them from
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expanding the proportion of shelf space allocated to the sale of nonfood
merchandise. They also sought to avoid restrictions that might impair
their ability to adapt the merchandise mix of their stores operations to
changed circumstances.
Although most supermarket storerooms had limited space for
general merchandise in the late 1960s, they allocated significant portions
of their storerooms to nonfood items and made good money from
them.'6 Carrying nonfood merchandise was nothing new to the
supermarket industry in the late 1960s. 6 The two earliest supermarkets,
Jamaica, New York's King Kullen unit and Elizabeth, New Jersey's Big
Bear unit carried nonfood merchandise from the outset.'6 9 In the 1940s,
during World War II, even supermarkets that had not allocated much
shelf space to nonfood items previously expanded the proportion of their
space allocated to nonfood products.' 69 Food was rationed and hard to
obtain then. 69 To avoid leaving large blocks of shelf space empty,
World War II era supermarkets filled that space with nonfood items' 69
and were pleased with the results. They were pleased enough with the
results to continue allocating significant shelf space to nonfood items.693
The end of World War II spurred a further expansion of the proportion
of a supermarket's shelf-space allocated to nonfood merchandise.' 6 4
The end of World War II was also the beginning of a long and rapid
expansion period for the supermarket industry. The vitality of this new
food distribution method combined with other factors to accelerate the
flowering of the shopping center industry. 69 5 Although many
supermarkets of the pre-War era were doing business from storerooms
that contained much more than 20,000 square feet of floor area, most
early supermarkets operated by the major grocery chain store
organizations were content to do business from storerooms that
contained much less than 20,000 square feet of floor area. 696 National
grocery chain store organizations made conservative decisions as to the
size of their early supermarkets. 6 97 In the 1930s, supermarkets operated
1687.
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by major grocery chain store organizations were in the 5000 to 10,000
square foot range. 169 Supermarket storerooms grew to approximately
20,000 square feet of gross leaseable area in the 1960s. 69 By the 1970s,
new supermarkets rarely had less than 30,000 square feet of gross
leaseable area. 7' Fifty thousand square foot supermarkets were
commonplace by the early 1980s, and 65,000 square foot supermarkets
were commonplace by
the 1990s.'70' Many contemporary supermarkets
72
are bigger than that.1
One aspect of the strategy underlying supermarket floor area
growth was the retailer's determination to provide shelf space for as
many merchandise items as possible.70 3 Food processing companies
were busy inaugurating new products and advertising them heavily."",
Supermarket executives wanted to avoid frustrating consumers on the
prowl for the latest heavily advertised food product. 70 5 A shopper might
prefer a bigger supermarket to a smaller one if she is more likely to find
what she is looking for in the bigger one. Not only will the bigger store
offer a greater variety of merchandise items, it is less likely to run out of
inventory than a smaller store.
Another reason for a supermarket executive to aspire to a larger
rather than a smaller size storeroom is that the percentage of gross
leaseable area dedicated to general merchandise with higher markups
can be much greater in a larger supermarket storeroom than in a small
supermarket storeroom.' 7° The percentage of general merchandise items
can still be larger in an enormous supermarket storeroom than it is in a
merely large supermarket storeroom.1707
B. ProblemsArisingfrom Extremely LiberalSupermarket
Lease Use Clauses or the Absence of a Use Clause
in a Supermarket Lease
Some supermarket chains have sought greater product mix
flexibility by openly demanding use clauses that expressly permit the
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demised premises to be usedfor any legal purpose.170 Other supermarket
chains have realized that the best use clause for a tenant is no use clause
at all, and they provide for none in their form leases. An extremely broad
supermarket use clause or the absence of a use clause from a
supermarket lease can be a big headache for a community-type or
neighborhood-type shopping center landlord.
I should point out that extremely liberal supermarket use clauses or
the absence of a use clause from a supermarket lease does not harm the
landlord all of the time or even most of the time. Over the years, most
supermarket tenants have not excessively ventured into uncharted
waters, despite use clauses that granted them the right to use the demised
premises for any legal purpose. Nevertheless, a minority of supermarket
tenants have used very liberal use rights destructively in the past, and
they are free to do so in the future.
The problem is that, without the constraints of an equitable use
clause, a supermarket tenant has the power to harm the landlord and
every other tenant of the shopping center. The right to use the demised
premises for any legal purpose includes the right to become something
other than a supermarket. That right has been exercised many times and
in many ways to the disadvantage of shopping center landlords and their
other tenants. Shopping center supermarkets have been converted to
many different kinds of retail units including drugstores, clothing stores,
and such category killers as home improvement centers.
The right to use the demised premises for any legal purpose is a
potential threat to landlords, department stores, category killers, and
shop space stores. With an extremely broad use clause or no use clause,
a shopping center landlord might have no way of preventing a
supermarket tenant from converting its storeroom to a department store
or category killer or to carve out parts of its storeroom for conversion to
shop space stores. With an extremely broad use clause or no use clause,
a shopping center landlord might have no way of preventing the
conversion of a supermarket to a flea market, a skating rink, a motion
picture theater specializing in X-rated movies, or a mortuary.
A supermarket lease with an extremely liberal use clause or a
supermarket lease without a use clause gives the supermarket the power
to undermine:
-a landlord effort to attract consumers to the shopping center by
presenting them with an interesting group of stores selling
many different kinds of merchandise in many different ways,
1708. See supra Part H.C.2.
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-a shopping center's competitive balance, and
-a landlord's ability to negotiate future leases with tenants
demanding exclusive clause restrictions.
C. Coping with a Supermarket Proposalfor the Right to Use the
Demised Premisesfor Any Legal Purpose
Although they may understand how destructive it can be when the
use clause permits a supermarket storeroom to be used for any legal
purpose, many landlord negotiators have a difficult time getting the
tenant's lease negotiators to back off from that principle. As difficult as
it may be to confront negotiators for a powerful chain store organization,
landlord negotiators should not meekly accede to a supermarket use
clause that does not limit the supermarket's use. Community-type and
neighborhood-type shopping center landlords need to impose reasonable
limits on the supermarket tenant's use.
How do landlord lease negotiators cope with a supermarket tenant's
fondness for the right to use the demised premises for any legal purpose?
Some landlord negotiators lock horns with the tenant negotiators
and insist on limiting the use of the demised premises to a supermarket
orfood supermarketuse.9
Some landlord negotiators are content with a tepid modification of
the any legal purpose restriction by inserting
the word retail. The result
70
purpose.
retail
legal
any
to
is a restriction
Some landlord negotiators agree that the demised premises can be
used for any legal purpose but propose amendments to temper the
negative effects of this principle. One type of amendment restricts the
use of the demised premises to a single retail entity. Another prohibits
the supermarket tenant from violating other tenants' exclusive clauses,
and still another prohibits the tenant from changing the principal use of
its storeroom to the principal use of another store in the shopping center.
Sometimes more than one or all three types of these amendments are
added to a supermarket use clause.
1. The Right to Use for Any Legal Retail Purpose
A use clause that restricts the use of the demised premises to any
legal purpose is about the same as a use clause that restricts nothing.
With a use clause as broad as the right to use the demised premises for
any legal purpose, the tenant can do anything in the demised premises
1709.
1710.

See supraPart I.C.I.
See infra Part IV.C.1.
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except sell an illegal product or engage in an illegal activity. Only a
governmental requirement like a statute, court decision, or
administrative regulation limits the use rights of a tenant with such a
liberal use clause.
The virtually unlimited power to change the use of the demised
premises arising from a liberal use clause could be used as a weapon in a
bitter landlord/tenant dispute. With no limits on its use imposed by the
lease or a legal requirement like a zoning law, nothing but good sense
could stop a supermarket tenant from converting its storeroom to a
factory, a hospital, a hotel, or (for that matter) a mortuary. Conversions
like that sound weird, but tenants involved in bitter disputes with their
landlords are capable of doing weird things.
Consequently, it is very much in the self-interest of a supermarket
landlord to find ways to soften the bite of a supermarket tenant's
proposal for the right to use the demised premises for any legal purpose.
One way to soften the bite of such a use clause, but not necessarily the
best way, is to propose amending the tenant's proposal so that the
tenant's use rights will be limited to any legal retailpurpose rather than
any legal purpose. Although restricting the use of a supermarket
storeroom to any legal retailpurpose is no panacea, it is less dangerous
for the landlord than any retail purpose. The good news is that a
restriction to any legal retail purpose would bar the tenant from using
the demised premises as a factory, office complex, or hotel. Moreover,
the supermarket lease negotiators might agree to the amendment quickly
and easily. Why shouldn't they? It would leave them with complete
freedom to sell anything at retail.
The bad news is that a supermarket use clause limiting the tenant to
legal retail uses does not address the real problems of a neighborhoodtype or community-type shopping center landlord. It does nothing to
prevent the supermarket tenant from converting its storeroom to a
department store, a category killer, or a flea market. It does not bar a
supermarket tenant from subdividing its storeroom into a series of shop
space stores.
Although this amendment is better than nothing, a prudent
neighborhood-type or community-type shopping center landlord needs
to find a better way to cope with aggressive supermarket tenant use
clause proposals.
2. Restricting the Use of the Demised Premises to a Single Entity
The right to use the demised premises for any legal purpose
includes the right to conduct more than one retail business from the
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demised premises. With the right to use its storeroom for any legal
purpose, a supermarket tenant could have the power to sever parts of the
demised premises from its supermarket storeroom and open additional
stores in the severed space. If the tenant has the right to use its storeroom
for any legal purpose, only building codes, zoning laws, lease alteration
clauses, and similar clauses can impose realistic restraints on this power.
A supermarket tenant with the power to carve up its storeroom might
decide to sever parts of the demised premises and use them as flower
shops, restaurants, candy stores, or other small store retail units. The
supermarket tenant might provide separate entrances for each unit it
severs from the supermarket space and build partitions that would isolate
each separate unit from the supermarket space completely. One way
landlord negotiators might cope with this problem without completely
discarding the general principle is to propose an additional restriction on
the tenant's use. Although the additional restriction would accede to the
general principle that the tenant will have the right to use the demised
premises for any legal purpose, it would permit the tenant to do so only
as a single retailentity.
One good aspect of a proposal to restrict the use of the demised
premises to a single retail entity is that, when combined with the right to
use the demised premises for any legal purpose, it is not very threatening
to most supermarket tenants. A supermarket tenant that agrees to this
restriction would not be barred from selling any product or providing
any service in its own store. However, it would not have the right to
operate more than one store from the demised premises.
On the other hand, limiting the use of the supermarket premises to a
single retail entity might be too strict from the supermarket tenant's
point of view and still too liberal from the landlord's point of view. Let's
look at this proposed restriction from the tenant's point of view first.
Restricting the use of the demised premises to a single retail entity might
be a problem for many contemporary supermarket tenants. They try to
incorporate the functions of what they perceive as an early-twentiethcentury village square within the supermarket premises. Shop-like
departments resembling bakeries, fish stores, butcher shops,
delicatessens, pharmacies, banks and flower shops are placed along the
store's periphery.171 They surround a core of self-service shelf space
712
stacking food, household products, and general merchandise offerings.
If the use clause prohibits more than one retail entity in the demised

1711. See PEAK&
1712. See id.
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premises and does not clarify what the parties mean by a retail entity, the
supermarket's right to include shop-like departments might be
challenged.
For many supermarket tenants, controversies over the definition of
a single retail entity can be avoided by defining retail entity right in the
lease. I define a retailentity as a business focused principally on the sale
of merchandise to the general public, serving food to the general public,
or providing services that are normally provided in shopping centers. A
retail entity is separated from other retail entities by partitions or other
barriers. It has its own entrance to a sidewalk, walkway or other
common area. It usually does business under its own business names,
and it collects the purchase price for the goods and services it sells. By
defiming retail entity this way, the supermarket's shop-like departments
would be part of a single retail entity, the supermarket unless they have
separate entrances to the common area.
On the other hand, defining retail entity this way will not make a
single retail entity restriction palatable to all supermarket operators and
landlords. Some supermarket tenants want the right to provide sidewalk
entrances for their separate shop-like departments, and they bargain for
that right. Customers of a supermarket that has this right and exercises it
have the choice of entering a supermarket's shop-like department from
the sidewalk or from the supermarket. That arrangement might be
convenient for supermarket customers and effective marketing for the
supermarket tenant, but it can also be destructive for the landlord. Shoplike departments with separate entrances to the common area look like
separate shop space stores and function like separate shop space stores in
many ways. Shop-like supermarket departments that look like separate
shop space stores and function like separate shop space stores compete
directly with shop space stores and pose a threat to their stability.
Moreover, unless the supermarket lease prohibits subletting, a tenant
with the right to sever part of its storeroom and create shop-like
departments with separate entrances from the common area could
compete directly with the landlord for potential rent paying occupants.
Landlords and supermarket tenants could happily compromise on
this issue by providing that the tenant will have the right to sever a
limited part of its storeroom and create a few shop-like departments with
separate entrances to the common area. Some supermarket operators find
this solution palatable. They are not trying to enter the real estate
business. Fear is their motivation for negotiating for the right to sever
parts of their storerooms and using them as separate stores. They fear
being bound by strict lease restrictions, making it excessively costly to
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reduce the size of the storeroom when a size reduction is mandated by
market conditions. This fear is grounded in good sense. For the past
seven decades, the size of supermarket storerooms has increased steadily
in response to market conditions. 71 3 That trend will not necessarily
continue. Will each generation's supermarkets be greater than the
previous generation's supermarkets? Supermarket executives do not
know the answer to that question, and neither do I. The day may come
when supermarket chains discover that their storerooms have too much
space.
Supermarket landlords should not rely solely on a use clause
restriction permitting the tenant to use the demised premises for any
legal purpose but limiting the use of the demised premises to a single
retail entity. A use clause limiting the use of the demised premises to a
single retail entity provides no protection against the possibility that the
supermarket tenant will change the use of the entire storeroom. Despite a
restriction limiting the use of the demised premises to a single retail
entity, a supermarket tenant could shift its focus to a home improvement
center, a toy store, or a furniture store. A shift like that would impair the
shopping center's ability to attract customers. None of these stores can
be expected to attract as many customers to a shopping center as a
supermarket or as often as a supermarket.
Consequently, standing by itself, a use clause restriction permitting
only a single retail entity has positive elements, but it does not
completely solve the tenant's problems or the landlord's problems. By
combining this restriction with an appropriate definition of single retail
entity it might work for the tenant. By combining this restriction with
other restrictions it might work for the landlord.
3. Restriction Against Violating Exclusives
A shopping center landlord bound by exclusive clauses in leases
executed before the supermarket lease can put his or her neck in a noose
with an excessively liberal supermarket use clause. With no effective
limits on its right to use the demised premises, the supermarket tenant
could violate the exclusive clause in every preexisting cotenant's lease.
By agreeing that the supermarket tenant will have the right to use its
storeroom for any legal purpose and forgetting to negotiate an exception
for the exclusive clauses in leases he or she executed previously, a
landlord could become vulnerable to lawsuits he or she could not
possibly win. If a supermarket tenant with the right to use the demised
1713. See supratext accompanying notes 1695-1702.
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premises for any legal purpose violates the exclusive clause in another
tenant's lease, the landlord will not have the power to avert the violation.
The other tenant might respond to the violation by suing the supermarket
tenant 14 and the landlord, and the supermarket tenant might countersue
the other tenant and the landlord.
A supermarket lease with no effective restraint on the tenant's use
is incompatible with a department store lease exclusive clause that bars
any other department store from the shopping center. In the case of a
community-type shopping center, the department store usually insists on
being the only department store in the shopping center. If the landlord
agrees in a department store lease to exclude all other department stores
from the shopping center, he or she must be concerned about the
possibility that another large store in the shopping center might be
converted to a department store in the future. The conversion of any
large store to a department store would cause the landlord to be in
violation of the department store exclusive clause, and that large store
could be the supermarket. All supermarkets are large-at least when
compared to the shop space stores in a community-type shopping center,
and some of them are large enough to become department stores. A large
supermarket could accomplish that feat by drastically reducing the
amount of food it carries and drastically increasing the amount of
general merchandise it carries.
Category killer tenants also negotiate for exclusive clauses to
protect themselves against direct competition from any cotenant.
Category killers are merchants occupying very large blocks of space,
some even larger than supermarkets. What makes them different from
other large nonfood stores is that they concentrate on a narrow group of
merchandise categories. Their exclusive clauses prohibit the landlord
from leasing other stores to be used principally for the sale of the same
narrow group of merchandise categories in which they specialize.
Category killers have nothing to fear from the sale of food, household
products, and general merchandise from a supermarket; and they usually
do not squawk about a supermarket selling some or even many of the
products they sell. However, if a supermarket decides to change its
product mix drastically and concentrate on the same narrow group of
merchandise categories as the category killer, the category killer might
well try to enforce its exclusive clause. This prospect is of special
concern when the supermarket use clause is so liberal that the
1714. This assumes that (1) the preexisting leases were recorded, or (2) the tenants of the
preexisting leases took possession of their premises before the supermarket lease was recorded or
the supermarket tenant took possession of its premises.
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supermarket has the right to sell anything at all. Selling anything does
not mean selling everything. The right to use the premises for any legal
purpose would give the supermarket tenant, or for that matter any other
tenant, the right to narrow its merchandise offering and directly
challenge a category killer cotenant.
Some shop space tenants, especially chain store organizations that
lease small store space, negotiate for exclusive clauses too. A wellrepresented prospective beauty parlor tenant wants an exclusive clause
providing that its store will be the only beauty parlor in the shopping
center. Similarly, a well-represented prospective Italian restaurant tenant
wants its restaurant to be the only Italian restaurant in the shopping
center or (occasionally) the only restaurant in the shopping center. The
same is true of dry cleaners, card and gift shops, stationery stores, liquor
stores, and many other shop stores when they are represented by
experienced shopping center lease attorneys. A supermarket lease that
permits the tenant to use the demised premises for any legal purpose
could easily cause a violation of a shop space tenant's exclusive clause.
It could cause an exclusive clause violation because a supermarket
tenant with the right to use its storeroom for any legal purpose could be
free to segregate a part of its storeroom and use it as a separate store in
violation of a shop space tenant's exclusive clause. A supermarket tenant
would be free to segregate a part of its storeroom and use it as a separate
store unless the use clause or alterations clause of its lease or the
applicable zoning law forbids it from doing so. Consequently, a landlord
confronted with a supermarket tenant request's for the right to use its
storeroom for any legal purpose needs to limit that right somewhat to
avoid a violation of the exclusive clauses in its shop space tenants'
leases.
Landlords concerned about potential exclusive clause violations
(every landlord should be concerned about them) should ask the
supermarket tenant to agree that, despite its right to use the demised
premises for any legal purpose, it will not violate the exclusive clause in
any existing cotenant's lease. A landlord proposal to bar a supermarket
tenant from violating existing tenants' exclusive clauses has a good
chance of getting a sympathetic reaction from supermarket lease
negotiators.
Here is how the landlords approach this. The first step for the
landlord is to inform the supermarket tenant that leases for other stores
in the shopping center contain exclusive clauses, provide a list of the
leases that contain them, and attach an exhibit to the supermarket lease
setting forth the full text of each exclusive. With copies of the exact
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language of the exclusive clauses to which its use rights would be
subjected, the tenant has three choices. It could decide that the other
tenants' exclusive clauses are too restrictive and break the deal. It could
demand that the landlord try to renegotiate one or more exclusive
clauses in other tenants' leases. It could also agree not to cause a
violation of any of them either for the entire term of the supermarket
lease, or for the balance of the term of the cotenant's lease. In my
experience, most supermarket executives take the latter path.
Given the proclivity for all kinds of tenants to demand exclusive
clauses, a supermarket use clause granting the right to use the demised
premises for any legal purpose can impair a shopping center landlord's
ability to negotiate additional leases after the supermarket lease is
executed. If the supermarket tenant has the right to use its storeroom for
any legal purpose, the landlord cannot accede to any new tenant's
demand for an exclusive clause without insisting on an exception for the
supermarket premises. Some shop space tenants are willing to settle for
an exclusive clause that applies everywhere in the shopping center but
the supermarket premises, but some shop space tenants demand
exclusive clauses that apply to the supermarket premises as well as every
other store in the shopping center.
Since the supermarket lease is often the first lease a landlord
negotiates for a new community-type or neighborhood-type shopping
center, the landlord can take one of several paths for protection against
granting the supermarket tenant use clause rights that could result in a
violation of a future tenant's exclusive clause. One path is to refuse to
agree that the tenant will have the right to use the storeroom for any
legal purpose and suggest that the use of the storeroom be limited to the
conduct of a supermarket business. Another path is to agree that the
tenant will have the right to use the storeroom for any legal purpose
except for any use that might cause a violation of an exclusive clause in
any future cotenant's lease as well as any existing cotenant's lease.
The latter path is a hard sell. Agreeing not to violate exclusive
clauses of leases executed in the future is a much more challenging
proposition for a supermarket executive than agreeing not to violate
exclusive clauses in existing leases. Who knows what restrictions will
wind up in future leases? When a supermarket lease is concerned, the
future is a long time. The term of a supermarket lease can be as long as
(or longer than) fifty years after giving effect to the tenant's options to
extend the term. Agreeing to be bound by all future exclusive clauses is
like signing a blank check. Unless limited by sensible parameters, this
constraint would empower the landlord to change the supermarket
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tenant's use rights by entering into a new lease without the supermarket
tenant's assent.
What parameters should limit the scope of this constraint?
Obviously, a supermarket tenant will not agree to abide by another
tenant's exclusive clause restriction against the sale of food for offpremises consumption.
The only future exclusive clause restrictions binding on the
supermarket tenant should be the right of a department store tenant to be
the only department store in the shopping center, the right of a category
killer to be the only store in the shopping center used principally for the
sale of the product categories sold in the category killer's store, and the
right of a shop space tenant to be the only store in the shopping center
used principally for the sale of the product categories sold in the shop
space tenant's store. A supermarket tenant should not be asked to honor
an exclusive clause in a future cotenant's lease that forbids the sale of
any merchandise item or service unless the supermarket lease itself
expressly designates the forbidden merchandise or service.
The future lease exclusive provision exception should also reflect
the following principles. When a new lease is executed, the supermarket
tenant should not be bound by its exclusive clause until the landlord
gives the supermarket tenant notice that the new lease has been executed
and the complete text of its use and exclusive clauses. If the supermarket
shifts the principal use of its storeroom or a segregated portion of its
storeroom to a principal use not already prohibited by another tenant's
exclusive clause, the supermarket tenant should give notice of the shift
to the landlord. After that, the landlord would not have the right to
execute a new lease with an exclusive clause prohibiting the supermarket
or any part of the supermarket from being used principally for that
purpose.
4. Restriction Against Using the Demised Premises for the
Principal Use of Another Store in the Shopping Center
Curtailing a supermarket tenant's right to use its storeroom for any
legal purpose by prohibiting a violation of exclusive clauses in cotenant
leases avoids many tenant mix problems for a community-type and
neighborhood-type shopping center landlords. However, some tenant
mix problems transcend that limit on a supermarket tenant's power.
With the notable exception of chain store organizations, shop space
tenants tend to know little about lease negotiations, and they are often
(all too often) represented in lease negotiations by inexperienced
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attorneys.'7 5 With little knowledge of industry customs and how to
protect themselves against the power of larger and more sophisticated
merchants, these tenants and their attorneys often neglect to request
exclusive clauses. When they do request an exclusive clause, they often
retreat from their request when confronted by a bombastic landlord
lawyer. The result is a great many shop space leases with no exclusive
clause at all.
Some landlords brood about the prospect that shop space merchants
will be overwhelmed by a supermarket cotenant's ample space and
greater purchasing power. Over the years, forward thinking landlords
have tried to protect shop space tenants from being eaten alive by
supermarkets and other big box retailers. A landlord's concern for shop
space tenants does not spring from humanitarian principles. It is derived
from unvarnished self-interest. Although shop space tenants (other than
chain store organizations) usually add little financial muscle to a
shopping center's financing package, they are a very important part of
the shopping center community. Many of them are capable merchants
with excellent ties to the community. They can transform a run-of-themill shopping center that is no different from any other shopping center
into a vibrant shopping center with a distinct personality. If a shop space
tenant does not make money, it will not have the funds it needs to pay
minimum rent to the landlord. If most of a shopping center's shop space
tenants do not make money, the shopping center might end up with no
shop space tenants. Without shop space tenants, a community or
neighborhood shopping center is a different and not so attractive place.
Supermarket landlords had good reason to brood over the
supermarket's power to overwhelm shop space tenants in the past, and
now they now have greater reason to brood. Supermarkets sell and have
always sold a great many things normally sold by neighborhood-type
and community-type shopping center shop space tenants. In this respect,
supermarkets have competed with shop space tenants from the outset,
but they did not overwhelm most of them. With supermarket and shop
space tenants sitting side by side along a strip of stores, each could do its
best to attract shoppers.
Supermarkets that have adopted the village square concept locate
departments emulating independent shops along the outer rim of their
storerooms. These shop-like departments offer more direct competition
1715. This problem starts early-at the very inception of the lawyer's career. "[r]he cluster of
transactional skills necessary to competently represent a client in a business transaction" are
"ignore[ld] completely" by many law schools. Debra Pogrund Stark, See Jane Graduate.Why Can't
JaneNegotiate a Business Transaction?,73 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 477, 481 (1999).
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for shop space stores, restaurants, and banks than supermarkets without
shop-like departments. Most shop space merchants can probably
withstand this competition. However, a shop space tenant such as a dry
cleaner, bank, coin laundry, or liquor store might find it very difficult to
survive in a community-type or neighborhood-type shopping center
location if its supermarket cotenant decides to open a shop-like
department selling the same product categories as the shop space tenant.
A supermarket tenant with the right to use the demised premises for any
legal purpose would have the right to do this unless that right is curtailed
appropriately.
How can a landlord protect shop space tenants without exclusive
clauses in their leases from direct head-on competition from a
supermarket? The landlord can negotiate for an exception to the
supermarket tenant's unlimited right to use its storeroom for any legal
purpose. The exception could be a restriction against shifting the use of
the supermarket premises or a severed part of the supermarket premises
for the principal use of any other store in the shopping center.
This restriction sounds a lot like the restriction against violating
cotenants' exclusive clauses, but it is different. A restriction against
violating exclusives would prevent a supermarket tenant from shifting its
principal use to the principal use of a cotenant's store only if the
cotenant is protected by an exclusive clause in its lease. This restriction
would prevent a supermarket tenant from shifting its principal use to the
principal use of a cotenant's store regardless of whether the cotenant is
protected by an exclusive clause in its lease.
A restriction like this needs its own parameters to make it
acceptable to a supermarket tenant. For starters, a list of every existing
cotenant's principal use should be attached to the supermarket lease as
an exhibit. With the exhibit attached to its lease, the supermarket will
know what it can do and what it cannot do-at least until the landlord
executes another cotenant lease. When a new cotenant lease is executed,
the supermarket tenant should be bound by the new cotenant's principal
use only after the landlord gives the supermarket tenant notice of the
new cotenant's principal use. This restriction should have no impact on
the supermarket's right to sell a specific product or render a specific
service. Like the restriction against violating cotenants' exclusive
clauses, a supermarket with the right to use its storeroom for any legal
purpose should have the right to shift the principal use of its storeroom
or a severed portion of its storeroom to any retail use other than a
cotenant's principal use at the time of the shift. If it does so and gives
notice to the landlord of the shift, the supermarket tenant's right to use
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its storeroom principally for that purpose should not be curtailed by any
future lease executed by the landlord.
V.

USE AND EXCLUSIVE CLAUSE RESTRICTIONS AGAINST THE SALE
OF SPECIFIC PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

A. Supermarket RestrictionsAgainst Cotenant Sales of Food
and Beveragesfor "Off-Premises Consumption" and
Competing Food Stores
1. The General Principle
Although some supermarket chains have been willing to settle for
an exclusive clause that prohibits the landlord from leasing any other
premises in the shopping center for use as a supermarket or food
supermarket, most supermarket negotiators request much more
restrictive exclusive clauses.
Some supermarket folks have aggressive goals when it comes to
their own exclusive clauses. For starters, they bargain for an exclusive
clause that prohibits much more than another supermarket. They seek to
prohibit the sale of food and beverages for off-premises consumption by
any other tenant of the shopping center. A restriction against the sale of
food or beverages for off-premises consumption is very nice for the
supermarket tenant, but it is a bitter pill for the landlord and the other
tenants to swallow. It is such a bitter pill that a landlord who agrees to
such a restriction without extensive qualifications could cause himself or
herself unnecessary problems.
Aggressive supermarket negotiators are not worried about logical
redundance. To make sure they leave no stone unturned in their effort to
bar direct competitors from the shopping center, supermarket tenants
want to specifically prohibit a second supermarket from the shopping
center. Similarly, many supermarket negotiators ask their landlords to
specifically promise that no other part of the shopping center will be
used as a grocery store, bakery, delicatessen, or butcher shop. They want
specific restrictions against a grocery store, bakery, delicatessen, butcher
shop, and second supermarket, despite the obvious fact that a restriction
against the sale of food and beverages for off-premises consumption by
any other tenant clearly bars a grocery store, bakery, delicatessen,
716
butcher shop, and second supermarket from the shopping center.
1716. See infra Part V.B.
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Prohibiting any other tenant from selling food for off-premises
consumption is as broad a restriction against food market competition as
you can conceive.
2. Restating the General Principle to Accommodate Restaurants,
Luncheonettes, and Snack Bars
Landlords who accept the general principle that no store of the
shopping center except for the supermarket will have the right to sell
food or beverages for off-premises consumption face many problems.
One problem that comes to mind immediately concerns the phrase,
for off-premises consumption. Although a benign intent underlies the
phrase, it is vague and potentially dangerous. Its goal is to distinguish
the food and beverages served by luncheonettes, snack bars, and
restaurants from the food and beverages sold by supermarkets, grocery
stores, and similar establishments. Does it achieve its goal? Does it
cause any mischief?
Here is the difficulty. A literal interpretation of the language, for
off-premises consumption, could cause unintended problems. When a
snack bar sells a hamburger, its management does not expect the
customer to eat the hamburger in the snack bar premises. A snack bar
hamburger is as likely to be eaten off the snack bar premises as on the
snack bar premises. Snack bar premises have room to take customer
orders, but they tend to have little or no room for customers to eat and
lounge after the orders are filled. Consequently, a considerable
proportion of food sold by snack bars is sold for off-premises
consumption. Luncheonettes, fast food operations and restaurants could
also be stymied by a restriction against the sale of food for off-premises
consumption. Although they serve meals in the expectation that the
customer will eat it at a table or a counter in the store, what's to stop the
customer from taking the meal and eating it somewhere else? When a
customer buys a meal at a luncheonette, fast food operation or restaurant
and eats it in the shopping center common area or at home, the
consumption is taking place off-premises. Department stores and variety
stores with internal snack bars, luncheonettes, and restaurants could
cause a similar problem. If the supermarket lease exclusive clause
requires the landlord to prohibit department stores, variety stores, snack
bars, luncheonettes, fast food operations, and restaurants from selling
food and beverages for off-premises consumption, any sale for offpremises consumption could cause a landlord default with respect to the
supermarket lease. All of that is unintended and makes no sense.
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When confronted with a proposed supermarket lease restrictive
covenant stating that all tenants but the supermarket are prohibited from
selling food or beverages for off-premises consumption, landlord
negotiators should propose that the language be restated to avoid
potential harassment of snack bars, luncheonettes, department store and
variety store luncheonette operations, and restaurant operators. As a first
step, landlords should ask that the restriction against the sale of food for
off-premises consumption be reworded. The new language would ban the
sale of food or beverages that are not intended to be consumed at the
shopping center instead of banning the sale of food and beverages for
off-premises consumption. The restated clause would be an improvement
because a restaurant customer's decision to eat the food purchased at the
restaurant in the common area probably would not result in a technical
default under the supermarket's exclusive clause.
Nevertheless, if applied literally, a supermarket's restriction against
food and beverage sales intended to be consumed away from the
shopping center would still inhibit the sale of prepared takeout food by a
snack bar, luncheonette, or fast-food operation. Even tablecloth
restaurants have takeout food operations. Although fast food restaurants
are primarily concerned with feeding customers on premises, they will
not yield the takeout trade-at least not voluntarily.
Although supermarket food sales are not now and never were
threatened by fast food restaurants, some supermarkets have tried to
limit the number and size of fast food restaurants for reasons that have
nothing to do with fear of competition. Some 'early hamburger
restaurants did not provide customers with tables and chairs. Customers
ate in their vehicles then. Supermarket executives who remembered the
early fast food restaurant days continued for a long time afterward to
worry about restaurant patrons' vehicles occupying valuable space in the
shopping center parking lot. They are still concerned that fast food
customers make parking tighter and the parking lot dirtier than it would
be otherwise.
Supermarket executives' fears of other tenants' sales of prepared
foods for off-premises consumption have varied considerably over the
years. In my experience, they acceded to landlord requests for an
exception for prepared food more often than they did not. When the
subject was hotly negotiated, it was usually because the supermarket had
dreams of competing for the prepared food dollar.
How can lease negotiators draft a supermarket exclusive clause that
permits snack bars, luncheonettes, fast food operations and restaurants to
conduct operations in the ordinary course of business without an
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unintended violation of a supermarket exclusive clause that forbids
cotenants from selling food for off-premise consumption? They should
concentrate on the factors that really distinguish snack bar, luncheonette,
fast food operations and restaurant food and beverages from supermarket
food and beverages.
These factors distinguish snack bar, luncheonette, and restaurant
food and beverages from supermarket food and beverages:
Luncheonette and restaurant food and beverages are usually
consumed on premises. The most obvious exceptions are takeout food
and beverages. Other exceptions are food and beverages purchased for
consumption in the common area. Food and beverage patrons of
shopping center snack bars and fast food operations located in enclosed
malls frequently purchase their goodies with an intent to consume them
in a food court or the shopping center's common area. There are
probably a few more exceptions.
Snack bar, luncheonette, fast food operations, and restaurant food
and beverages are usually prepared, processed or packaged on premises.
Except for supermarket delicatessen, butcher, and bakery departments,
supermarket food and beverages usually are not.
Food and beverages sold by snack bars, luncheonettes and
restaurants are usually sold in small portions that are intended to be
consumed on the day of sale. A snack bar, luncheonette, fast-food
operator or restaurateur normally sells beverages in large or small paper
or plastic cups. The beverages are dispensed into the cups at the store.
Canned and bottled beverages sold in snack bars, luncheonettes and
restaurants are usually refrigerated. The bottles and cans are usually
opened by the seller at the point of sale.
The next step for the landlord is to convince the supermarket
negotiator to provide that snack bars, luncheonettes and restaurants will
have the right to sell food and beverages intended to be consumed away
from the shopping center rather than food for off-premises consumption.
They should also have the right to sell food and beverages that are
prepared,processed,packaged or repackaged on premises. They should
have the right to sell beverages in large or small paper or plastic cups.
They should also have the right to sell canned, boxed, and bottled
beverages that are refrigerated and opened.
Almost all supermarket negotiators with whom I have dealt
understood the problem and agreed to restate the restriction. I thanked
them sincerely and was duly grateful.
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3. Beverage Sales Issues
Beverage sales can be big tickets to profit. Getting the exclusive
right to sell beverages in any well-attended place is like winning a
lottery.
In the shopping center context, beverage sales have never been
completely in the supermarket orbit. They are and have always been sold
in many parts of shopping centers. Snack bars, luncheonettes, and
restaurants are only three of many examples. Theaters make good money
from their food and drink concessions, and vending machines can be
found in so many places.
Supermarkets do not direct their attention to thirsty people who
want to satisfy their cravings right away. So they usually do not regard
any of these establishments as direct competitors. A landlord can resolve
a potential conflict between a supermarket exclusive clause restriction
against the sale of beverages for off-premises consumption and
anticipated snack bar, luncheonette, restaurant, and theater use clauses
that would permit these tenants to sell beverages. The potential conflict
can be resolved partly by restating the proposed restriction so that it
prohibits the sale of beverages intended to be consumed away from the
shopping center instead. Many shopping center tenants (other than snack
bars, luncheonettes, restaurants, and theaters) will not object to a
restrictive covenant against the sale of beverages intended to be
consumed awayfrom the shopping center.
However, the landlord's dilemma as to potential lease conflicts
with respect to beverage sales by such cotenants as general merchandise
stores, drugstores, and liquor stores cannot be resolved completely or
even principally by merely restating the general principle that all other
tenants are barred from selling beverages intended to be consumed away
from the shopping center. Department stores, variety stores, drugstores,
liquor stores, and specialty food stores all sell beverages intended to be
consumed away from the shopping center. Although supermarket
negotiators are fully aware of these sales and have tolerated them over
the years, many supermarket form lease exclusive clauses still prohibit
them. If a landlord wants the supermarket's exclusive clause to be
realistic and reflect the conditions a supermarket normally encounters in
a community-type or neighborhood-type shopping center, he or she must
negotiate for additional exceptions to the general principle of
the restriction.
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a. Exceptions for the Sale of Alcoholic Beverages
The sale of alcoholic beverages might be one of the specific
exceptions. Liquor stores would be completely barred by a supermarket
beverage exclusive clause. They do not offer much for sale other than
beverages, albeit alcoholic beverages. Department store and drugstore
wine and whiskey sales would be barred as well. A restriction against
the sale of beverages for off-premises consumption would also apply to
beer sales by department stores, variety stores, drugstores, and health
and beauty aid stores.
Although most supermarket tenants have acceded to my requests
for an alcoholic beverage exception, some have insisted on an exception
to the exception. Liquor stores are not normally into beer sales, and beer
is an important supermarket item. These supermarket tenants argue that
their interest in a beer exclusive clause should prevail over the small
possibility that a liquor store operator will even ask for the right to sell
beer in a subsequent negotiation. On the other hand, some department
stores and other general merchandise type stores such as variety stores,
drugstores, and health and beauty aid stores, insist on the right to sell
beer. That right is, of course, incompatible with a supermarket's
exclusive right to sell beer. The most important influence on use clause
negotiations concerning the sale of alcoholic beverages is the applicable
liquor law. Chain store lease negotiators seldom waste much time and
energy trying to prohibit other tenants from selling merchandise their
employer is barred from selling pursuant to statutory law or case law.
b. Exceptions for the Sale of Nonalcoholic Beverages
Negotiations relating to exceptions to restrictions against the sale of
nonalcoholic beverages intended to be consumed away from the
shopping center revolve around the same ideas as negotiations relating
to exceptions to restrictions against the sale of food intended to be
consumed away from the shopping center. It is best to deal with most
food and nonalcoholic beverage problems at the same time.
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4. Specific Restrictions Against Food and Beverage Sales by
General Merchandise Cotenants
a. Department Store, Variety Store, and Drug Store Food
and Beverage Sales
Supermarket policy on food sales by cotenant department stores
and variety stores has varied from chain to chain and from era to era.
Some supermarket companies have always been delighted to have the
company of department stores and variety stores and have always been
content to live with their cotenant's promise not to have a food
supermarket department in the store. Other food chains have historically
bargained strenuously for a covenant prohibiting department stores,
variety stores (and all other tenants) from selling food and beverages for
off-premises consumption.
Landlord, department store, and variety store negotiators usually
find it easy to cope with a supermarket restrictive covenant that prohibits
the department store and variety store from containing a food
supermarket department and that goes no further. Most (but not all)
shopping center department stores have had little interest in competing
with supermarket food sales, and, over the years, their negotiators have
accepted restrictions against supermarket departments with little fuss. A
covenant against operating a food supermarket department says nothing
about selling individual food items. It merely forbids afood supennarket
departmentwithin the department store and variety store.
On the other hand, a shopping center landlord cannot be sure that
all department stores will agree not to include supermarket departments
in their stores. Some department stores had massive food departments
even in the nineteenth century and long before the first supermarket
opened for business.171 7 Many discount department store chains had food
departments as early as the 1950s.17"8 Two Guys from Harrison, an early
discount department store chain, incorporated a food department in its
stores in the 1950s and 1960s.17 19 Its food department was as large as
most supermarkets of that era.'72 Two Guys' competitor, E.J. Korvette,
which claimed to be the first discount department store chain,'72' also
included vigorously competitive food departments in its department

1717. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 72.
1718. See MAHONEY & SLOANE, supra note 228, at 357.
1719. See iL at 355-56.
1720. See CHARVAT, supranote 130, at 73-74.
1721. See MAHONEY & SLOANE, supra note 228, at 362.
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stores before it passed from this world into retailers' heaven.'7m Some
contemporary discount department store chains, notably Wal-Mart and
Kmart, have no qualms about competing with supermarket food sales.
When they are willing to accede to restrictions against operating a
supermarket department, department store and variety store negotiators
need to clarify or amend this restriction to make sure that it will not
prevent them from opening a gourmet food department. Department
store gourmet food departments usually specialize in high-priced food
items not usually emphasized by supermarkets. Over the years, it has not
been difficult to convince a supermarket chain that its restrictive
covenant against food sales in other stores should provide for an
exception permitting a gourmet food department in a department store,
variety store, and drugstore.
A supermarket lease negotiation becomes a much more complicated
task when the supermarket negotiators demand a stringent broad-based
restriction against the sale of food and beverages for off-premises
consumption (or away from the shopping center). Unlike a restriction
against the operation of a food supermarket department, a supermarket
proposal to prohibit all other tenants from selling food and beverages for
off-premises consumption (or away from the shopping center) forces the
landlord, department store, variety store, drugstore, and shop space lease
negotiators to proceed with exceptional care. Department stores and
other general merchandise stores do sell products (like candy, pretzels,
popcorn, and cake) that most people perceive as food. 7 13 The stuff might
not contain any nutrition, but it is deemed food by industry usage.
When supermarkets occupied much smaller storerooms than they
currently occupy, use and exclusive clauses of general merchandise store
and supermarket leases were often reconciled by prohibiting each of
them from selling the others' principal merchandise categories except
from a small part of its floor area. Accordingly, in that era, some
supermarkets prohibited general merchandise store sales of food
intended to be consumed away from the shopping center. An exception
to this restriction allowed general merchandise stores to sell most food
categories from an area that ranged between 3000 square feet and 10%
of the floor area of the general merchandise store. Conversely, some
general merchandise stores prohibited the supermarket from selling
general merchandise items not defined by the lease as typical
supermarket items. An exception to this restriction allowed the

1722.
1723.

See id.
See MAYO, supranote 53, at 72.
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supermarket to sell items not defined by the lease as typical supermarket
items from an area that might range between 3000 square feet of floor
area to 10% of the floor area of the supermarket.
As a general principle, this solution was good, but it needed fine
tuning. Supermarket people believed that a general merchandise store's
use of as little as 10% of its floor area for the sale of food could be
dangerous competition. Consequently, when the supermarket and
general merchandise store reconciled their differences by providing a
restriction-free island within the stores, the supermarket wanted an
additional restriction. They insisted on an additional restriction against
the sale of specific food products.
To find common ground with supermarket people who proposed
exclusive clauses that, as a general principle, barred any store but the
supermarket from selling food and beverages for off-premises
consumption, some landlords would propose that the restriction be
narrowed or made more specific. Supermarket negotiators usually
agreed to mollify the restriction by narrowing it to allow department
stores, variety stores, drugstores, and shop space stores to sell many food
items. To this end, except for supermarkets that had puny bargaining
power or an inadequate understanding of shopping center lease
negotiations, supermarkets would not allow other tenants to sell fresh
and frozen meat, fish, poultry and crustaceans; fresh and frozen fruit and
vegetables; or dairy products. Other specific classes of food frequently
denied to department stores, variety stores, and other general
merchandise stores by supermarket lease exclusive clauses have
included smoked meat; frozen dinners; some kinds of frozen desserts;
some kinds of pet food; and canned soup, fruit, vegetables, and hams. I
have had success in proposing a compromise that limited the general
merchandise store canned food sales to imported gourmet lines of
canned soup, fruit, vegetables, and hams, but many general merchandise
stores found that too restrictive. Variety stores have not always been
willing to agree to a restriction against the sale of canned food. Major
food categories that have provoked the most difficult negotiations
among landlords, supermarkets, department stores and variety stores
include frozen desserts, dairy products, canned soup, canned fruit and
vegetables, imported smoked meat and fish, canned hams; and pet food.
Let's take a closer look at pet food. Supermarkets are very
defensive about their ability to sell cat and dog food. 172 Nevertheless,

1724. Some contend it is more nutritious than some processed food products intended for human
consumption, but that is another story.
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some department store and variety store chains want a share of this
market. Although cat and dog food are more appropriately regarded as
supermarket items, some supermarket executives have tolerated a
department store, variety store, and drugstore right to sell dog and cat
food, at least to a limited extent. In my experience, supermarkets have
not been as concerned about bird food and other kinds of pet food sales.
The supermarket, department store, variety store, and drugstore might all
end up with the unlimited right to sell bird food and other types of pet
food.
A supermarket's insistence that general merchandise stores refrain
from selling milk or dairy products should be negotiated. Few
department stores, variety stores, or drugstores seriously intend to get
involved in milk sales. However, if a department store, variety store, or
drugstore agrees not to sell any dairyproducts, it may ultimately regret
the decision. Department stores and variety stores sell many inedible
products of which one ingredient or another is derived from milk. A
landlord negotiator should propose a substitute clause that would
achieve the supermarket's main goal with respect to dairy products
without subjecting the department store and variety store to a mindlessly
harsh restriction. The substitute restriction would bar the sale of specific
classes of dairy products. The list should include sweet and sour cream,
sweet and sour cream substitutes, yogurt, cheese spreads, margarine, and
butter.
Cheese should also be restricted but not completely. Many
department stores sell cheese from their gourmet food departments, and
they should not be required to relinquish that right. Supermarket
executives with whom I have negotiated have agreed to limit the cheese
restriction, insofar as it applies to the department store, to brand-named
cheese produced by food processing companies in the United States.
However, department store gourmet food departments should be entirely
exempt from that restriction.
Frozen desserts should also be restricted but not completely. Frozen
dessert sales can be a contentious issue in supermarket exclusive clause
negotiations. Do not describe these items as ice cream. Frozen desserts
include frozen yogurt, frozen juice bars, ice milk, sherbet, ices, frozen
cream pies, frozen fruit compote, and many other treats. Over the years,
most department stores and variety stores have had little interest in the
right to carry frozen cream pies and frozen fruit compote. However,
department stores and variety stores have been reluctant to yield the
right to sell ice cream, frozen yogurt, ice milk, sherbet and ices.
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b. More on Drugstore Store Food and Beverage Sales
Here's more on drugstore store food and beverage sales. I discuss
drugstore issues as part of my discussion of general merchandise stores.
Drugstores have a split personality. A great many contemporary
drugstores function partly as general merchandise stores and partly as
specialized stores with a very heavy concentration on health and beauty
related categories. 7' With the decline of variety stores over the last
twenty years, the drugstore general merchandise role has expanded to
assume the variety store function. This section focuses on the drugstore
in its more traditional role of specialized store with some general
merchandise functions.
Traditional drugstores and health and beauty aid stores loved being
near supermarkets for about three decades after World War II ended. In
that era, many drugstore operators would press landlords for the store
right next to the supermarket. Few supermarkets sold prescription drugs,
supermarket health and beauty aid shelves were much thinner than
drugstore health and beauty aid shelves, and drugstore food sales were
much thinner than they are now.
I am not suggesting that supermarkets first started selling
prescription drugs only recently or that supermarket health and beauty
aid shelves first appeared after World War II. Supermarkets were selling
prescription drugs as early as 1937.726 Although many decades passed
before prescription drug departments were routinely incorporated in
supermarkets, the Big Bear supermarket in Elizabeth, New Jersey that
opened for business in 1932 had a health and beauty aid department. 727
A 1937 survey indicated that 20% of the supermarkets that participated
in the survey had drug departments, and 25% had cosmetics
departments.' 7 Supermarket interest in health and beauty aid sales
increased after World War II.1729
Moreover, I am not suggesting that drugstore food sales are a recent
phenomenon. Drugstores have been selling many products that were not
related to health care for years."'7 Although the traditional pharmacist
considered himself a professional, he realized that he could not really fill
all of his time or space by preparing and selling prescription drugs and

1725.
1726.
1727.
1728.
1729.
1730.

See LONGSTREH, supranote 60, at 164-65.
See ZI msRmANmv, supra note 14, at 120-21.
See id.
See id. at 127.
See id. at 150.
See LONGSTRETH, supranote 60, at 164-65.
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performing other pharmaceutical duties.' 73' The Elias Durand pharmacy
that opened for business in Philadelphia in 1825 is an example.' 73 This
was the first pharmacy in America to include a soda fountain.7 3 With an
ever-careful eye on the dollar, the pharmacist came to stock anything he
could sell to customers itching to kill time as they waited for
prescriptions to be filled.
Now, we live in the age of the super supermarket and the super
drugstore. Supermarkets are larger than ever, and super drugstores are
much larger than ever. Contemporary supermarkets tend to sell
prescription drugs and health and beauty aids-big time; and super
drugstores sell food-plenty of food. What used to be a very compatible
marriage of convenience has become an intense rivalry.
How does a supermarket landlord reconcile supermarket and super
drugstore use and exclusive clauses these days? Not easily, and maybe
not at all. Contemporary supermarket and super drugstore use and
exclusive clause concepts are so divergent that even a Nobel Prize
winner may lack the wisdom to propose an acceptable compromise.
Nevertheless, compromise is still a possibility. A supermarket or a super
drugstore will find a way to compromise these issues when they are
presented with a desirable location they know they cannot have without
compromise. They will buy leaseholds subject to severe restrictions to
add a desirable location. They will bid for leaseholds in the bankruptcy
court and accept dismal lease restrictions to add a desirable location.
They will even negotiate with each other when they want a location and
discover they cannot get everything they want in the lease negotiation.
They might even be reasonable.
I cannot provide precise guidelines for proposed compromises
between aggressive supermarkets and aggressive super drugstores.
However, they should have no trouble living and thriving together in the
same shopping center without massive changes in standard operations.
These days, supermarket negotiators will not agree to a restriction
against a prescription drug department, and drugstore negotiators will
not agree to traditional restrictions against the sale of food. However, a
supermarket might be willing to tolerate a drugstore's food sales if the
food department occupies less than 15% of the drugstore's floor area; if
the drugstore agrees not to sell fresh meat, fish, poultry, crustaceans,
fruit, and vegetables; and if the drugstore agrees to limit the sale of
frozen meat, fish, poultry, crustaceans, fruit, and vegetables.
1731. See MAHONEY & SLOANE, supra note 228, at 343.
1732. See id.
1733. See id.
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One alternative remains for a shopping center landlord. He or she
could skip the big super drugstore chains and try to interest a less
aggressive traditional drugstore operator in leasing space in the center.
Not all contemporary drugstores are huge and aggressive. Unrestricted
rights to sell food are not essential to all drugstore operators. If a
community-type and neighborhood-type shopping center landlord has
the opportunity to lease storerooms to both a supermarket chain and a
less aggressive traditional drugstore operator, he or she might get the job
done by distinguishing between food items carried in traditional
drugstores before the ascent of the super drugstore from their
counterparts in supermarkets.
Here is a list of some of the food items carried by traditional
drugstores before the ascent of the super drugstore:
-Baby food.
-Diet food.
-Confection type food.
-Jam and jelly.
-Frozen desserts.
-- Cookies.
-Other food loss leaders.
Prepackaged baby food was a staple item for traditional drugstores.
Many shoppers prefer buying baby food in a drugstore. It is a
convenience product with reasonable shelf-life and does not require
refrigeration facilities.
Diet food has the aroma of both health and beauty. Health and
beauty have been the underlying themes of traditional drugstore
merchandising. Traditional drugstores have considered diet food to be a
natural part of their merchandise mix.
Traditional drugstores have sold confection-type food including
candy, nuts, potato chips and pretzels. Drugstore confections have been
different from the confections sold in department stores and variety
stores but not entirely different from supermarket confection offerings.
Like supermarkets, traditional drugstores have usually had a shelf
section stocked with economy size packages of popularly-priced
chocolate bars, Lifesavers, chewing gum, and other types of cheap
confections. Unlike most supermarkets, some traditional drugstores have
carried a small selection of modestly priced boxed chocolates.
Jam and jelly have been sold in some traditional drugstores for
many years. However, over the years, drugstore jam and jelly jars tended
to be larger than the best-selling supermarket jam and jelly jars, and
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drugstore jam and jelly brands have not always been stocked in
supermarkets.
Traditional drugstores have sold cookies too. Supermarkets with
on-site bakeries are likely to try prohibiting all other stores from selling
cake and cookies baked on the premises. However, over the years,
supermarkets usually tolerated traditional drugstore sales of prepackaged
cookies baked off-premises.
B. SupermarketRestrictionsAgainst Specialty Food Stores and
Specialized Food Items
Will a supermarket tenant permit a delicatessen store to do business
in the same shopping center as the supermarket? For that matter, how do
supermarkets react to bakeries, butcher shops, fish stores, and
greengrocers as cotenants? They are not happy about any of them.
However, fair is fair, and the shopping center will probably never be
built in the first place unless the developer is able to find shop space
tenants. To make a shopping center work financially, somebody's got to
pay big rent; the department stores and supermarkets do not. The
department stores and supermarkets have the bargaining clout to avoid
volunteering for this chore, but they do not have enough clout to prohibit
landlords from leasing space to all shop space cotenants.
The supermarket's attitude as to cotenancies depends a great deal
on the size of the shopping center. If the supermarket is the anchor
tenant of a neighborhood-type shopping center, it will probably insist
that the developer live without a delicatessen, a bakery, etc. If the
shopping center is of the community-type and it has department store
and drugstore neighbors, the supermarket's attitude toward specialized
food shops might soften.
The supermarket's attitude as to cotenancies also depends a great
deal on the size of the cotenants' storerooms. A landlord might need to
plead for relief from a supermarket food and beverage restriction with
hat in hand to accommodate a shop space tenant's needs. He or she
should be willing to reassure the supermarket tenant that each cotenant
allowed to sell food and beverages for consumption away from the
shopping center will be appropriately small (try 2000 or 3000 square feet
of floor area) and that it will not step on the supermarket's tail with a
heavy concentration of high markup food products or volume building
food products the supermarket sells or might want to sell.
Assuming that a supermarket tenant is willing to accept specialized
food cotenants in the shopping center, here are some reactions a landlord
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might get from a supermarket tenant when he tries to reconcile the
supermarket's exclusive clause with the specialized food store's use
clause:
1. Delicatessens
Supermarkets do not regard delicatessens as good company these
days. Delicatessen departments are highly prized by supermarkets, and
most modem supermarkets will not willingly permit competition for this
market segment. Nonetheless, the label, delicatessen, applies to more
than one type of retail unit. The types are materially different from each
other, and the differences are significant to supermarket negotiators.
Some delicatessens more closely resemble restaurants than stores.
Although they do sell food intended to be consumed away from the
shopping center, they concentrate on customers who eat on premises.
Although the delicatessen might also sell canned food, fresh fruit and
vegetables and other food items, these sales are not terribly significant.
Consequently, supermarket people tend to tolerate them.
However, supermarket people are much less tolerant of
delicatessens that concentrate on products intended to be consumed
away from the premises. In the supermarket psyche, that is the culprit.
Under some circumstances, supermarket chains are even willing to
live with a delicatessen that concentrates on products intended to be
consumed away from the premises. If a supermarket chain believes its
store will have a low marginal appeal to a particular ethnic group, it may
permit an ethnic type delicatessen to be a cotenant. So, where the
supermarket tenant is convinced that it does not have many Jewish,
Italian, German, or Polish customers, it might not object to a Jewish,
Italian, German, or Polish delicatessen store. Permitting an ethnic deli
could bring these people to the shopping center where the supermarket
will have a chance to attract them.
2. Bakeries
Many supermarket chain form leases bar a bakery from any other
part of the shopping center. Some supermarket leases specifically forbid
the landlord from leasing any premises other than the supermarket for
use as a bakery. Other supermarket leases do not specifically prohibit a
bakery but contain broad-based restrictions, like restrictions against the
sale of food and beverages intended to be consumed away from the
shopping center, that would exclude a bakery anyway. These restrictions
are usually aimed at retail bakeries that bake bread or cake on the
premises.
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Doughnut shops are bakeshops, and a great many of them bake on
premises. They could easily be barred by a bakery prohibition. On the
other hand, doughnut shops do not really present a threat to
supermarkets even when the doughnuts, muffins, and other highly
caloric delicacies are baked on premises. The landlord should be astute
enough to propose that a doughnut shop be exempt from the restriction
against a bakery and the restriction against the sale of food intended to
be consumed away from the shopping center. The tendency of doughnut
shops to carry milk has aroused the ire of supermarket tenants over the
years, but most doughnut shops sell milk routinely and will not execute a
lease that forbids the sale of milk. Consequently, landlords should
propose that the supermarket tenant permit the doughnut shop tenant to
carry one or two freezer cases of milk and other dairy products but no
more.
Bagel stores are also specialty bakeries. A bagel store sells, and
usually bakes, the traditional Eastern European Jewish doughnut-shaped
morsel. Does the bagel store provide fearsome competition to the
supermarket? Probably not. Most supermarket executives will be
tolerant of a bagel store as long as it sticks to selling bagels. However,
they do not all stick to selling bagels, and many bagel stores find room
for milk and other dairy products. Milk and dairy product sales by bagel
stores are no different from such sales by other bakeries. The
supermarket will not suffer as long as the space allocated to milk and
other dairy products is strictly limited. Accordingly, landlords should
propose that the supermarket's restriction be amended to permit a freezer
case or two of dairy products in the bagel store.
A pizza parlor might be perceived as a bakery also, and some
restaurants bake bread and cake on premises. Landlords should make
sure that pizza parlors and restaurants are excluded from bakery
restrictions in supermarket leases.
3. Butcher Shops
Butcher shops are also very unpopular as potential supermarket
neighbors in community-type and neighborhood-type shopping centers.
Contemporary supermarket lease forms tend to prohibit the sale of fresh
or frozen meat in any part of the shopping center other than the
supermarket and specifically bar a butcher shop from the shopping
center. It is not an easy task to modify or delete this restriction.
Supermarket lease negotiators tend to strenuously resist landlord efforts
to delete or modify the restriction.
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Nevertheless, some supermarket chains wil allow the landlord to
lease space to a small ethnic type butcher shop. Kosher, Italian, and
German butchers are examples. Naturally, a supermarket will do this
only if it believes that it has a remote chance of attracting customers
from the applicable ethnic group to its meat department.
4. Fish Stores
A landlord should be able to negotiate an exemption to a
supermarket restriction against the sale of food for off-premises
consumption for a fish store. However, he or she might not be able to
find a fish store tenant to take advantage of the exemption. We do not
see many fish stores in shopping centers nowadays. Their absence is not
primarily caused by supermarket intransigence, but by a general scarcity
of prospective tenants.
5. Appetizing Stores
Few landlord lease negotiators need worry about providing for an
appetizing store exemption from the supermarket restrictive covenant.
You just do not see many of them anymore. A large part of their
traditional market has been usurped by kosher-style delicatessen stores.
Nevertheless, you will find old supermarket lease clauses providing that
appetizing stores are immune from a supermarket exclusive. Old clauses
make new lawyers very happy, and sometimes (all too often) they get
copied word for word. So, I would not be surprised to see an appetizing
store restriction in a new lease drafted by a lawyer who never saw or
heard of one and who has not the slightest idea of what an appetizing
store might be.
As a former employee of one such store (situated at the comer of
Archer Street and White Plains Road in the Bronx), I feel that it is my
duty to tell you about it (whether you thirst for this knowledge or not).
Appetizing stores specialized in distinctly Eastern European Jewish type
of fish, salads and other food. They featured smoked fish, especially
smoked salmon products such as lox and Nova Scotia. Their stock was
full of loose candy, dried fruit, potato salad, and cole slaw. Cheese was a
big seller. Traditional appetizing stores carried no meat or meat
products; that is what distinguished them from kosher delicatessens.
Traditional kosher delicatessens specialized in smoked meat and
sausages, paid little attention to fish, and carried no dairy products
whatsoever.
If the supermarket does not expect to attract many Jewish
customers, it might permit a shopping center to have an appetizing store.
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However, this issue is likely to surface these days only in the
Metropolitan New York area and southern Florida.
6. Cheese and Smoked Meat Stores
Can a supermarket successfully bar a fancy cheese and smoked
meat specialty store? The supermarket will probably try, and many
factors will influence its chance of success.
The principal factor is whether the shopping center in question is a
regional-type, community-type, or neighborhood-type shopping
center.7m As I have indicated above, supermarkets usually favor
community-type or neighborhood-type shopping centers. Conversely,
fancy cheese and smoked meat stores seldom have any interest in
locating in a community-type or neighborhood-type shopping center.
They prefer enclosed mall shopping centers, and very few communitytype or neighborhood-type sfiopping centers have enclosed malls. Thus,
conflicts between supermarket exclusive clauses and a fancy cheese and
smoked meat store use clauses do not often occur.
Of course, enclosed mall shopping centers come in many different
varieties, and some of them do include a supermarket. Supermarkets are
anchor tenants of some smaller enclosed malls. When the supermarket is
a mall anchor, it has considerable bargaining power. In the unlikely
event that a fancy cheese and smoked meat store wants to locate in that
kind of mall, it might be frustrated entirely by the supermarket lease
exclusive clause.
As enclosed mall shopping centers get larger and more upscale, the
interest of their landlords in a supermarket tenancy gets smaller.
Regional shopping center landlords do not want a supermarket in the
enclosed mall. Shopping carts clash with the luxurious ambience most
enclosed mall landlords try to project, and the mere sight of shopping
carts in the mall would convince some shoppers to buy their designer
jeans and overpriced party dresses elsewhere. Consequently, when a
regional enclosed mall shopping center is willing to lease space to a
supermarket, the supermarket is often tucked away in a location
separated from the enclosed mall and completely independent of the
mall. The fancy cheese and smoked meat store, on the other hand, would
more likely be in the enclosed mall area where the department stores are
located. In this situation, the landlord will probably have enough

1734. See supra Part I.B (analyzing the relationship
supermarkets).
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bargaining power to ignore a supermarket demand that the specialty
store be excluded.
7. Gourmet Food Stores
Independent gourmet food shops are almost universally detested by
supermarket negotiators, and they tend to try to exclude these kinds of
specialty stores from shopping center cotenancies.
However, landlords seldom worry about conflicts between gourmet
food store use clauses and shopping center exclusive clauses. These
birds seldom nest in the same place. Gourmet food shops target highincome people and want to draw customers from very large geographical
markets. Regional enclosed malls are usually the best kind of shopping
center to satisfy their criteria. Conversely, regional enclosed mall
shopping centers are not favored by supermarket tenants, and
supermarket tenants are not favored by regional shopping center
landlords.
Potential conflicts between supermarkets and gourmet food stores
do not happen very often. Here and there, you will find an upscale
community-type shopping center anchored or coanchored by a
supermarket. A community-type shopping center might attract a gourmet
food shop if it caters to upper-income-bracket customers and attracts
other upscale shops. When this situation occurs, the landlord should try
to get the supermarket to soften its food restriction to permit the gourmet
food store. In turn, the supermarket might bargain for assurances that
would limit the size of the gourmet food store and prohibit the gourmet
food store from carrying supermarket-type grades of meat and fish.
8. Ice Cream Stores
Ice cream stores favor all kinds of shopping centers including
community-type and neighborhood-type shopping centers.
Although supermarkets and ice cream stores are frequent cotenants,
the popular broad based restrictive covenants found in supermarket
chain form leases would be violated by the presence of an ice cream
store. Ice cream and other frozen desserts sold in ice cream stores are
food, and they are sold for off-premises consumption as well as onpremises consumption.
Obviously, landlords have not had a hard time convincing
supermarket negotiators to mollify their form lease use restriction to
adapt its lease form to the landlord's need for a small ice cream store
lease.
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The key to reconciling a supermarket exclusive clause with an ice
cream store use clause is to exploit the difference between the frozen
desserts sold in ice cream stores and the frozen desserts sold in
supermarkets. Ice cream stores cater principally to the shopper who
prefers to eat ice cream at the shopping center, while the supermarket
caters primarily to the shopper who prefers to take the dessert home in
large packages. Of course, ice cream stores sell for off-premises
consumption too, but their take-home desserts tend not to be
prepackaged items. Take-home desserts purchased from an ice cream
store tend to be scooped and packaged at the point of sale.
9. Candy Stores
Regardless of your mother's opinions and nutritional science, candy
is food in the eyes of supermarket executives. They can be excessively
contentious in trying to prevent anyone from selling candy or any other
edible (or allegedly edible) substance in the shopping center. Landlords
confronted by contentious supermarket executives can find themselves
without a candy store altogether or with a limit on the size and number
of candy stores. Fortunately, the clash seldom occurs because of the
candy store's proclivity for regional shopping centers and the
supermarket's proclivity for community-type and neighborhood-type
shopping centers.
10. Stationery Stores
Stationery stores are also candy merchants.
If that is the case, why not call the store a candy store? Earlier
generations did call them candy stores. The contemporary shopping
center stationery store is not very different from the urban comer candy
store of an earlier day. Its merchandise mix is closer to the earlier day
urban candy store than it is to the earlier day urban stationery store.
Shopping center stationery stores usually include a counter or rack
featuring cheap candy, chewing gum, and cough drops. They also carry
boxed chocolates, frozen desserts and (sometimes) milk. Like earlier day
urban candy stores, some shopping center stationery stores provide
dessert and soft drink counter service.
A stationery store tenant is a valuable element of a community-type
or neighborhood-type shopping center's tenant mix. These stores tend to
be small, family-owned businesses, bind themselves to healthy (for the
landlord) rental rates, and are staffed (at least in part) by their owners.
However, if the shopping center is to have a stationery store, the
landlord must cope with the supermarket's basic premise that it should
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have the exclusive right to sell food and beverages in the shopping
center. The landlord's obvious need is an exemption for the sales of food
and beverages in a stationery store. Supermarket executives are usually
inclined not to resist stationery store cotenancies but try to impose
reasonable limits on the size of the store and its product mix. The
landlord should be able to gain a supermarket negotiator's confidence by
agreeing to limit the size and number of stationery stores. In most cases,
one stationery store is enough, and its floor area need not exceed 2000 or
3000 square feet.73 5 The supermarket people also like to see language
that prohibits the concentrated sale of high markup food products or
volume building food products the supermarket sells or might want
to sell.
11. Fancy Food and Fancy Fruit Gift Packages
Fancy food and fancy fruit gift packages are additional food items
that should not be banned by the supermarket's restrictive covenant
against the sale of food and beverages intended to be consumed away
from the shopping center. Food gift packages are sold by many shopping
center stores including catalog stores, department stores, gift shops and
gourmet food stores.
12. Mail Order Catalog Items
Speaking of catalog stores, they do sell food items from their
catalogs and usually will not identify specific items in advance. Catalog
store food sales are much too small to concern a supermarket, and
supermarket tenants are usually willing to modify their restriction
against food sales to accommodate the needs of a catalog store. To get
this job done, the drafters need to say no more than this: any item sold
pursuantto a mail order catalogwill be exemptfrom the restriction.
VI. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE?
All of this should discourage supermarket lease negotiators from
mindlessly borrowing use and exclusive clauses from old leases. Old
leases are no more sensible than new leases. Lease negotiators of prior
generations learned no more about supermarket business operations in
law school than contemporary lease negotiators.7 16 Meaningful
supermarket use and exclusive clauses that are appropriate for today's
1735. See HAMPE & WrrrENBERG, supra note 8, at 366.
1736. See supra note 1715 for a discussion of American law schools' customary neglect of
transactional matters.
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retail environment and have a good chance of working well for decades
to come are not likely to be found in law firm archives or form books.
Appropriate and meaningful supermarket use and exclusive clauses
emerge from negotiations among reasonable and knowledgeable
landlord and tenant representatives. They should reflect:
-the customary product line boundaries between supermarkets and
other shopping center tenants;
-the fundamental principles underlying the supermarket business
model devised by Michael Cullen and other supermarket
industry founders such as a low-price policy, a low-cost
structure, large store size, diverse product mix with a heavy
concentration of food and household products, self-service,
cash and carry, availability of parking facilities, and an
efficient merchandise movement system with a grid pattern
layout and shopping carts;
-the impact of the supermarket on the shopping center's
tenant mix;
-the impact of the supermarket on the shopping center's
financeability;
-the impact of the supermarket on the shopping center's
marketability;
-the impact of the shopping center on the supermarket's sales
volume; and
-the shopping center landlord's need to avoid conflicts between
supermarket use clauses and exclusive clauses in cotenant
leases.
All of this should discourage supermarket lease negotiators from
proposing one-sided use and exclusive clauses and bargaining for them
aggressively. The supermarket and shopping center industries grew from
common roots, and they embraced each other early on. 7 Both industries
were founded on the birth and phenomenal growth of motor vehicle
transportation in the twentieth century. 1738 In the twenty-first century,
supermarkets and community-type shopping centers will prosper
together or decline together. Similarly, supermarkets and neighborhoodtype shopping centers will prosper together or disappear together.
Whether they prosper, decline, or disappear in the twenty-first century
depends on many factors neither a food merchant nor a real estate
developer can control. However, food merchants and real estate

1737. See MAYO, supranote 53, at 165-66.
1738. See id. at 115.
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developers can control whether they will cooperate to take advantage of
the symbiotic relationship that provided supermarket operators and real
estate developers enormous profits during the last seventy years.
Cooperation will not insure success, but it will go a long way towards
averting failure.
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